Fooled by ‘smart drugs’ – why shouldn’t pharmacological cognitive enhancement be liberally used in education?

ABSTRACT

Research shows that various pharmaceuticals can offer modest cognition enhancing effects for healthy individuals. These finding have caused some academics to support liberal use of pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE) in schools and universities. This approach partially arises from arguments implying there is little moral justification for regulating such drugs. In this paper, I argue against the liberal use of PCE on epistemic grounds. According to Charles Taylor, emotions and behaviour are epistemically valuable because they tell us meaningful things about reality. Hence, an accurate interpretation of students’ emotions and behaviour in context is crucial to support an effective and ethical educational process. This paper supports the assertion that PCE might alter emotions and behaviour, and thereby distort the interpretation of the educational situation by students, educators and policy makers. Therefore, when discussing whether or not to regulate PCE we should be mindful of these epistemic concerns.

KEYWORDS:

• Pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE)
• education
• smart drugs
• Charles Taylor
• neuroethics
• bioethics

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. I’m assuming that enhancing cognition entails a change in behaviour. This is not necessarily true. But, if it does not manifest itself in behaviour (better concentration, memory enhancement, improved exam scores, etc.) it will probably have no desirable effect whatsoever. And if that is the case, then what it the value in taking the drugs? See also Vrecko (2013) on the difficulty of separating cognitive enhancement from emotional change.

2. For more information about these arguments see Bostrom and Sandberg (2009), Maslen, Faulmüller, and Savulescu (2014), and Kass (2003).

3. It might appear as if supporters of liberal PCE use violate the Kantian maxim by treating others merely as a resource. But, at least in their view, this is done to benefit students by serving their interests, and thereby not treating them as mere means, but also as ends in themselves. In the view I wish to promote, the morally suspect attitude is that of not respecting the students as valuable (even if not equal) sources of information. This would be disregarding the behaviour, feelings and thoughts of the students when deciding their interests. PCE may well improve academic performance, but it might also effect other areas of interest, such as food availability, social justice, inspiration towards worthwhile life pursuits, etc.

4. Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2007, 11) put it thus: ‘Where positivism is less successful, however, is in its application to the study of human behaviour where the immense complexity of human nature and the elusive and intangible quality of social phenomena contrast strikingly with the order and regularity of the natural world. This point is nowhere more apparent than in the contexts of classroom and school where the problems of teaching, learning and human interaction present the positivistic researcher with a mammoth challenge’. See also Biesta(2007) and Hyslop-Margison and Nasee (2007).

5. For example, it might be true that some animals can interpret and express what Taylor claims to be distinctly human emotions. I owe this interesting insight to an anonymous reviewer of this journal.