Activists in office: Pro-Kurdish contentious politics in Turkey

Abstract

This paper contends that in some semi-democratic regimes the participation in electoral politics of ethnopolitical activists does not end overt conflict between the state and challengers. Instead, this activity, here called ‘representative contention’, in some cases constitutes an important form of social movement activism and can help explain how movements in semi-democratic regimes survive, consolidate and advance their agendas. As an example, the paper argues that pro-Kurdish participation in national and local politics between 1990 and 2005 provided the movement with a new institutional basis for public gathering, legal protection from prosecution, new access to domestic and international audiences, and new symbolic resources. Cumulatively, this consolidated the movement in relatively stable arenas and helped sustain it when the movement's armed flank was weak.

Notes

Some of the research in this article was supported by grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation's Program on Peace and International Cooperation and from San Francisco State University. My thanks for the generous support of these institutions, as well as to Hamit Bozarslan, Reşat Kasaba, Hootan Shambayati, Ralph Squillace and Reyhan Yalçındağ for their comments, insights and assistance. All views and any errors are my own.

1. An important exception is Barkey (1998). For useful background on pro-Kurdish political parties, see also Güney (2002) and Gürbey (2004). By far the most extensive accounts of the pro-Kurdish parties are in Turkish: particularly important are Ölmez (1995) and Demir (2005).

2. Exceptions are Horowitz (2000), Zirakzadeh (1997) and Esman (1994, esp. pp. 38–39), although Horowitz's examination of ethnic parties does not explicitly deal with cases involving attempts by a ruling majority ethnic group to suppress the formation of minority ethnic parties.

3. Ottaway (2003) labels another subset of these ‘middling’ regimes as semi-authoritarian: ‘carefully constructed’ alternative systems whose leaders deliberately seek to maintain some semblance of democratic government.

4. Although exact figures are difficult to ascertain, it is conservatively estimated that about 65% of the population in Turkey's southeastern provinces is of Kurdish origin, with Kurds making up at least 70%–75% of the population in provinces such as Diyarbakır and Van. About 12%–15% percent of Turkey's population is conservatively estimated to be of Kurdish origin. See Mutlu (1996, pp. 517–541) and Kirişci and Winrow (1997, pp. 119–122).

5. Incorporation takes place when movements become incorporated into existing structures and procedures but “without transforming the basic rules of the game”. See Giugni (1998, p. xv).

6. Similarly, a regional concentration of an ethnic minority is an important factor determining the likelihood of violent rebellion. See Gurr (2000, pp. 75–76).

7. In the 1999 municipal elections, for instance, only 3% of registered voters in the city of Istanbul voted for the pro-Kurdish HADEP, although Kurds make up an estimated 25% of the population of the city. In the 2002 national elections, in which HADEP-successor DEHAP campaigned vigorously, the party won about 56% of the votes in the province of Diyarbakır, but only 6% in Istanbul. See Turkish State Institute of Statistics (1999). For 2002 election results, see NTV/MSNBC television's election website, http://www.ntrmsnbc.com/modules/section2002/bolgeler.asp, accessed 10 May 2005.

8. For a recent outline of Kurdish demands, see ‘What do the Kurds want in Turkey? ’, a statement issued on 12 December 2004 by the Kurdish Institute of Paris and signed by about 200 prominent pro-Kurdish intellectuals, activists and politicians in Turkey and Europe. Available online at: http://www.kurdmedia.com/reports.asp?id = 2307, accessed 10 May 2005.

9. For an exhaustive documentation of these speeches and the prosecution's case against HEP, see the Constitutional Court decision to close the party, available online at: http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/kararlar/spk/k1993/k1993-01.htm

10. As late as January 2002 publishers were still sometimes prosecuted and fined for using the word ‘Kurdistan’ in published works.

11. See, for instance, Milliyet, 26 October, 2 November, 13 November and 18 November 1991.

12. For a useful discussion of legislative immunity as applied in EU member states, see the European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (2001).

13. Pro-Kurdish activists were frequently prosecuted in the 1990s under Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law and Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code, among others. For details of prosecutions, see I˙nsan Hakları Vakfı (1994, pp. 237–320).

14. Zana ran and won as an independent candidate for the mayor of Diyarbakır in 1977. An outspoken advocate of Kurdish rights and a leading member of several pro-Kurdish cultural and literary associations, he served as mayor until he was arrested following the 1980 military coup.

15. The mayors of Diyarbakır, Bağlar and Viranşehir, for instance, reported significantly reduced city debt. See Ülkede Gündem (2004, p. 9). Also author's interviews with Cabbar Legara (25 May 2003) and Feridun Çelik (26 May 2003).

16. Interview with Cabbar Legara, Diyarbakır, 25 May 2003.

17. See Beysanoğlu (2001).

18. In Kurdish the word is spelled Newroz; in Turkish it is spelled Nevruz. Such seemingly minor distinctions carry substantial symbolic weight: in Diyarbakır human rights activists were prosecuted in 2001 and 2002 for using the word ‘Newroz’ in public information documents. The case became known as the ‘case of the “W”’. See Diyarbakır Söz (2002).

19. Interview with Cabbar Legara, Diyarbakır, 25 May 2003.

20. For various newspaper accounts, see Simon Tidsall, ‘What's in a name? Too much in Turkey’, Guardian, 25 January 2001; Associated Press, ‘Turkish court bans Gandhi Street in Kurdish area’, 22 January 2001; and ‘Gandi senin neyine…’, Radikal, 22 January 2001.

21. Interview with Feridun Çelik, Diyarbakır, 26 May 2003.

22. Interview with Cabbar Legara, Diyarbakır, 25 May 2003.

23. Interviews with Osman Beydemir, Diyarbakır, March 2004 and March 2005.

24. On the concept of politics ‘as if’, although used by her to explain the durability of an authoritarian regime, see Wedeen (1999).