Spinoza’s genealogical critique of his contemporaries’ axiology

ABSTRACT

Among Spinoza’s principal projects in the Ethics is his effort to “remove” certain metaethical prejudices from the minds of his readers, to “expose” them, as he has similar misconceptions about other matters, by submitting them to the “scrutiny of reason”. In this article, I consider the argumentative strategy Spinoza uses here – and its intellectual history – in depth. I argue that Spinoza’s method is best characterised as a genealogical analysis. As I recount, by Spinoza’s time of writing, these kinds of arguments already had a long and illustrious history. However, I also argue that, in his adoption of such strategies, we have good reason to think Spinoza’s primary influence was Gersonides. Elucidating this aspect of Spinoza’s critique of his contemporaries’ axiologies brings a number of explicatory and historical boons. However, regrettably, it also comes at a cost, revealing a significant flaw in Spinoza’s reasoning. Towards the end of this article, I consider the nature of this flaw, whether Spinoza can avoid it and its ramifications for Spinoza’s wider philosophical project.

KEYWORDS:

• Spinoza
• Ethics
• axiology
• values
• genealogy
• Gersonides

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank James Wilson and Niklas Olsson Yaouzis and two anonymous reviewers for their many helpful comments on previous versions of this article.

Notes on contributor

Benedict Rumbold is a Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at University College London. Benedict’s research concerns ethical and political questions at various levels of abstraction. He also works on the history of moral philosophy, specializing in the ethics of Spinoza. He holds a PhD in Philosophy from Birkbeck College, University of London.

Notes

1. Spinoza, Ethics, Book I, Appendix; Spinoza, Ethics, Book IV, Preface.

2. Spinoza, Ethics, Book I, Appendix.

3. See, Spinoza, Treatise.

4. Spinoza, Ethics, Book I, Appendix.

5. Ibid.

6. Deleuze, “Spinoza and the Three “Ethics”,” 27–30.

7. Sasso, “Discours et non-discours de l’Ethique.”

8. Deleuze, “Spinoza and the Three “Ethics”,” 27–30.

9. Spinoza, Ethics, Book IV, Preface.

10. See, for example, Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory; Curley, “Spinoza’s Moral Philosophy”; Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method; Frankena, “Spinoza’s ‘New Morality’”; Frankena, “Spinoza on the Knowledge of Good and Evil”; Mattern, “Spinoza and Ethical Subjectivism”; Garrett, “Spinoza’s Ethical Theory”; Jarrett, “Spinoza on the Relativity of Good and Evil”; Miller, “Spinoza’s Axiology”; Nadler, Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’; LeBuffe, “Spinoza’s Normative Ethics”; Youpa, “Rationalist Moral Philosophy”; Youpa, “Spinoza’s Theories of Value”; and Kisner, “Perfection and Desire.”

11. Rumbold, “Spinoza’s Analysis.”

12. See, for example, Srinivasan, “The Archimedean Urge.”

13. See, Srinivasan, “The Archimedean Urge.”

14. In this way, Spinoza’s argument looks akin what Srinivasan would refer to as an argument from explanatory inertness. Srinivasan, “The Archimedean Urge.”

15. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 20–1.

16. For further discussion on the similarities and difference between these writers’ treatment of the genealogical method, see Hoy, “Nietzsche, Hume and the Genealogical Method.”

17. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 22.

18. Ravven, “Spinoza’s Rupture with Tradition,” 197.

19. Plato, The Republic, Book II, 358–60.

20. Xenophanes, “Fragments,” fragments 5–6.

21. Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, Chapter 12.

22. Nadler, “The Jewish Spinoza.”

23. Roth, Spinoza, 224.

24. Gullan-Whur, Within Reason, 285.

25. Nadler, “The Jewish Spinoza.”

26. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, §9, Annotation 16. See also James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics, 169.

27. See Spinoza, Ethics, Book III, Proposition 6–9.

28. Harvey, “Gersonides and Spinoza on Conatus.”

29. Garrett, Meaning in Spinoza’s Method, 134–43.

30. Feldman, Gersonides: Judaism within the Limits of Reason, 25–7.

31. Gersonides, The Wars of the Lord, 102–3.

32. Spinoza, Ethics, Book I, Appendix.

33. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza.

34. Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method.

35. Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. 2, 258.

36. For example, Garrett, Meaning in Spinoza’s Method; Ravven and Goodman, Jewish Themes in Spinoza’s Philosophy; Nadler, Spinoza’s Heresy; Smith, Spinoza, Liberalism; Roth, Spinoza, Descartes and Maimonides; and Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza; Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion.

37. For example, van Bunge, Spinoza Past and Present; van Bunge, “Spinoza’s Jewish Identity.”

38. Some modern philosophers might demure at the point, arguing perhaps that it is rationally permissible for Sarah to both (a) believe that God caused her to regain her sight and (b) believe that her belief that God caused her to regain her sight is unjustified. See, for example, Weatherson, “Do Judgments Screen Evidence?” See discussion in Srinivasan, “The Archimedean Urge.”

39. Garrett, “Spinoza’s Ethical Theory,” 287–8; Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 290.

40. Spinoza, Ethics, Book I, Appendix.

41. Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 6; Hobbes, De Homine, chap. XI, 4, 47.

42. Spinoza, Treatise, §1.