Is the debate on ‘global justice’ a global one? Some considerations in view of modern philosophy in Africa

Abstract

At present, the debate on global justice, a debate which is at the core of global ethics, is largely being conducted by European and American scholars from different disciplines without taking into account views and concepts from other regions of the world, particularly, from the Global South. The lack of a truly intercultural, interreligious, and international exchange of ideas provokes doubts whether the concepts of global justice introduced so far are able to transcend regional and cultural horizons. The article introduces concepts of justice from African scholars, whose voices have remained marginal until now, like the Kenyan philosopher Henry Odera Oruka, the Ethiopian philosopher Teodros Kiros, and the debate on ubuntu, one of the most controversial concepts in southern Africa today. These concepts focus on issues that are seldom considered in the debate on global justice, such as the importance of bodily needs as a prerequisite for human beings to act as moral beings and the importance of human relationships and solidarity. The last part of the article discusses factors which lead to exclusion from the academic discourse and the question how we as scholars can work for more academic justice.

Keywords:

• global justice
• academic injustice
• intercultural philosophy
• Henry Odera Oruka
• ubuntu

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Addendum

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Dr. Anke Graness is currently working on her habilitation project ‘The History of Philosophy in Africa’ at the Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna (Austria). Her interest of research include intercultural philosophy, philosophy in Africa and ethics. Some recent book chapters include: ‘Gerechtigkeitskonzepte im subsaharischen Afrika – gestern und heute.’ In: Sedmak, C. ed. 2014. Gerechtigkeit. Vom Wert der Verhältnismäßigkeit. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft; ‘“Ubuntu” und “buen vivir”. Zum Umgang mit indigenen vorkolonialen Konzepten.’ In Münnix, G. ed. 2013. Wertetraditionen und Wertekonflikte. Ethik in Zeiten der Globalisierung. Nordhausen: Verlag Traugott Bautz.

Notes

1. A well-known exception to this tendency is Sen (2009). Attempts to open an intercultural discussion on principles of global justice can occasionally be found in journal articles, for example, in Global Ethics or Thought and Practice (see Masolo 2012, 2014; Metz 2014; Metz and Gaie 2010; Ochieng’-Odhiambo 2005).

2. The concept of personhood plays an important role in contemporary African philosophy, too. It has been intensively discussed by the representatives of Négritude and ethnophilosophy and their critics. Two general tendencies can be identified in the discussion: (1) The ‘African person’ as a kind of counter-concept to a supposed ‘Western’ understanding of person (Mbiti 1969; Menkiti 1984, 2006). By setting up a stereotypical dichotomy, the Nigerian philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti, for example, distinguishes between ‘Western’ views, which generally hold that a person is a lone individual, and ‘African’ views, which define a person by reference to the community, which always takes precedence over the individual life. (2) A linguistic analysis of the concept of person in various African languages, such as Akan or Yoruba, including philosophical derivations of such understanding (Gyekye 1995, 85–103, 1997; Wiredu and Gyekye 1992). The analyses of the Akan concept of a person by the Ghanian philosopher Kwame Gyekye, who strongly opposes Menkiti's approach, point to a kind of ‘moderate or restricted communitarianism’, which includes communalistic as well as individualistic values. His approach shows that strict dichotomies do not exist between ‘Western’ and ‘African’ concepts. His moderate communitarianism, which calls for a dialectical view of individualism and communitarianism, is certainly another contribution to the global justice debate.

3. For more detailed analyses of Odera Oruka's concept of global justice, see Graness (2011, 2012).

4. Kiros does not explore the question of the political consequences of his principles of justice in a deeper way. On the other hand, he is in search of a new moral theory as a basis for social changes.

5. Key works of the ethnophilosophy tradition are Kagamé (1956), Mbiti (1969), and Senghor (1964) or more recently Ramose (1998a, 1998b) and Shutte (2001).

6. Moreover, see the different views in Murove (2009) and the different approaches in Praeg and Magadla (2014).

7. This may be what Bruce Janz calls ‘philosophy-in-place’, which requires consideration of the geographical and historical context of ideas as well as the embodied emplacement of those ideas (see Janz 2009, 17ff).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) V 348 Richter-Programme.