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ABSTRACT
Pufendorf makes a clear distinction between the physical constitution of human beings and their value as human beings, stressing that the latter is justified exclusively by the regular use of the free will. According to Pufendorf, the regular use of free will requires certain inventions (divine as well as human) imposed on the free will and called moral entities. He claims that these inventions determine the moral quality of a human being as well as the standards according to which human beings and their actions are able to be judged. This article examines the normative aspects of Pufendorf's concepts of moral value and moral estimation in regard to the epistemological question of the accessibility of moral entities for human beings. In the first part, it reconstructs Pufendorf's doctrine of moral entities and the place of moral estimation in this doctrine. In the second part, it presents Pufendorf's account of the moral philosophy as a science in order to explain his theory of moral normativity as imposed, and the role of a person in regard to their own moral status. In the last part, it illustrates some consequences in regard to the problem of slavery in Pufendorf.
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this article was presented at the Esteem and Self-Esteem conference organized by Andreas Blank at the University of Klagenfurt in 2019. The present version has benefited from the comments of anonymous referees for this journal, for which I am very grateful. I would like also to thank John Walsh and especially Anna Ezekiel for helpful remarks and copyediting. Work on this article was generously funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) project number 417359636.
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Notes
1 Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis = OHC.
2 OHC I.7.1. Tranlastion by Andrew Tooke in Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man, 100.
3 OHC I.7.5: “Per quam efficitur, ut nos nemini praeferamus, reputantes, caeteros aeque bene suo libero arbitrio, ac nos, uti posse, quo aequo pollent; cujus legitimus usus unicum illud est, quod homo pro suo reputare possit, & quo sese aestimare aut despicere queat” (translation in Pufendorf, De Officio hominis et civis, 136). In his English translation, Andrew Tooke uses “a free use of their Understanding” for the original “suo libero arbitrio” and “the regular use whereof” for the original “cujus legitimus usus” (see Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man, 103). This decision to translate “free use of the understanding” instead of “free will” can be explained by the fact that for Pufendorf the free will always uses the understanding, which leads the will, like a torch leads a person in the dark (see JNG I.3.3), which in this way makes it free. It is remarkable that Pufendorf claims the rational conduct of free will to be “that alone which a Man can call his own”, and that a person’s value as a human being is founded in this exclusive property. It seems likely that John Locke, who follows Pufendorf very closely, adopts and extends this idea of value, claiming in his Second Treatise on Government that there is a property in our own person, namely the “property of labour”, which is exclusively ours and “puts the difference of value on every thing” (Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 296).
4 Pufendorf’s idea that the regular use of free will (and therefore value) is due to imposition by (divine) will implies some conceptual queries, which Stephen Darwall identifies as a kind of deficiency of Pufendorf’s theory. According to Darwall, Pufendorf is using a circular argument: “we encounter a fundamental instability, since the idea of ‘moral power’ as Pufendorf understands it seems already to presuppose a fundamentally equal sociability, dignity, and right, where Pufendorf seeks to derive these equal moral powers from God’s superior moral power” (Darwall, “Pufendorf on Morality, Sociability, and Moral Powers,” 237). As I argue in this article, there are two perspectives in Pufendorf’s theory: an ontological one and an epistemological one, where the second is the fundamental one. According to my interpretation, there are some misunderstandings of Pufendorf’s theory due to the overemphasis on the ontological perspective. The consequence of my interpretation is that I do not share Darwall’s attestation (which is a common interpretation) that natural law and morality in Pufendorf is founded merely on God’s use of moral power. This, according to Darwall, is in opposition to Grotius and Hobbes, who claim the foundation of natural law and morality in rational self-interest. I will argue in this paper that Pufendorf’s theory implies both aspects (rational self-interest and theological voluntarism) and that the difference is not fundamental but rather due to different perspectives of argumentation (an epistemological one and an ontological one).
5 De jure naturae et gentium = JNG.
6 JNG I.1.2.
7 Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, 138–9.
8 JNG I.1.1. This and all following translations of passages from JNG are drawn from Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations.
9 Kari Saastamoinen claims human dignity as expressing “a comparative superiority in relation to other creatures” (Saastamoinen, “Pufendorf on Natural Equality, Human Dignity, and Self-Esteem,” 41). I agree with this, but with the caveat that such comparative superiority is due to the capability to understanding and to free will and therefore to moral conduct. According to Pufendorf, human dignity is always linked to and justified by participation in the realm of moral entities.
