Where are the female radicals?

If one is interested in studying the role women played in radical circles and in the development of radical thought during the early modern period, one is confronted with the curious fact that there is hardly any research literature on the topic. Looking at standard accounts of the so-called Radical Enlightenment, one gets the impression that there are very few radical women worth mentioning, if any at all.¹ Although in recent years scholarship on the Radical Enlightenment has flourished and brought to light many texts, traditions, and ways of communication that were hitherto unknown or barely studied,² and although the term “Radical Enlightenment” itself has come under scrutiny and its meaning and legitimacy have become controversial,³ one matter still has to be studied in more depth: women’s participation in and contributions to radical circles and thought.⁴ One may thus ask: Where are the female radicals?

This special issue is concerned with investigating some of the various ways in which women participated in and contributed to radical circles and thought. Its main aim is to make these contributions visible; however, this endeavour also requires some critical reflection and readjustment of the historiographical categories we use, as well as an openness to expand our understanding of the notion “radical thought” in relation to its content and its historical and geographical demarcation.

As an interpretive tool, the term “Radical Enlightenment” was introduced into scholarship to interpret and structure the thought of a certain period of time in a specific way.⁵ This interpretative tool has seldom been applied to assess women’s participation in the intellectual world.⁶ If we aim at a more inclusive approach and at examining the thought of women and women’s activities, however, we might also have to readjust our conceptual framework accordingly. Acknowledging the unequal living conditions, and hence the different problems women faced, it becomes apparent that to act radically or to write radical texts could mean something quite different for women during the early modern period. Thus, we need to reconsider the topics and themes that are assumed to be characteristic of radical thought, the geographical and historical extension of radical thought, and the distinction between “radical” and “moderate.”

Concerning the first, some of the themes and topics that are central to standard discussions on radical thought, such as atheism and materialism, seem generally to be less relevant for women, even if a disenchanted worldview (be it materialist or simply disentangled from revealed religions) helped to strengthen, in some cases, awareness of their autonomy. Other themes that play a certain role in standard research on the Radical Enlightenment but do not figure there prominently might become central and very important: for example, gender equality, autonomous free will, or marriage. Still other topics that are not usually considered to be radical might gain significance, such as, for instance, education or subversive reconceptions of faith, which developed in a wide variety of ways, stretching from denial to harsh criticism of religion, until the radicalization of minoritarian Protestant trends. In this way, investigation into women’s thought enriches current debates on the Radical Enlightenment. Furthermore, the geography and chronology of radicalism might appear different when seen from the viewpoint of women writers. In fact, it seems that the first and perhaps most daring expressions of intellectual freedom by women and of feminist claims are to be sought before the beginning of the Radical Enlightenment, in late-Renaissance Italian culture, and outside of the most-studied areas, such as the Anglo-Dutch connection. Finally, labels such as “radical” or “moderate” should be employed with caution and always placed in appropriate contexts. It is crucial to note that there was not necessarily one unique set of “radical” or “moderate” ideas. Apparent radicalism in one sphere, such as materialism, irreligion, and atheism, did not necessarily translate into support for the equality of women in the social and political sphere, even though, in some cases, criticism of religion and the vindication of gender equality go hand-in-hand. On the other hand, apparent “moderatism” in another sphere – for instance, in politics – could nevertheless motivate some authors, labelled as “moderate” for other reasons, to contest and undermine the traditional basis of women’s subordination.

Despite the complexity of these different trends and the intertwininig of different aims they brought about, we still believe that the term “radical thought” is helpful to understand women’s acceptance and participation in the intellectual world. Many audacious women of the period transgressed barriers that were set for their gender in social, political, and theoretical contexts in both word and deed. They wrote sharp polemical texts, engaged with clandestine manuscripts, and challenged gender boundaries by performing bold actions. In hitherto unheard of ways, women made claims, such as demanding the right to vote and full access to education and profession, that were only to be granted in a widespread way in the twentieth century.

In this special issue, we do not intend to start with a normative concept of what feminine and/or feminist radical thought should imply.⁷ Rather, we intend to explore the field by studying the writings of women from various countries and backgrounds who were engaged in different debates and intellectual movements. It goes without saying that this collection of articles does not claim completeness. The ten articles of this special issue present case studies of radical thought by women from the mid-seventeenth century until the end of the eighteenth century, from Europe’s south in Italy, to France, Germany, The Low Countries, and England up to Europe’s north in Denmark-Norway. Many of these articles critically discuss the different understandings of the concept of “Radical Enlightenment,” as developed by Margaret Jacob, Jonathan Israel, and Martin Mulsow, in particular, and investigate in what ways these conceptions render it possible or impossible to consider women’s thought and agency, while exploring what kinds of methodological approaches might be useful in investigating women’s radical thought.

