The Consistency of Policy with Opinion in the Russian Federation, 1992–2006

Abstract

This article draws upon hundreds of surveys of Russian public opinion conducted from 1992 to 2006 to assess the responsiveness of the Russian state to citizens' policy preferences. Patterned after studies of US opinion, this study finds levels of opinion–policy consistency in Russia to be surprisingly high. Opinion–policy consistency is assessed over time and across policy domains, with extended discussions of how opinion affects (and fails to affect) policy, using the “shock therapy” policies of the early 1990s and the first and second Chechen conflicts as examples.

Acknowledgments

I thank Jeff Berejikian, Jaroslav Tir, Ryan Bakker, Bob Shapiro, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions, and Sam Bestvater for assistance with manuscript preparation. An earlier version of this project was supported by funding from the University of Georgia.

Notes

This article makes reference to supplementary material available on the publisher's website at: <www.doiXXX.org>.

The language of “audience costs” is taken from Fearon (1994).

Ironically, the impact of the public voice in the context of the Soviet system seems to have received more serious scholarly attention. Hough and Fainsod, for example, explore in detail the mechanisms available to the Soviet public to impact decision-making, even in the absence of democratic institutions (Hough & Fainsod, 1979: 314–319, 360–361, 512–513, 552–554).

These approaches are deemed “collective” in contrast to studies of “dyadic” representation, which examines the relationship between the preferences of an individual decision-maker (usually a legislator) and that decision-maker's constituency, typified by Miller and Stokes' (1963) study of voting behavior in the U.S. Congress. More recent efforts have extended the dyadic approach to other contexts, including France (Converse & Pierce, 1986) and Canada (Soroka et al., 2009). For a complete review of the literature in this area, see Wlezien and Soroka (2007), Manza and Cook (2002), Kuklinski and Segura (1995), and Weissberg (1976).

Recent work employs the thermostatic model comparatively in Britain (Jennings, 2009; Soroka & Wlezien, 2005) and Canada (Soroka & Wlezien, 2004).

The complete set of questions used in the analysis is summarized in Appendix A, available on the publisher's website at <http://dx.doi.org/<fulldoi>>. A complete list of questions is available from the author.

The sample excludes areas of active military conflict (the Chechen and Ingush Republics, Dagestan, and North Osetia). Also excluded are the Russian Federation's least accessible and most sparsely populated regions (Nenetskiy AO, Khanty-Mansiyskiy AO, Taimyrskiy AO, Evenkiyskiy AO, Kamchatka, Chukotka, Sakhalinskaya Oblast). However, Levada-Center notes, these exclusions amount to only 12 respondents per survey and 5% of the adult population overall. A complete description of the sampling method is available at <www.levada.ru/eng/sample.html>. A record of sampling points for the Courier surveys can be found at <www.levada.ru/eng/spoints.html>.

Like Monroe, only cases of “potential federal policy” are included in the sample (1998: 10). Many cases are formally enacted or proposed for enactment by the federal government; other cases, as in Monroe's sample, “were not actively under consideration” (1998: 11).

One example illustrates both issues. In a May 2000 Courier survey, a policy question (included in this analysis) asks, “What is your attitude to the proposal to empower the president of Russia to dismiss heads of the regions and to dissolve regional legislative assemblies in case they issue edicts and pass laws which contradict the constitution and laws of the Russian Federation?” (Courier, 2000-16). Of the respondents, 63.1% expressed support for the measure. The following question asks whether this change will be good or bad for Russia: “If the president gets full control over the parliament and governors, he will have practically unlimited power in his hands. Will it do Russia good or bad, in your opinion?” (Courier, 2000-16). Here, only 50.9% say that the proposed policy change will do Russia good. That is, when the issue is re-framed in terms of “unlimited power” in the hands of the president, support drops by 12%.

A statistically discernible majority refers to survey marginals favoring and opposing a given policy being statistically different given the survey's margin of error. For example, given a margin of error of +/-3%, the marginal responses favoring and opposing a given policy must be at least six percentage points apart. Only 32 otherwise usable questions lacked a statistically discernible majority. These questions are reported in Appendix B, available at <http://dx.doi.org/<fulldoi>>.

The number of observations originating in each year within the temporal frame are as follows: n₁₉₉₂ = 9; n₁₉₉₃ = 18; n₁₉₉₄ = 3; n₁₉₉₅ = 9; n₁₉₉₆ = 11; n₁₉₉₇ = 3; n₁₉₉₈ = 33; n₁₉₉₉ = 18; n₂₀₀₀ = 26; n₂₀₀₁ = 22; n₂₀₀₂ = 17; n₂₀₀₃ = 10; n₂₀₀₄ = 15; n₂₀₀₅ = 10; n₂₀₀₆ = 10.

153 observations in the sample, or 71% of the whole, entail true majority opinions (i.e., including responses of “don't know/no opinion”).

Table 3 is replicated in Appendix C (available at <http://dx.doi.org/<fulldoi>>) with retroactive questions excluded. On average, domain-specific consistency drops by 5.3% with retroactive questions removed, with actual declines in consistency ranging from a change of 0% (Economy) to 11% (Chechnya). Overall Foreign Policy consistency drops from 67% to 60% and Domestic Policy drops from 65% to 61%. The absence of any dramatic change within domains further justifies the decision to retain retroactive questions.

The question reads, “Should, in your opinion, the economic reforms be continued or stopped?” (Courier, 1992-5, 1993-20).

The question reads, “How do you assess the rate of transfer to the market economy?” (Courier, 1993-10).

The questions read, “How did you vote on the [national referendum]” and, “Do you have confidence in the president of the Russian Federation, B.N. Yeltsin.” (Courier, 1993-12).

The bulk of Russia's privatization occurred in 1992–1993, followed by a second wave in 1995, the “loans for shares” program. The last major act of privatization took place in 1997 with the auction of the state telecommunications firm, Sviaz'invest.

The question reads, “Would you be for or against keeping up by the Duma of the preparation procedure of Boris Yeltsin's impeachment?” (Courier, 1998-11).

The question reads, “Would you be for or against the involvement of Russian armed forced to solve conflicts in the Transcaucasia?” (Courier, 1993-14).

The question reads, “What position should be taken by the Russian government owing to the worsening situation in the Republic of Chechnya?” (Courier, 1994-8).

The question reads, “Which of the following judgments on the bringing in of the Russian troops in Chechnya would you share?” (Courier, 1995-2).

Protests of 100 persons or greater are included in this figure.

Question wording may play a role in this trend. When the same question was worded differently in June 2006 – “Should, in your opinion, the federal forces continue or stop military operations to destroy fighters in Chechnya?” – 61.2% of respondents supported continued military operations (Courier, 2006-8).

However, in lieu of negotiations, in July 2006 Moscow and the loyalist government of Ramzan Kadyrov declared a period of amnesty for Chechen fighters.

Indeed, Rose et al. are surprised to find that, since mid-2001 “a clear majority of Russians endorse the new regime” in the New Russia Barometer surveys (Rose et al., 2004: 202).

An effective measure of salience, however, remains elusive (Wlezien, 2005; Wlezien & Jennings, 2011).