Leo Strauss: education and the body politic

Abstract

Leo Strauss is commonly cited as a seminal influence for the neoconservatism that, in the minds of many commentators, dominates the administration of George W. Bush. What intersection, if any, exists between Strauss's views and neoconservatism? This paper investigates that question by studying Strauss's writings on liberal education and assessing whether, and on what grounds, liberal education as conceived by Strauss is capable of the vital role which he assigns to it. In addressing this question the paper examines the work of Joseph Tussman, a contemporary of Strauss, as a means of elucidating the depth and distinctiveness of the Straussian project. The essay concludes that while Strauss may have much in common with the themes of neoconservatism, his priorities extend beyond the neoconservative agenda and, in some cases, run counter to it.

Keywords:

• character education
• democratic education
• Joseph Tussman
• Leo Strauss
• neoconservatism
• political education

Notes

1. The two essays (1968a, b), which represent the only occasions during which Strauss explicitly treated liberal education, were delivered in June 1959 and March 1960. Tussman dates the foreword to his book as ‘July 1960’. A central question before us is whether, while sharing a time and political context, the two authors perceived and addressed similar or even identical problems. Strauss, by the way, subsequently consolidated his two addresses (1965).

2. Although Strauss does assign liberal education a political role, as we will demonstrate below, it is not its only role. In ‘Liberal education and responsibility’ (1968b), Strauss suggests that the purpose of liberal education may be preparation for philosophy or the cultivation of human excellence. The purpose of liberal education transcends the political and, in fact, gives direction to the political.

3. Tussman betrays some anger as he speaks of ‘the attempt to find salvation in competition and machinery, in the offsetting clash of countervailing power’ (1968, p. 99).

4. The American founding therefore proceeds from one response to a perennial question regarding liberal democracy: ‘Which is prior, in order of fundamental importance: a good legal constitution whose rules and practices regulate the actions of individuals in and out of office; or the inner spiritual disposition of the citizens, especially those who fill the highest offices?’ (Pangle & Pangle, 1993, p. 2). Classical republics, such as Athens, had insisted that the priority belongs to inner spiritual disposition (itself the product of character formation). As a means of cultivating the civic virtues, classical authors recommended that religion, music and poetry be carefully controlled and then exploited by placing them at the center of public life. In this regard, at least, the American Founders generally departed from classical theory. Rather than focus on dispositions and character, the dangers of liberty would be met through sound fundamental laws and institutions. This remains the dominant view in liberal democratic theory. See, for example, Kateb (1992, especially pp. 37–56), who argues that well‐ordered democratic institutions will develop the virtues necessary to sustain them; and Holmes (1995), who maintains that individual virtues, compared with proper institutional arrangements, lack the reliability required to protect democratic institutions. Hirschman (1977) traces the emergence of the view that democratic government rests on political institutions rather than individual virtue.

5. In this essay, Galston provides a useful review of many other contemporary scholars who argue that democratic institutions rely on individual virtue. See especially pages 37–39.

6. For a detailed analysis of Strauss and neoconservative thought, see Norton (2004), Smith (2006), Zuckert and Zuckert (2006) and Pangle (2006).

7. For an instructive account of a possible foreign policy that is consistent with Strauss's moderate political expectations, see West (2007).

8. See Gerson (1996), Kristol (1995), Devigne (1994) and Steinfels (1979).

9. Despite the commonality between Strauss and neoconservatism, it is well to recall that Strauss's priorities and concerns extend beyond the political preoccupation of neoconservatism. This is evident as Strauss points past the best democratic regime, and toward the best regime simply.