Abstract
This paper deals with the coordination of a supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a price setting retailer. The manufacturer offers a single product to the retailer, who faces time and price sensitive demand. Under explicit cost information, optimal quantity–price pairs are derived for an integrated scenario and a decentralized scenario by considering the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader. It is shown that a conventional revenue sharing contract does not coordinate the chain. Then a coordination contract is used – with a fraction of the retailer's generated revenue, the manufacturer also shares a fraction of the retailer's cost and it is shown that the coordination contract cuts out channel conflict and leads to a win–win result. The revenue sharing fraction, wholesale price and range of cost sharing fraction, within which a win–win result is possible, are determined in exact form. A numerical example is presented to explain the proposed model.
Acknowledgements
The author is thankful to the Editor in Chief and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments for the improvement of the paper.