More Than a Name? Variation in Electoral Mobilisation of Titular and Non-Titular Ethnic Minorities in Russian National Elections

Abstract

Do patterns of electoral mobilisation differ between titular and non-titular ethnic minorities in Vladimir Putin’s Russia? Despite the fact that ‘titular privileging’ has been identified as one of the central causal mechanisms for patronage-based electoral mobilisation in Russia, existing literature has not tested this systematically. This study investigates whether turnout patterns differ between titular and non-titular ethnic minorities in Russia. We leverage unique raion-level electoral and demographic data in a series of multilevel models to analyse whether turnout patterns between these two groups vary in recent Russian legislative elections (2003 and 2011) and presidential contests (2004 and 2012). The empirical findings suggest that electoral turnout is consistently higher in raions with a higher share of titular minorities and that this effect is moderated in unexpected ways by contextual characteristics at the raion and regional levels.

Acknowledgements

Both authors have contributed equally to this article. Inga Saikkonen was a visiting scholar at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University during the research for the article. Previous versions were presented at the EACES-HSE Workshop, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, June 29, 2015 and at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 16, 2015. The authors would like to thank David Szakoniy, Lena Surzhko-Harned and participants at the presentations for excellent comments. All remaining errors are their own.

ORCiD

Allison C. White http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8364-3164

Notes

1. For example, the largest minority group, Tatars, accounts for less than 4% of the population (All-Russia National Census 2010).

2. The Soviet Union consisted of 15 Union Republics, which were divided further into ethno-territorial units. For example, the Russian (Union) Republic had 16 Autonomous Republics as well as lower level ethnic units. Titular privileging was most extensive in the Union and Autonomous Republics.

3. Our analysis is focused exclusively on patterns of voter turnout reported by raions with varying proportions of titular and non-titular ethnic minorities and therefore does not include ethnic Russians, as examining patterns between the ethnic Russian and non-Russian population has already received considerable scholarly attention.

4. Ideally, we would leverage both individual- and aggregate-level data to investigate these questions, but to the knowledge of the authors, individual-level survey data have not differentiated between titular and non-titular ethnic minority groups in survey instruments.

5. See also Lankina’s (2006) work on the role of republican local administrations in quelling nationalist mobilisation movements.

6. Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

7. Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

8. Of course, officials in authoritarian settings may also be interested in depressing voter turnout in some areas, particularly if they supported the opposition in previous elections or have drawn the ire of the regime in other ways (Cox & Kousser, 1981). However, ethnic minority groups have been identified as one of the key demographic groups that the regime targets in electoral mobilisation (Hale, 2003, 2007; White & Moser, 2014; Saikkonen, 2015), and thus this study expects a positive relationship between denser titular minority populations and raion-level turnout.

9. Considerable diversity exists within Russia’s 21 ethnic republics based on several factors, such as the ethnic make-up of the population (whether the titular ethnic group comprises the majority or minority), whether the regional executive is a member of the titular minority group, the presence of natural resources, geographical location, and so on. Therefore, heterogeneous effects likely exist between titular and non-titular minority groups situated in different ethnic regions. Future research that disaggregates the ethnic republics and distinguishes them along various dimensions would offer a productive refinement of our preliminary investigation.

10. Data regarding resource wealth at the regional level are provided by Bradshaw (2006); this variable distinguishes between regions for which the proportion of the regional economy based on the export of natural resources exceeds 40%.

11. Moraski and Reisinger found that the regions showing highest ‘deference’ to the Kremlin over time were most likely to be located in the Caucasus (2010).

12. Recent research suggests that emulation effects exist both within and across Russia’s regions in electoral mobilisation and ethnicity plays a significant role in the creation of electoral networks and incentives (Moser & White, 2016).

Additional information

Funding

Inga Saikkonen’s work for this article was supported by the Academy of Finland [grant number 258190].