Ethnicity and politics in Bolivia

Abstract

In recent years polarization along ethnic lines has become an important feature of Bolivian politics. In this article we examine the emergence of new indigenous movements in Bolivia and how this was eventually reflected in the adoption of multiculturalist policies by the Bolivian state. However, in an overall context of neoliberal economic policy and a party system that suffered a ‘representation deficit’, such policies may celebrate cultural pluralism while stopping short of addressing issues of the redistribution of power and resources. This provided the context for a series of popular protests in which indigenous people played a prominent role and which eventually carried over into the 2002 general elections. We argue that it remains to be seen if the new presence of indigenous people in Bolivia's political arena points to a constructive incorporation.

Acknowledgements

This article is based on research carried out in the context of the project ‘Indigenous Peoples and Reform of the State in Latin America’, sponsored by the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT), Mexico.

Notes

1. Ecuador is the other country where such a party has become a key player, while in Colombia and Venezuela parties with links to the indigenous movement have also become significant (Van Cott, 2003).

2. The Congress is made up of a Senate (27 seats) and a Chamber of Deputies (130 seats). When the new president was elected, supporters of Manfred Reyes Villa, who ran for the Nueva Fuerza Republicana (New Republican Force, NFR) and had come in third with some hundreds of votes behind Morales, annulled their vote. There were two blank votes and two absentees.

3. For an unauthorized biography of Hugo Banzer, see Sivak (2001).

4. In 1995 a Law on Administrative Decentralization was introduced that basically concerned the Departmental level.

5. The share in total government investment by local governments rose from about 9% in 1994 to about 25% by the end of the 1990s, while the share of central government declined from 65% to 29%.

6. NFR was founded some years earlier by Cochabamba's Mayor Manfred Reyes Villa, who had started his political career as a Banzer protégé (Mayorga, 1997, pp. 129–224).

7. The Water War was important in initiating a protest cycle. Here we discuss the episode very briefly. For more extensive accounts see Assies (2003) and Nickson and Vargas (2002).

8. For an insight into the mindset of Ofensiva Roja see Calla et al. (1989, pp. 298–312).

9. This is very well documented in an excellent analysis by Magdalena Cajías (2001) on which this section relies in good part.

10. Occasionally other indigenous peoples of the lowlands are also mentioned but relations, as we will see, are somewhat tense.

11. By the end of September the number of dead amounted to at least 15 and some 100 people had been wounded.

12. The speech is reproduced in an interview with Felipe Quispe (2001).

13. The Ministry came to be occupied by a candidate indicated by Felipe Quispe, Wigberto Rivero, linked to the MIR. He also received the support of Marcial Fabricano, the controversial leader of the lowland indigenous organization CIDOB, and from the Confederation of Colonists, but not from the Santa Cruz-based indigenous organization CPESC, which, as we shall see, played an important role in the Indigenous and Peasant March for Land, Territory and Natural Resources of June–July 2000. According to Felipe Quispe, he had nominated Wigberto Rivero because no Aymara or Quechua was disposed to take a post in the Banzer government (personal communication, 7 October 2002, Mexico). Relations between highland and lowland indigenous organizations are often tense and Quispe's remark reflects the highlanders' view that the lowlanders are more accommodating.

14. This figure sparked some concern among the lowland indigenous peoples since it corresponded to the figure of 3.8 million hectares in the lowlands which, according to government sources, would be returned to the state as a result of the new agrarian and forestry legislation. It remained unclear where the 3.8 million hectares for the highlanders would come from and how this figure had been reached.

15. Because of problems with registration as a party, the ASP candidates ran for the nearly extinct Izquierda Unida.

16. For a discussion of policy development, see Laserna (1997; 1998) and Gamarra (1999).

17. Neither has it ever been able to substantiate Morales's alleged links to the cocaine mafia (Albó, forthcoming).

18. The Sacaba market is rather insignificant in comparison to the La Paz market, but it is an important outlet for a few tons of legal leaves produced by the Chapare peasantry. Because of the eradication policies the quantity of leaves sold was reduced by 90% and turnover dropped from around Bs 20 000 000 in 1997 to Bs 6 000 000 in 2001 (Bs = Bolivianos).

19. For suggestive analyses on the interlinking of geopolitical and other interests and the motives behind ‘development assistance’ and the ‘war on drugs’, see Duffield (2001) and Joyce (1999).

20. The First March had taken place in 1990 and a Second March took place in 1996 to press indigenous demands to be incorporated into the new agrarian legislation, under the banner ‘Land and Territory’ (Albó, 1994; Assies, 2000; Van Cott, 2000).

21. For a detailed analysis see Assies (2002).

22. Headed by the controversial Marcial Fabricano, who was to become a Vice-Minister in the new Sánchez de Lozada government.

23. Such regionalism, and particularly Cruceño regionalism, should be understood against the background of shifts in the Bolivian economy. While the highland mining industry declined, Santa Cruz emerged as the dynamic centre of a new agro-export economy. Although Bolivia still is known as an Andean country, in fact it is increasingly ‘Amazonian’.

24. In October 2001 the Bolivian government convoked an ‘Earth Summit’ which was later renamed ‘Encounter’ as expectations were reduced, because the conditions for resolving problems had worsened after the Pantani massacre. The principal peasant organizations did not participate in the encounter and announced that they would convoke a summit of their own.

25. For technical problems with registration the UCS did not participate in the 1989 elections.

26. At some point in mid-2000 it was rumoured that an alliance was in the making between Manfred Reyes Villa, Johnny Fernández of the UCS and Evo Morales, but this never materialized and it would hardly have been a credible coalition.

27. Where ethnicity is concerned, among the established parties the MIR was a partial exception in exhibiting some populist features and showing some sympathy for the indigenous population. In 1990 Paz Zamora went to meet the First March of the lowland indigenous peoples and under his government Bolivia ratified ILO Convention 169. The MIR also has an important following among the population of El Alto.

28. The notion of ‘territory’ was expressly avoided in order to convey the idea that the TCOs are a form of property and should not be understood as constituting administrative units, since it was thought that this might constitute a threat to governability and national intregity (Vadillo, 1997, p. 343).

29. In January 2000, in the border region between the Oruro and Potosí Departments, the Quechua-speaking Laime and Jucumani had set aside ‘ancestral’ rivalries and boundary disputes and turned against their Aymara-speaking Qaqachaca neighbours in a particularly violent round of border disputes which claimed 33 lives. The government sent in troops and first aid kits and started to study the ‘permanent presence of the army’. Such violence can hardly be explained in terms of ancestral rivalries. Instead, one should look at things like desperate poverty and secular government neglect.

30. The affair which finally lead to his resignation was another of the scandals that plagued the Banzer government and constituted something like a real-time telenovela (soap opera). Episodes of police accusing the minister of threats and attempts at bribery, even though they may have been exaggerated, sounded quite plausible to the Bolivian public, used to the arrogance of the average politician. Quispe stated that he would not negotiate with such a liar and that indigenous people at least respected their wives.