10 JNG I.1.1.
11 Ibid., I.1.2.
12 In prominent research on Pufendorf there are controversial interpretations of whether Pufendorf’s claim entails metaphysical aspects or not. On the one side, there are positions like that of Ian Hunter, who opposes Pufendorf’s project to metaphysical claims, but stresses this in regard to political theory: “We cannot appreciate the true character of Pufendorf’s reconstruction of ethics and politics until we realise that he is no longer in the business of attempting to derive political obligation via metaphysical reflection on man’s rational and moral being … Pufendorf was among the first to see that the desacralisation of civil governance meant that individuals would have to learn to accede to their civil duties independently of cultivating an ‘integral’ moral personality – a practice which would have to be restricted to the domain of private spiritual striving” (Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, 161). On the other side, there are interpretations of Pufendorf as providing his own “metaphysics of ethics” (see, for example, Schneewind, Invention of Autonomy, 138).
13 See also JNG I.1.4.
14 Ibid., I.1.3.
15 JNG I.1.3: “We may define Moral Entities to be certain Modes superadded to Natural Things and Motions, by Understanding Beings; chiefly for the guiding and tempering the Freedom of voluntary Actions, and for the procuring of a decent Regulatory in the Method of Life.”
16 It is not very clear whether Pufendorf is using the Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes when he claims in JNG I.1.2 a difference between the causality of the internal force of instinct of nature and of the human free will. I will consider this difference below.
17 JNG I.1.2.
18 This cooperation leads to the formulation “regular use of the free will”, which Pufendorf uses in order to mark the crucial criterion for the concept of value (see note 4 above, OHC I.7.5, and JNG I.1.2).
19 JNG I.1.2.
20 OHC, “Preface.”
21 Once again, the English translation from 1715 offers peculiar interpretation while translating “ex lumine rationis” with “from the light of nature”. A possible explanation for this could be the consideration of the content of thinking and willing (which is experience and natural desires), and not of the artificial regulation of the faculties of understanding and free will (which is invention imposed to these faculties).
22 In the Preface of his Discours sur les origines et les fondements de l’inégalité (1755), Jean-Jacques Rousseau acknowledges Pufendorf for distinguishing between rules that nature follows and rules that nature prescribes to rational beings, and claims this distinction as a merit of early modern philosophy in contrast to ancient philosophy. But Rousseau accuses Pufendorf of providing a metaphysical account of epistemic access to the rules nature prescribes, instead of acknowledging the instinct of nature as the actual source of such normativity. Rousseau’s critique of Pufendorf’s moral epistemology seems to imply a deficient understanding of the function of the fundamental difference between natural entities and moral entities in Pufendorf. However, Rousseau has reasons for this critique. As Schneewind points out, Pufendorf is claiming that every mature person is able to “comprehend at least the more general precepts” (JNG I.3.3), but more detailed knowledge is a privilege of authorities (JNG II.3.13. See Schneewind, Invention of Autonomy, 126).
23 JNG I.1.5. “ … ad normam entium physicorum ista quoque moralia in classes redigere. Idque tum quia in illa majori studio inquisivere philosophi, sic ut ex eorundem comparatione hisce multum lucis accedere possit; tum quia vix aliter quam ad analogiam entium physicorum intellectus noster materiae immersus moralia concipere valet.” See also JNG I.1.6–7.
24 Ibid., I.1.12.
25 Here it is possible to exemplify that the relation between natural and moral entities is just an analogical one. When Pufendorf differentiates between the natural moral state and the contingent moral state of a person, he is pointing out that the natural moral state is not the state of natural entities before every imposition of moral entities (JNG I.1.7: “Naturalem hominis statum vocamus, non quod is citra omnem impositionem ex physicis principiis essentiae humanae fluat”). Instead, he is claiming it as the state resulting from the imposition of some (divine) reason different to impositions made by human beings (JNG I.1.7: “sed quod ex impositione Numinis, non ex arbitrio hominum, hominem statim ab ipsa nativitate comitetur”). This specification also points out the difference between creation (natural entities) and imposition (moral entities) on the level of divine action. But this perspective should also be separated from the epistemological one of acknowledging the rules of reason as divine impositions or divine commands, which determines the difference between prudential and moral rules in Pufendorf. I will discuss this in the second part of this article noting Pufendorf’s critique of Aristotelian moral philosophy as failing to attain the status of science.
26 John Locke states something similar when he defines the state of nature in his Second Treatise of Government not only as a “State of perfect Freedom” but also as a state “of Equality” in Power and Jurisdiction due to being part of “the same species” and being “born … to use the same faculties” (Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 269; see also 304). In Pufendorf, this relational aspect of the natural moral state is also seen by some scholars as the foundation of the duty for respect and humanity, which leads to the difference between Pufendorf’s concept of the natural state and that of Hobbes (see, for instance, Dann, Gleichheit und Gleichberechtigung, 98).