The first three articles cover a period before the “official” beginning of the Radical Enlightenment. Sabrina Ebbersmeyer’s article on Arcangela Tarabotti’s (1604–1652) radical criticism of the patriarchy takes place in the late Italian Renaissance and shows how and on what grounds Tarabotti affirmed women’s liberty and free will in all its theological and political implications, challenging patriarchy as a true “tyranny” and women’s subordination as “sacrilege” in relation to God. Ebbersmeyer provides evidence that Tarabotti’s treatise was considered to be politically dangerous, which explains why its publication was hindered in Italy and France and eventually led to its condemnation once printed in Holland.

The second article, by Gianni Paganini, examines a clandestine Latin manuscript dated 1659: Theophrastus redivivus. The first philosophical treatise of atheism, this anonymous work also dealt with the topic of sexual desire and, in this connection, with the issue of gender equality. This is the case in which the broader framework of a materialistic conception of the law of nature, before Spinoza, supported gender equality and, in particular, the equal right of women and men to sexual satisfaction. In the context of harsh criticism of the so-called “civil state,” the author subverts the institution of marriage and the hierarchy in which it results. Theophrastus’ approach can be compared to the contemporary view of Hobbes, but for the former liberty is the most valuable worth and contract a means of subjugation.

The third article, by Marrigje Paijmans et al., deals with the Dutch context in the longue durée (1500–1800). Taking as its starting point the notion of “agency,” the article analyses the life, work, and relations of three Dutch authors (Anna Bijns, Meynarda Verboom, and Margaretha van Dijk), as well as the representation of female radicalism in two literary works, in order to reassess the notion of radicalism with regard to a woman’s world. Paijmans et al. argue that these three figures gained agency by negotiating their position in patriarchal knowledge systems and by bending conventions within male-dominated networks to make their radical voices heard.

The fourth, seventh, and eighth articles each present case studies concerning feminine radicalism in northern Europe, Germany, and France. Juliane Engelhardt examines radical Protestant movements in England, the Holy Roman Empire, and the twin kingdom of Denmark and Norway from the 1690s to the 1760s. She argues that, in contrast to the intellectual environments of the Radical Enlightenment, it was easier for women to assert themselves within radical Protestant movements, such as the Quakers, the Philadelphians, and radical Pietist and Moravian communities. Jane Lead in London, Johanna Eleonora Petersen in Magdeburg, and Marie Wulf in Copenhagen are the most prominent figures to have joined feminine agency with religious motives, such as prophetism, the special status of women as the mothers of Jesus, and women as co-regents in the future millennium.

In her article “Émile Du Châtelet and her Examens de la Bible: a radical clandestine woman philosopher,” Maria Susana Seguin explores Du Châtelet’s clandestine work Examens de la Bible and asks the question of whether or not it is legitimate to talk about a feminine clandestine philosophy. As Du Châtelet’s work is, perhaps with the exception of Tarabotti’s Paternal Tyranny, the only one within the corpus of clandestine philosophical literature attributed to a woman, a possible answer to this question requires nuanced methodological and philosophical considerations. Based on her assessment of the feminine and feminist aspects of Du Châtelet’s work, Seguin concludes that, although its feminist nature is not self-evident, it still demonstrates that women were engaged in clandestine philosophical activity.

Anne-Sophie Sørup Nielsen critically assesses the term “Radical Enlightenment” as a historiographical category in relation to women’s philosophical writings. Focusing on the German context, Sørup Nielsen analyses the philosophical thought of Dorothea Erxleben (1715–1762), the first female medical doctor in Germany, as represented in her work Rigorous Investigation (1742). The author aims at developing a new approach to the classification of radical thinkers and concludes that substantial parts of Erxleben’s ideas can be categorized as radical.

The fifth and sixth, as well as the last two articles, are concerned with English radical thinkers. Martin Fog Lantz Arndal investigates Mary Astell’s (1666–1731) radical and subversive ideas concerning gender equality. By comparing Astell’s radical views to some conservative ideas about religion also found in her writings, Arndal challenges the view – held, among others, by Jonathan Israel – that radicalism and moderation are “mutually antagonistic,” and concludes that modernity and secularization do not necessarily march hand–in–hand.

In her article, “Catherine Trotter Cockburn and the Virtue of Atheists,” Jacqueline Broad explores Cockburn’s (1679?–1749) radical claim that it is possible for atheists to be virtuous. Analysing Cockburn’s response to William Warburton’s critique of Pierre Bayle’s position on this matter, as well as Cockburn’s letters to her niece, Ann Arbuthnot, Broad investigates if Cockburn’s views commit her to a naturalistic position. She concludes that we find in Cockburn’s writings a complex and nuanced position that should motivate scholars to reflect more on the close relation between secular and religious principles in radical thought.

Karen Green examines, in her article “Catherine Macaulay and the concept of ‘Radical Enlightenment’,” Macaulay’s (1731–1791) influential defence of the equal rights of men on the eve of the American and French revolutions. By critically assessing different notions of the concept “Radical Enlightenment” as developed by Margaret Jacob and Jonathan Israel, Green concludes that the religious aspects of Macaulay’s radical political ideas accord better with Jacob’s “ecumenical radical enlightenment” than they do with Israel’s secular characterization.

