Must Pluri-national Federations Fail?

Abstract

This article questions the widely held assumption that pluri-national federations are likely to break down or break apart. It shows that the case against pluri-national federalism needs to be substantively qualified, and then outlines the conditions that facilitate successful pluri-national federations. The argument is preliminary in nature, but suggests a more balanced and nuanced account of the durability of pluri-national federations than is associated with either its critics or its arch-supporters.

Acknowledgements

John McGarry thanks the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Ethnicity and Democratic Governance project at Queen's University for funding his research. Brendan O'Leary thanks the Lauder endowment of his chair at the University of Pennsylvania and the Queen's Ethnicity and Democratic Governance project.

Notes

The expressions ‘pluri-national’ and ‘multinational’ may be treated as synonyms, but there is a formal case for the former expression. A ‘pluri-national federation’ describes a state in which there are multiple recognized nations, whose respective nationals may be either concentrated or dispersed, and in which individuals may identify with one, more than one, or none of these nations. The prefix ‘pluri’ helpfully describes cases of ‘not one’; that is, it covers both ‘two’ and ‘more’, and suggests that national identity or identities may be variable and change in intensity, and that the federation may comprise both conflicting and compatible identities. ‘Multinational federation’, by contrast, suggests three or more nations, and is more likely to be associated with an essentialist position in which there are thought to be spatially discrete and homogeneously adjacent nations, each of whose members has an equally intense national identity, and no other salient identity.

Confusingly, hard-line nationalists sometimes say they support federation when they mean confederation, as in the case of the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash. The Parti Quebecois does not commonly use the term confederation, but offers a synonym, ‘sovereignty-association’.

For the distinction between national and pluri-national (or multinational) federations, see McGarry & O'Leary (2005).

Lipset (1960, pp. 91–92) argued that the main benefit of federalism for divided societies is that it creates cross-cutting cleavages, but only if internal federal boundaries and ethnic boundaries intersect. Federalism ‘increases the opportunity for multiple sources of cleavage by adding regional interests and values to the others which crosscut the social structure’.

For the problems with this perspective, especially from a Kurdish perspective, see the essays in O'Leary et al. (2005), particularly chapters 1–4.

Nigeria's hyper-centralism is a function of Abuja's control of oil revenues, but is also rooted in the 1979 and 1999 constitutions. According to Joye and Igweike, under the new constitution (which largely copies the old one), there ‘are few, if any … areas in which state governments can act independently of the Federal Government’ (cited in Suberu & Diamond, 2000, p. 15). The existence of such separate powers is an essential hallmark of federalism.

Unitarists often claim that decentralization leads to corruption and inefficiency, but contemporary Nigeria demonstrates that corruption and centralization can go hand in hand. Supporters of anti-corruption reforms in Nigeria argue that this requires ‘power and resources [to be] shifted downward, to levels of authority that are closer to the people and more visible’ (Diamond, 2001, p. xviii).

In 1913, before he had responsibility for governing the Soviet Union, Lenin made clear his contempt for federalism and his preference for unitarism: ‘We are in principle against federation. It weakens the economic connection and is inappropriate for a unified state. Do you want to separate? we say, Then go to the devil and cut yourself off altogether … You don't want to separate? Then, please, don't decide for me, don't believe you have the “right” to federation’ (italics and grammatical errors in original) (Connor, 1984, p. 217). As Connor notes, Lenin dropped his opposition to federalism upon assuming power to ensure those nations that had seceded ‘that reunion would not result in political subservience’ (ibid., p. 218). Lenin ‘was very much a pragmatist willing to bend his [centralist] principles to the contingencies of the day. During the first years of Soviet power he became convinced that territorial autonomy needed to be granted to the major non-Russian minorities to quell dissent and win them over to the cause of Bolshevism’ (Kolsto, cited in Kymlicka, 2001, p. 203).

The claim that communist pluri-national federalism ‘created’ divisions cannot explain easily why strong ethnic identities exist among groups that were not accommodated through federal institutions, such as the Chechens or Crimean Tatars. There is an explanation for this implicit in the arguments of critics of pluri-nationalism federalism. It is that the decision to accommodate some national groups led those excluded to mobilize. We do not reject this empirical explanation outright, but we think the appropriate way to deal with this possibility would have been to accommodate the excluded identity groups, not to refuse to accommodate any of them.

‘As the rivalries among these three groups [Yoruba, Ibo, Hausa] crystallized into bitter political struggles during the late colonial period … it became increasingly clear to all interested observers that only by some form of highly decentralized political arrangements could the main groups be accommodated within a single country’ (Suberu, 2001, p. 20).

Supporters of civic nationalism might respond that British (or other forms of) civic nationalism was not neutral between the UK's diverse peoples, and that a more genuinely inclusive version of civic nationalism might have worked. This is indeed part of the weakness of civic nationalism. It often reflects the values and interests of the state's dominant national community.

