An edifying philosophy of education? Starting a conversation between Rorty and post-critical pedagogy

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I will establish a conversation between Rorty and the recent proposal of post-critical pedagogy. The assumption is that through this dialogue some tenets of the latter could find a Rortyan redescription that avoids the risk of ‘metaphysical’ formulations, whereas Rorty’s ideas can increase in their relevance with respect to education thanks to the post-critical perspective. In particular, the conversation will develop by focusing on the shared attitude towards the critical-negative attitude of poststructuralist thought, the significance of the subject-matter in education and an interpretation of pedagogical hermeneutics (a key notion of post-critical pedagogy) through the lens of the Rortyan idea of edification. In the conclusion, by distinguishing two views of hope – an eventist and a transitionalist – it is argued that it is precisely in this theme, which seems to be a privileged meeting ground for Rorty and post-critical pedagogy, that there may lie a major fault line.

KEYWORDS:

• Neopragmatism
• post-critical pedagogy
• hope
• task of education
• educational love

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. In the Preface to How We Think Dewey wrote: ‘This scientific attitude of mind might, conceivably, be quite irrelevant to teaching children and youth. But this book also represents the conviction that such is not the case; that the native and unspoiled attitude of childhood, marked by ardent curiosity, fertile imagination, and love of experimental inquiry, is near, very near, to the attitude of the scientific mind’ (Dewey [1933] 1986, 109. Emphasis added. For an interpretation of the significance of this statement see Oliverio 2012).

2. It is appropriate to specify that I am not arguing in favour of a Rortyan demise of the vocabulary of inquiry. Indeed, elsewhere (Oliverio 2018) I have vindicated – against Rorty – the significance of the Deweyan understanding of inquiry for education. I am only trying to outline what a possible strategy, which avoids educational elitism as a consequence of the abandonment of the centrality of the notion of inquiry, may look like. In this respect, a Rortyan stance re-contextualizing PCP seems to be much more promising than the reckless association of Hirsch and Dewey. At the same time, I am ready to recognize that a more charitable reading of Rorty’s educational ideas can be provided, without inferring any elitism from his socialization/individualization distinction: see the magnificent Del Castillo Santos, 2014.

3. As Ramberg has noted, this stance implies a ‘critical’ moment as well. The paper of Kai Wortmann included in this symposium nicely elaborates on this theme in reference to PCP.

4. See the paper of Bianca Thoillez in this symposium, which accurately and exhaustively engages with this topic.

5. I have specified the reference to Biesta because Vlieghe and Zamojski (2019, ch. 5) spell out the notion of ‘transcendence’ in a different way. On the other hand, their proximity to the Biestan theme here introduced is clearly stated (Ibid., 37).