Abstract
Peacebuilding as an approach to assisting states in the transition from war to peace has been around since the mid-1990s, and has become a policy approach for most multi- and bilateral donors. Evidence that it is an effective approach to prevent the return of violent conflict is still lacking. This article explores the many difficulties of evaluating peacebuilding programmes, and furthers the position that formal metric indicators are not suited to war-torn contexts. Using the case of Sri Lanka, it highlights the risks of using development reporting as a proxy measurement of peacebuilding and explores the possibility of more locally derived qualitative methods of evaluation.
Notes
1 According to Cowen and Shenton (1998) there are ‘two forms’ of development, ‘intentional’ (interventionist) and immanent (what would happen anyway) (cited by Morse Citation2008, p. 341).
2 This includes Japan.
3 It has been suggested that fundraising by the LTTE for humanitarian purposes was largely a cover for procuring funds that would be used to buy weapons, however the author did witness, among other things, LTTE demining programmes as well as solar electrification projects.