27 The possibility of restriction of the natural state is also included in Locke’s discussions of: (1) the state of war (and slavery); (2) property; and (3) paternal or parental power (see Locke, Two Treatises on Government, 278–318). In the first case, a person harming the law of nature is no longer “under the ties of the Common Law of Reason” and “has no other Rule, but that of Force and Violence, and so may be treated as Beasts of Prey, those dangerous and noxious Creatures” (279). In the second case, a person uses their natural freedom to create “Property in his own Person”: the person is able in this way to remove something “out of the State of Nature” by using “the Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands” and to make “it his Property” (287–8). Third, Locke discusses the case where someone could be temporary under the subjection of another, analyzing the status of children who “are not born in this full state of Equality, though they are born to it” (304).
28 JNG I.1.17: “Videntur autem modi commodissime posse distribui in affectivos, et aestimativos: secundum illos personae certa ratione affectae intelliguntur, secundum hoc personae et res aestimari aptae sunt.” It is significant here that Pufendorf is using the term “affection” and not “determination”, since this gives us an idea of what he claims the effects are of the recognition of moral entities. There seems to be a lack of sensitivity in regard to this formulation. For example, Schneewind states that Pufendorf “offers no account of how a recognition of a moral entity can have effects in the physical world” (Schneewind, Invention of Autonomy, 138). But it seems to be clear that such an effect is thought merely as an affection and as such it has the binding force of advice or counsel and can oblige the free will to a certain action only if the person, who recognizes the affect as given by reason, is cognizant enough to recognize it also as the will and command of God. I will discuss this aspect in the next section of the article.
29 JNG I.1.17 and I.1.18.
30 Ibid., I.1.17 and I.1.19-20.
31 Ibid., I.1.17 and I.1.22.
32 Ibid.: I.2.8: “Knowledge of the Law of Nature … which includes all Moral and Civil Doctrins that are genuine and solid, to make this Knowledge, we say, fully come up to the Measure and Perfection of Science.”
33 Ibid., I.2.1.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., I.2.3.
36 Ibid., I.2.8.
37 OHC I.3.
38 Pufendorf points out that when he uses the term natural state in regard to human beings, he is referring not to natural entities before every imposition, but rather to the state of imposition of (divine) reason before every (human) contingent imposition: “Naturalem hominis statum vocamus, non quod is citra omnem impositionem ex physicis principiis essentiae humanae fluat; sed quod ex impositione Numinis, non ex arbitrio hominum, hominem statim ab ipsa nativitate comitetur” (JNG I.1.7). The state of initially imposed (divine) reason mentioned here is the inevitable sociability of human beings as the principle of moral attribution (in respect to natural law). But despite this strict conceptual division, there is still the epistemological perspective in Pufendorf, in which empirical perceptions and observations of natural entities are important starting points for the rational derivation of the imposed (divine) reason in human nature. But Pufendorf abstains from achieving knowledge of the intentions of God as such. For him, it is not possible to derive this from empirical observations of God’s creation. For this epistemological perspective in Pufendorf, see Denzer, Moralphilosophie und Naturrecht bei Pufendorf, 40-49; on the function of empirical observation, see 48. Ian Hunter suggests an interpretation of the epistemological account of Pufendorf concerning the observation of “the requirements of the exigent condition in which” the reflecting person “happened to find himself” (Hunter, “The Invention of Human Nature,” 933).
39 I already mentioned in the first part of this article that within his doctrine of moral entities Pufendorf defines the rationality of a person as the essential property of our natural state. Some scholars claim the method of construction of this natural state is a resolutive-compositive one (see Medick, Naturzustand und Naturgeschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, 31; see also Wolfgang Röd, Geometrischer Geist und Naturrecht). Medick points out that the methodology in early modern natural law based on the construction of natural state as an analytical-normative axiom is crucial for the normative claim of natural law and political theory of that period (Medick, Naturzustand und Naturgeschichte, 39). Röd provides an impressive analysis of Pufendorf’s methodology that also helps us to understand the relevance of Erhard Weigel’s application of mathematical methods in social disciplines to Pufendorf’s own methodology, which leans on Weigel’s approach but develops it further.