As Chinn and Roper (1995) wrote, after elections in 1990, ‘those appointed to high level posts were overwhelmingly ethnic Moldovans, leaving minority activists little hope that their interests would be represented in deliberations on key issues’. Moldovans accounted for 69.62 per cent of the entire legislature, but for 83.3 per cent of the leadership. All five of the leading positions in the Supreme Soviet were held by ethic Moldovans, as were 18 of 20 positions in the Moldovan government (Crowther, 1997, p. 338, n10).

Eritrea's autonomy, which had been established in 1952, was formally abrogated by the Ethiopian government in 1962.

For two general accounts on the relationship between centralization and nationalist rebellions, see Gurr (2000) and Hechter (2000).

Interestingly, Czechoslovakia is absent from Snyder's account of the relationship between ethno-federalism and violence.

It is useful to remember Bosnia-Herzegovina when considering the argument that cross-cutting republican and ethnic boundaries have conflict-reducing effects.

As Watts claims: ‘it is not so much because they are federations that countries have been difficult to govern but that it is because they were difficult to govern in the first place that they adopted federation as a form of government’ (Watts, 1999, p. 110).

The result of the 1995 referendum on sovereignty was 50.4% against, and 49.6% for. It is not absolutely clear, however, that 49.6% were voting for ‘independence’. The question was unclear. Some of those who voted yes appeared to believe that they would continue to be citizens of Canada.

‘Federalism reduces conflict by allowing those political forces excluded from power at the top the opportunity to exercise regional power’ (Hanf, 1991, p. 43).

The Ibo coup led by Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi in January 1966 was followed by a ‘Unification Decree’, which moved Nigeria towards a unitary state. The regional and federal public services were combined, to the considerable advantage of the better-educated southerners and the disadvantage of the Hausa. This, and the loss of many northern military leaders in the January coup, set off anti-Ibo violence in the North, and contributed to Ironsi's assassination in July (Suberu, 2001, p. 31).

In a country that is divided equally between Muslim and Christian and between North and South, northern Muslims headed all four military governments during 1984–1999. After General Abacha's rise to power in 1993, the head of state, the Chief of Defence staff, the Inspector-General of Police, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the National Security Adviser and the Chief Justice were all Muslims. This sectionalism provoked ‘much alarm, alienation, and even paranoia’ (Suberu & Diamond, 2000, p. 13). Abacha's northern and Muslim-dominated government trampled on the rights of the minorities in the oil-rich Niger Delta, and executed their leaders, including the novelist Ken Saro-Wiwa.

This is particularly important where, as in Nigeria, the lion's share of power is allocated to the centre (Diamond, 2001, p. xvi). An obstacle to the practice of consociationalism in Nigeria is its single person presidential system of government. For details on recent conventions that Nigeria has developed to ensure (imperfectly) representative government at the centre, see Suberu & Diamond (2000, pp. 26–30).

The link between intra-unit conflict and conflict between the unit and the rest of the federation can be seen in Canada's experience. In 1987, Canada's federal government introduced a package of constitutional changes aimed at addressing Quebec's concerns over the 1982 patriation of Canada's constitution. The changes had to be ratified by the provinces as well as the federal government, with the final date for ratification set for June 1990. In 1988, Quebec's provincial government refused to accept a Supreme Court ruling that would have allowed the use of English (alongside French) on outdoor signs in the province. English Canada read this as intolerance towards Quebec's Anglophone minority, and that contributed to a mood that prevented the ratification of the federal government's proposals for Quebec. This in turn poisoned relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada, sending support for secession soaring.

From 1885, elections in the UK were based on a universal male franchise, and from 1918, a universal franchise.

Canada's birth was in fact a hybrid of ‘coming together’ and ‘holding together’ processes: on the one hand, it involved the joining together of a number of previously separate British North American colonies; on the other hand, it involved the division of the unitary colony of the ‘Two Canadas’ into the separate federal units of Ontario and Quebec. As the latter provided the driving force behind the decision to establish a federation, Canada should probably be seen as more of a holding-together federation than one based on coming-together.

The importance of voluntary origins for the legitimacy and stability of states, whether federations or unitary states, is often recognized in the rival historiographies of federalists/unionists and separatists, with the former arguing that the federation/union arose voluntarily, while the latter argue it was imposed. Thus, in Canada separatists point to the conquest of 1759 as Canada's starting point and/or argue that the confederation agreement of 1867 was not ‘really’ voluntary, as Francophone elites did not have a serious alternative of separating. Federalists, on the other hand, point to the key role that Francophone elites had in shaping the federal agreement. Similar debates take place between British unionists and Scottish separatists.

The fact that Brussels, historically part of Flanders but dominated by French-speakers, is a separate region helps to explain the survival of Belgium. Flanders would be more likely to secede if it included Brussels.