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Abstract
Bevir's weak intentionalism construes meanings consisting in the understanding of a specific individual and they are identifiable solely by reference to that individual, by contrast with strong intentionalism, whereby a text expresses prior purposes of the author and a text has meaning only by virtue of the determining will of its author, so that to understand what a text says, we must recover what its author meant. Bevir's approach is to focus on what is actually written, on the product of the act of expression, rather than on what an author might have antecedently said (or somehow otherwise stated) they would write. A third possibility is to reject intentions altogether, and the paper explores the debate between Bevir and Brown over whether any theory of intentionality can be coherent.
Notes
1 M. Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). It should be noted that because I am to a great extent commenting on discussions of Bevir's original book, for the sake of convenience I often refer directly to the book even where I am closely summarizing Brown's or Bevir's exposition or criticism of it.
2 V. Brown, ‘Historical Interpretation, Intentionalism and Philosophy of Mind’, Journal of the Philosophy of History, 1 (2007), 25–62.
3 Bevir, The Logic, 67.
4 Bevir, The Logic, 67.
5 Bevir, The Logic, 68.
6 Bevir, The Logic, 68.
7 Bevir, The Logic, 70.
8 Bevir, The Logic, 72.
9 V. Brown, ‘On Some Problems with Weak Intentionalism for Intellectual History’, History and Theory, 41 (2002), 198–208.
10 Bevir, in Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 199.
11 Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 200.
12 Bevir, The Logic, 142.
14 Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 201.
13 Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 200.
15 Bevir, The Logic, 150.
16 Bevir, The Logic, 173; Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 202.
17 Bevir, The Logic, 173.
18 Bevir, The Logic, 172.
19 Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 203.
20 Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 204.
21 Bevir, The Logic, 75, 119, 232.
22 Bevir, The Logic, 123.
23 Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 205.
24 Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 205.
25 Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 206.
26 Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 207.
27 Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 207.
28 Bevir, ‘How to Be an Intentionalist’, History and Theory, 41 (2002), 209–17.
29 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 209.
30 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 209.
31 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 210.
32 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 211.
33 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 211.
34 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 212.
35 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 213.
36 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 213.
37 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 213.
38 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 214.
39 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 214.
40 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 214, quoting and correcting Brown, 205–6.
42 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 215.
41 Brown, ‘On Some Problems’, 203.
44 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 215.
43 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 215.
45 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 216.
46 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 216.
47 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 216.
51 Brown, ‘Historical Interpretation’, 27–8.
48 Brown, ‘Historical Interpretation, Intentionalism and Philosophy of Mind’, Journal of the Philosophy of History, 1 (2007), 25–62.
49 Brown, ‘Historical Interpretation’, 26.
50 Brown, ‘Historical Interpretation’, 27.
52 Brown, ‘Historical Interpretation’, 28.
53 Brown, ‘Historical Interpretation’, 29.
54 Brown, ‘Historical Interpretation’, 29.
55 Brown, ‘Historical Interpretation’, 30.
56 Brown, ‘Historical Interpretation’, 30.
57 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 211.
58 Bevir, ‘How to Be’, 211.