Human rights, transnational actors and the Chinese government: Another look at the spiral model

Abstract

This article assesses the usefulness of Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink's spiral model as an explanation of the changes in the Chinese government's human rights practices from the time of the ‘anti-rightist’ campaign in 1957–1958 to the end of 2003. It is concluded that the spiral model has provided a valid explanation for many of the changes in the Chinese government's human rights practices, and its responses to its internal and external critics, over this time period. Many of the responses of the transnational human rights network and the Chinese government by the end of this period indicate that the latter had progressed to phase three of the model. It is also concluded that the spiral model only conceptualises part of the constitutive relationship between the target state and international human rights norms—the influence of these norms on the identities, interests and behaviours of a target state. It does not conceptualise the influence of a target state on international human rights norms or the transnational human rights network. Therefore, the spiral model cannot explain why the Chinese government has had such a significant influence over the enforcement mechanisms of these norms.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Associate Professor Franz Oswald for his comments on an earlier draft, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments. All have been very useful and much appreciated.

Notes

[1] Risse et al.'s examples were Indonesia, South Africa, the Philippines, Uganda, Guatemala, Poland, Czechoslavakia, Chile, Kenya, Tunisia and Morocco. Their study attempted to address criticisms of earlier social constructivist studies, including that the causal mechanisms through which norms influence state identities, interests and behaviours have generally been under-specified. See Checkel (1998); Johnston (2001); Yee (1996).

[2] As the discussion of the spiral model by Risse et al. was published just prior to Foot's 2000 book, the model was only briefly discussed by Foot.

[3] This technique aims to publicly exclude the target state from the ‘“civilised community” of states’ and thus hopefully elicit a deep feeling of offence in the target state's leadership that will motivate it to change its identity and interests and improve its human rights practices. See Risse & Sikkink (1999), pp. 14–15.

[4] Despite these killings occurring in the streets of Beijing outside Tiananmen Square as well as in the square itself, the killings became known as the Tiananmen Square massacre.

[5] This network initially focused on the human rights abuses of the Tiananmen Square massacre but later widened to include the repression of a range of individuals and groups in China, as well as abuses such as those related to population control and prison labour policies. For discussion of the Tiananmen Square massacre and international responses to it, see Chan 1991; Salisbury 1992; Nossal 1993; Kinnvall 1995; Benewick 1999; Nathan 2001.

[6] For a discussion of the influence of domestic structure on the degree to which transnational networks can have an impact on a state, see Risse-Kappen 1994.

[7] This is described by Keck and Sikkink as the ‘boomerang pattern’ (Keck & Sikkink 1998, pp. 12-13).

[8] This was highlighted in an interview with an Amnesty International Secretariat official in London on 16 August 2004. For further details on the interactions between international human rights NGOs, human rights activists, UN bodies and officials of democratic states, see Foot (2000), pp. 116–137, 171–187, and Kent (1999a), pp. 56–79.

[9] Japan also imposed relatively symbolic sanctions but was reluctant to condemn the events of the massacre, reflecting Japan's concern that China should not be isolated as this would affect its economic relationships. See Kesavan (1990), pp. 669–681, especially p. 671.

[10] The other UN human rights bodies highlighting concerns regarding human rights in China included the UN Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions, the Special Rapporteur on Torture, the Committee Against Torture, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, and the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. See Tessitore & Woolfson (1990), p. 158; Tessitore & Woolfson (1991), p. 153.

[11] This was also confirmed in an interview with the leader of the 1991 and 1992 Australian Human Rights Delegations to China in Canberra on 20 March 2002.

[12] Formerly known as Asia Watch.

[13] From an interview with an AI Secretariat official, London, 30 March 2001.

[14] See the annual reports of AI and HRW from 1991 to 2003 and editions of the Human Rights in China Bulletin published in 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003.

[15] From an interview with an Amnesty International Secretariat official, London, 16 August 2004.

[16] The US government also sponsored a resolution on China at the 2004 UNCHR session.

[17] Democratic states that commenced or resumed bilateral dialogue meetings with China include the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Hungary, Brazil, Australia and Japan as well as the European Union (EU). Those that adopted technical cooperation programmes included the United Kingdom, Norway, Australia and Sweden. The responses of some of the international human rights NGOs to this development were to produce reports critical of the bilateral dialogue approach and urge the democratic states not to neglect multilateral approaches. See Free Tibet Campaign, HRIC, and International Campaign for Tibet (2003); HRIC 1998a; interview with AI Australia Government Liaison Group member, Canberra, 16 August 2001.

[18] These White Papers included Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (IOSCPRC) 1991, 1992a, 1996, 1997a, 1998 and 2000a,b.

[19] For example, the Prison Law of 1994 included some emphasis on improving the respect for rights of detainees, and the 1995 Laws on Judges and Procurators and the People's Police Law all focused on increasing the accountability of judges, prosecutors and police (see Kent 1999a, p. 204). In 1997 the Chinese government established the Criminal Law ostensibly to establish that only acts explicitly stated as crimes could be considered crimes. However, offsetting this positive development was the establishment of other legislation labelling a number of activities as crimes that had previously been considered to be disciplinary offences. The Criminal Law also replaced the widely criticised category of ‘counterrevolutionary crimes’ with ‘crimes endangering state security’ that included no definitions as to what may constitute such crimes. See also the 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2002 and 2003 annual reports of Amnesty International, and the 1993, 1998, 1999 and 2003 annual reports of Human Rights Watch, for details of concessions offered by the Chinese government.

[20] For example, see the 1992 ‘Reform of criminal offenders in China’ (IOSCPRC 1992b) and ‘Progress in China's human rights cause in 1996’ (IOSCPRC 1997b).

[21] For example, compare the 1995 White Paper ‘The progress of human rights in China’ (IOSCPRC 1991) with the 1991 White Paper on human rights.

[22] For example, in 2001 the Vice-President of the Supreme People's Court admitted that there was corruption in the legal system and the Supreme People's Procuratorate admitted that the CCP interfered in ‘sensitive cases’. There were also reports by 2003 of police and government official awareness that workers' demonstrations needed to be handled with great care as they had much popular support.

[23] For example, measures introduced in 2002 included ‘new disciplinary measures for corrupt or incompetent judges; new educational and competency standards for would-be judges, prosecutors, and lawyers; a code of ethics for prosecutors; the introduction of a chief prosecutor for each case rather than a prosecution committee; a prohibition against firing judges without proper legal procedures; and, as part of the effort to eliminate corruption, annual internal disciplinary court inspections’ (HRW 2003).

[24] This is despite China's modernisation programme having led to economic decentralisation and a loosening of state control over other aspects of Chinese society. The top leadership of the CCP has continued to retain significant control over many policies, including, in particular, those related to dealing with internal and external critics of the government. For discussion of the declining role of the state in China since the beginning of the modernisation programme and the level of control the Chinese state has retained, see Shambaugh (2000) and Naughton & Yang (2004).

[25] In 1995 the vote on the no-action motion was tied.

[26] Many observers of economic, political and societal change in China have concluded that the CCP will continue to retain a substantial level of control within China at least into the near future. See discussion in Nelsen (2000) and Naughton & Yang (2004).

[27] This is consistent with the findings of Ann Kent (2001), p. 624. For further discussion of bilateral dialogue meetings and technical cooperation programmes, see HRIC (2000b); HRIC (2003c); Woodman (2004).