Self-Determination and Power-Sharing in Israel/Palestine

Abstract

This article surveys three different concepts of political self-determination that may be applied to the Israel/Palestine conflict, and considers how they may or may not justify power-sharing arrangements of the type suggested by Brendan O’Leary. In addition, the various forms of both two-state and one-state solutions are considered for their congruence with the best understanding of self-determination. The three forms of the self-determination principle are: statist, national, and ecological. The author argues that only the last is justifiable as the basis for a settlement of the conflict, as well as more generally for twenty-first century conflicts over resources and territory. In theory, ecological self-determination would justify a one-state solution that would unify the region in order to maintain its resources sustainably. But both solutions face myriad political obstacles. The author discusses the difference between consociation and federation, two theories of power-sharing, both with disadvantages, and concludes that O’Leary has suggested an interesting approach that focuses not on the end-state solution, but on intermediate proposals to begin the process of cooperation. The author concludes by maintaining that the main obstacles are neither philosophical nor policy-oriented, but political, and suggests some reasons for cautious optimism in that regard.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. For a description of the Peel Commission, including a map of the proposed partition, and Jewish reactions, see Shlaim (1990, pp. 57–58); as well as Dothan (1993, p. 208). Arab reactions are discussed in Mattar (1988, p. 81); as well as in Sinanoglou (2010, p. 140).

2. For descriptions of the White Paper, as well as Jewish and Arab responses, see Barbour (1971, pp. 470–71); and Cohen (1988, pp. 123–24); see also Dothan (1993, p. 259); and Mattar (1988, p. 84).

3. For further discussion of both these problems, see Dahbour (2003).

4. This argument is made most extensively in Dahbour (2013). For one recent study of ecosystem data that can serve as a preliminary basis for such assessments, see Sayre et al. (2014).

5. Michael Walzer was the crucial figure who, in the 1970s and 1980s, re-emphasized the importance of the self-determination principle as an attribute of political communities generally. See Walzer (1983, 2000).

6. Allen Buchanan was the philosopher to originate the term. See Buchanan (1991) and Buchanan (1997). The phenomenon has also been referred to as ‘internal colonialism.’

7. See, for example, Glick (2014). Note that Glick makes two exceptions to the complete absorption of occupied territories by Israel—the Golan Heights region of Syria, occupied by Israel since 1973, is included; and the Gaza Strip is excluded, and would continue to be ‘administered’ by the Palestinian Authority. The latter, as she notes, is significant because it would change the ‘demographic equation’ in favor of the Jewish population of an enlarged Israeli state. These exceptions undermine Glick’s argument for her version of the 1SS.

8. On the idea of a quasi-state, see Jackson (1990); on the concept of effective sovereignty, see Jackson (1999).

9. O’Leary refers to the polarization danger of the liberal model in the conclusion of his article. See O’Leary (2015, p. 16).

10. O’Leary suggests the interesting possibility of a five-state federation: Jerusalem, northern Israel, southern Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. All, except possibly for Gaza, would contain both Jewish and Arab inhabitants. See O’Leary (2015, p. 16).