Inclusive education and Barrierefreiheit: some social-epistemological considerations

Abstract

Barrierefreiheit is a key term in the German inclusion movement, in education and more generally. Sometimes translated as ‘accessibility’, it refers not just to absence of barriers but to freedom from barriers, which in turn indicates a significant social and ethical component. It signals an active, conscious intervention by agents, a consequence of agentic commitment towards crossing borders and overcoming boundaries. In this regard, this article seeks to provide an epistemological analysis and illustration of what ‘inclusive’, ‘barrier-free’ education means, by examining three ideas within social epistemology: epistemological access, epistemic paternalism and epistemic justice. In so doing, it articulates a position that might be called ‘context-sensitive realism’, which cautions against not only constructivist theoretical leanings but also the anti-individualism that characterises a substantial portion of the inclusive education literature.

Keywords:

• Barrierefreiheit
• context-sensitive realism
• epistemological access
• epistemic justice
• epistemic paternalism
• inclusion
• social epistemology

Acknowledgement

This paper was written as a contribution to the sub-project on inclusion and educational justice, part of a joint project, ‘Inklusives Leben und Lernen in der Schule’, based at KU Eichstätt-Ingolstadt and sponsored by the Freisinger Bischofskonferenz. I also wish to thank Naoko Saito, Naomi Hodgson and Rafal Godon for their insightful remarks on earlier drafts of this paper.

Notes

1. As Martha Nussbaum explains, ‘it would be progress if we could acknowledge that there really is no such thing as “the normal child”: instead, there are children, with varying capabilities and varying impediments, all of whom need individualised attention as their capabilities are developed’ (Nussbaum 2006, 210).

2. In this regard, Krassimir Stojanov examines the different responses provided in terms of distributive justice, participatory justice and recognitory justice (Stojanov 2015).

3. To be more precise, these are ideas within the fairly new field of social epistemology, understood here as concerned with the interpersonal and social practices and norms that influence and guide the search for knowledge.

4. It might seem, of course, given that ‘differentiation’ and ‘personalization’ are central to the discourse of learning, that it has been acknowledged that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is not desirable (I owe this consideration to Naomi Hodgson). I simply report an observation within the literature on epistemological access here. An obvious drawback is that many educators may feel simply overwhelmed by the demand to attend to each individual’s personal, differentiated needs, interests and capabilities. I return to this point below.

5. The question might be posed now whether this is not a form of construction of knowledge. I do not think it is: it is, rather, a matter of knowledge selection. Even if one could attach the notion of construction to belief and justification, one could not meaningfully connect it with truth – unlike the notion of selection.