40 OHC I.3.9.
41 Ibid., I.3.10. On the one hand Pufendorf links the prudential aspect to the will of God: “And since he that designs the End, cannot but be supposed to design those Means without which the End cannot be obtain’d, it follows that all such Actions as tend generally and are absolutely necessary to the Preservation of this Society, are commanded by the Law of Nature” (OHC I.3.9). On the other hand, he suggests that in human reason there is already a necessity to observe prudential reasoning as if it is a law: “He has enjoyn’d us Mortals, to observe these Dictates of our Reason as Laws … to the Constitution of which a Superior is necessary to be supposed” (OHC I.3.10).
42 Ibid., I.2.4.
43 Cumberland, De legibus naturae, V.27.
44 JNG I.6.5: “Obligationem igitur supra definivimus, per qualitatem moralem operativa[m], qua quis praestare aut pati quid tenetur (quando nempe obligationem consideramus, prout haeret in eo, qui obligatur. Secus atque Rich. Cumberland de leg. nat. c. 5. §. 27. qui obligationem definit, prout est actus legislatoris, quo actiones legis suae conformes eis, quibus lex fertur, necessarias esse indicat).” This passage is not included in the first edition of 1672 because Pufendorf was not acquainted with Cumberland’s work at that point. He added this passage in the second edition to explain the difference with Cumberland, who held the command of a superior alone to be a sufficient condition for obligation ignoring the subjective accomplishment of the obliged person.
45 OHC I.2.5.
46 JNG I.8.3.
47 Ibid., I.8.2. In a paper on the development of the concept of the forum internum in the German Enlightenment, I argued that Pufendorf’s account of the forum divinum, as a Protestant critique of medieval concepts of conscience, should be understood as an enlightened requirement attempting to support practical rationality in human behavior (which is the organization of one’s own actions according to rules instead of following natural instinct). This implies that a constant judging of the accordance of one’s own actions with norms will increase such accordance and lead to habits of rational conduct (see Mihaylova, “Gewissen als Pflicht gegen sich selbst”).
48 Ibid., I.7.1-3, and I.7.7; see also OHC I.2.12-13. Grotius does something similar when (in the first two pages of the Prolegomena to his De jure belli ac pacis) he criticizes the ancient understanding according to which justice could be understood as the right of the strongest. Grotius tries to clarify the fundamental difference between justice and the right of the strongest by explaining the difference between justice and utility: while utility always refers to an individual perspective, which could possibly conflict with another individual perspective, justice should be considered as a universal norm with the purpose of regulating conflicting individual interests.
49 Such a case would imply that the civil law deviates from the prescriptions of natural law. This enables critique of the civil law using natural law as the standard which the civil law must adhere to.
50 JNG I.7.7.
51 Ibid., I.7.6.
52 The idea that esteem and self-esteem have different functions is also present in contemporary debate (see, for example, Brennan and Pettit, The Economy of Esteem). While Pufendorf seems to share the analysis of such modern theories in regard to the function and mechanisms of esteem in social and political life, he considers the concept of self-esteem in a different way, stressing its function in regard to the moral integrity of a person. However, my aim in this article is not to analyze the psychological mechanisms of the social function of esteem and self-esteem in Pufendorf, but rather the theoretical frame and the normative standards according to which judgements about esteem and self-esteem are grounded.
53 JNG V.2.6.
54 I am only sketching here some important possible objections against Pufendorf without claiming to make a comprehensive account on this subject. For more detailed analysis, see Zurbuchen, “Dignity and Equality in Pufendorf’s Natural Law Theory.”
55 JNG VI.3.2.
56 Ibid., VI.3.4.
57 Ibid., VI.3.5.
58 Ibid., VI.3.6.
59 Ibid. Pufendorf considers here only the debt that a prisoner of war incurs for his life and body being kept free from harm. He is not commenting on the implications of the difference between the just and unjust war, like Locke does. For a general discussion of the advantages of Locke’s discussion of the relation between war and slavery in opposition to Pufendorf’s more extensive idea of the possibility of slavery, see Franke, Sklaverei und Unfreiheit im Naturrecht des 17. Jahrhunderts.
60 JNG VI.3.7.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., VI.3.8.
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Katerina Mihaylova
Katerina Mihaylova is a post-doctoral fellow and lecturer at Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg working mainly on modern moral and political philosophy. She got her M.A. and her Ph.D. from Ludwig-Maximillian-University Munich with theses on Kant's theory of space and on the function of sincerity in Kant's theory of obligation. She has written articles on 18th century German moral and legal philosophy and edited some volumes on Jean-Jacques Rousseau, on conscience, on obligation, and on sincerity in the enlightenment philosophy.