The last article of this special issue also addresses the controversial relationship between Enlightenment and secularism. In her article, “Radicalism, Religion and Mary Wollstonecraft,” Sarah Hutton challenges the assumption that “Enlightenment radicalism” was essentially secular. Hutton explores the role of religion in Wollstonecraft’s radical thought and argues that religion provided an important intellectual resource for Wollstonecraft’s political arguments. She concludes that religion and radicalism do not contradict each other in Wollstonecraft’s thought.

Despite the variety of topics, as well as historical and geographical contexts, some recurring themes become apparent across these ten articles. First, and this may not come as a surprise, many women were concerned with issues of gender inequality. They challenged marriage legislation, social hierarchies, and common understandings of gender roles and the limitations of women’s rights and liberties. Second, and related to the first, the majority of the articles collected here investigate various forms of political radicalism, whereas metaphysical radicalism arises only occasionally. And finally, most of the articles in this special issue address, in one way or another, issues of religion. Together, they show that religious belief does not necessarily exclude radical thought when it comes to gender equality. To this end, however, belief had to be reconceived almost from scratch, either in an anticonfessional direction or with a very critical approach to sacred texts and ecclesiastical institutions; sometimes, instead, gender equality fitted very well within an atheistic and materialistic version of radicalism. It seems that, in many instances, religious belief so reworked, or rather radical reconceptions of religion, could serve the radical political claims of women. These observations encourage us to re-evaluate the importance of claims for gender equality in the development of radical thought and to rethink the relation between religion, critique of religion, and radicalism, as radical religion (think of “Radical Reformation” and more generally of trends distinct from the “orthodox” mainstream) of the period also encouraged and promoted women’s emancipation. Moving rather from partial acceptance than from total denial, it was easier for some women to subvert the common wisdom and to advance their agenda of rights. This is an aspect, or a particular strategy, of radicalism that seems worth exploring.

With this special issue, we hope to inspire further research on women and radical thought in the early modern period, as well as critical reflection on the historiographical categories we use, in order to develop a more inclusive approach. Our intention, thereby, is to contribute to changing the standard narratives of Europe’s past in such a way that women’s thoughts and deeds attain their appropriate place therein.

Notes on contributors

Sabrina Ebbersmeyer is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Her main areas of expertise are Renaissance and Early Modern philosophy, as well as feminist history of philosophy. Her books include the monograph Homo agens (de Gruyter 2010), a translation of the letter exchange between Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes into German (Fink 2015), Women, Philosophy and Science: Italy and Early Modern Europe (Springer 2020, co-edited with Gianni Paganini), and Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–1680): A Philosopher in her Historical Context (Springer 2021, co-edited with Sarah Hutton).

Gianni Paganini (Università del Piemonte Orientale), Fellow of the Research Centre of the Accademia dei Lincei (Rome), edited with G. Canziani the first atheist clandestine manuscript: Theophrastus redivivus (1659). He is also the author of Skepsis. Le Débat des modernes sur le scepticisme (Vrin 2008), which was awarded by the Académie Française. In 2010 he received the prize for his work in history of philosophy by the Accademia dei Lincei (Rome). His current research concentrates on seventeenth-century philosophy (Gassendi, Hobbes, and clandestine philosophy) and the Enlightenment (Emilie Du Châtelet, Hume, and Diderot).

Notes

1 See, for instance, Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment; Israel, Radical Enlightenment (on Emilie du Châtelet, pp. 85–6); Mulsow, Radikale Frühaufklärung. However, it should be mentioned that women’s role in the general Enlightenment has received considerable attention in recent decades: see, for example, Hunt et al., Women and the Enlightenment; Knott and Taylor, Women, Gender and Enlightenment; Hesse, The Other Enlightenment; DeLucia, A Feminine Enlightenment.

2 See, for example, Paganini, Jacob, and Laursen, Clandestine Philosophy.

3 See Israel and Mulsow, Radikalaufklärung; Ducheyne, Reassessing the Radical Enlightenment.

4 Notable exceptions are Hutton, “Liberty of Mind”; Davies, “The Radical Enlightenment”; Green, “Catharine Macaulay’s Enlightenment Faith.”

5 See Stjernfeld’s article on the origin of the term, “‘Radical Enlightenment’.”

6 The topic of women’s equality was dealt with by Israel especially in the second volume of his “radical” trilogy: Enlightenment Contested, 552–7 (on “basic equality”), 572–89 (on “Sex, Marriage, and the Equality of Women”), 866–7 (on Radical Enlightenment as “a package of basic concepts and values”).

7 Most of the articles presented in this volume resulted from an international workshop co-organized by Sabrina Ebbersmeyer and Gianni Paganini on Women and Radical Thought: From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, which took place at the University of Copenhagen in November 2018. This workshop was part of the research group Thinking the Republic of Letters of the Center for Modern European Studies at the University of Copenhagen.