Pragmatic Trans-Border Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis of Poland’s and Hungary’s Policies Towards Kin-Minorities in the Twenty-First Century

Abstract

This paper outlines the dynamic development of policies in Poland and Hungary towards kin-minorities and their outcomes under the rule of right-wing governments. The main aim is to provide a comparative analysis of kin-state policies targeting co-ethnics living beyond the countries’ borders and point out possible explanations for common and different elements in these two cases. The similarities between Poland’s and Hungary’s policies towards kin-minorities are manifested in an official narrative about one existing nation across borders, and legal measures and political actions aimed at supporting minorities in neighbouring countries. At the same time, there are some important differences concerning, inter alia, ethnic preferential citizenship laws. The Hungarian authorities use preferential naturalisation as a means of strengthening the influence of non-resident ethnic Hungarians as voters in Hungary’s elections. Non-resident Hungarians also play an important role in foreign policy towards neighbouring countries. For policymakers in Poland, ethnic Poles living abroad remain a demographic and economic reservoir. The changes in legal regulations, aimed at encouraging them to settle and work in Poland, are dictated by the constantly high demand for a labour workforce and expected severe demographic decline. Both Hungarian and Polish policies towards kin-minorities are examples of pragmatic trans-border nationalism, which is a concept also developed in the article.

Acknowledgements

This article is based on Research Project No. 2018/31/B/HS5/00913, funded by the National Science Centre, Poland.

Notes

1 The repatriation scheme was addressed to persons who declared Polish nationality and demonstrated a connection with Polishness through cultivation of the Polish language and customs and who had (or had in the past) at least one parent or grandparent or both great-grandparents of Polish nationality or citizenship. A person arriving in Poland with a repatriation visa acquired Polish citizenship at the moment of crossing the border to Poland. What was important was that the geographical scope of repatriation was restricted to the territory of the Asian parts of the former USSR and was not applicable for Poles in Ukraine or Belarus (**the Act of 9 November 2000 on Repatriation, No. 106, Item 1118).

2 The dominant tone in the Polish authorities’ official narrative on the state's duties towards Polish minorities in the East could best be illustrated by the words of the Polish President regarding the rights of the harmed, multi-million part of our nation that remained behind the Eastern border of the country, in the territory of the Second Polish Republic painfully cut off by the decisions of the Allied powers in Yalta [and] the nation’s commitment to compensate compatriots from the former Soviet Union for the harm suffered […] This task is a priority and duty of state authorities towards the past, present and future generations of Poles (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016, p. 3).

3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania has described the introduction of the Day of National Cohesion as the act of revisionism (see: Románia megalapozatlannak tartja, hogy 2020 a nemzeti összetartozás évének lett nyilvánítva [Romania believes that 2020 has been declared the year of national cohesion]. Retrieved January 6, 2020, from https://magyarnemzet.hu/kulfold/romania-megalapozatlannak-tartja-hogy-2020-a-nemzeti-osszetartozas-evenek-lett-nyilvanitva-7049264/). The Slovak authorities have also expressed their criticism in this matter (see: Szlovákia bírálja a nemzeti összetartozás évéről hozott magyar döntést [Slovakia criticises the Hungarian decision on the year of national belonging]. Retrieved January 5, 2020, from https://www.m190-21-hp-nemzeti-osszetartozas-everol-hozott-Magyar-dontest).

4 Demographic perspectives are unfavourable in both countries, mostly as a consequence of low fertility and high emigration (noted especially after accession to the EU). The fertility rates in Poland and Hungary are amongst the lowest in Europe (1.4), while the number of Hungarian and Polish citizens of working age (20–64 years) in European countries in 2015 was 5 and 6% of these countries’ populations respectively (European Commission, 2016).

5 According to Jan Dziedziczak (Secretary of State at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) conclusions should be drawn from the erroneous migration policy of France, Germany or the Benelux Countries and therefore ‘an effective migration policy based on our compatriots should be led’ (statement at the conference ‘Repatriates or immigrants. Directions of Poland's and European Union's migration policy’/‘Repatrianci czy imigranci. Kierunki polityki migracyjnej Polski i Unii Europejskiej’, 18 April 2016. Retrieved January 7, 2020 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41SgEYcRBoA.

6 The first attempt to establish the Karta Polaka was made in 1999 but it was not possible to adopt the relevant act before the end of the parliamentary term. It was finally adopted in 2007.

7 During the announcement of the results of the defeated 2011 election, the PiS chairman said: ‘I am deeply convinced that the day will come when we shall succeed in having Budapest in Warsaw’ (statement by Jarosław Kaczyński, 9 October 2011).

8 Although dual citizenship is not allowed in Slovakia and Ukraine, Hungarian consulates grant the citizenship, which entails many serious legal consequences in the event of disclosure of this fact, including deprivation of a person's citizenship of the country of residence.

9 Unfortunately, there are no current data on the number of ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries who settled in Hungary. Available data relate to 1985–2011 and indicate that their number could be as high as 173,000 (Péti et al., 2017).

10 According to data provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010–2017), about 250,000 documents have been issued since the introduction of the Karta Polaka Act in 2007, including over 90% to citizens of Belarus and Ukraine.

11 Official estimates show that about 70% of all permanent residence permits issued in 2017–2018 were granted on the basis of holding the Karta Polaka (Zespół do Spraw Migracji, 2019).

12 In 2017, nearly 9,000 people were granted permanent residence permits based on the Karta Polaka, an increase of 107% over the previous year; in 2018 this number exceeded 9,600 permits (Office for Foreigners, 2018).

Additional information

Funding

This article is based on Research Project No. 2018/31/B/HS5/00913, funded by the National Science Centre, Poland.