Why we should not presume competence and reframe facilitated communication: a critique of Heyworth, Chan & Lawson

Abstract

In their recent article in Frontiers in Psychology, “Presuming autistic communication competence and reframing facilitated communication,” Melanie Heyworth, Tim Chan, and Wenn Lawson argue for a positive reappraisal of facilitated communication (FC). The authors base their argument on several dozen problematic claims. Some of these claims rely on inaccurate assumptions about augmentative and alternative communication (AAC), Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA), conversational pragmatics, message passing tests, cognitive testing, cueing, recent discoveries about autism, and/or the empirical research on FC. Other claims involve circular reasoning or are not supported by the studies cited as support. Still others involve biased characterizations of FC critics or biased takes on key concepts pertaining to FC and the rights of people with disabilities. This article will examine each of these claims, explaining what is wrong with its underlying assumptions, its underlying reasoning, or its characterization of FC critics and of disability rights. As we will see, there are no grounds for a positive reappraisal of FC.

Keywords:

• Facilitated communication
• autism
• non-speaking
• message passing; presuming competence

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Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

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