Skills and Knowledge - Nothing but Memory?

Abstract

The aim of this article is to enquire into neuroscientific research on memory and relate it to topics of skill, knowledge and consciousness. The article outlines some contemporary theories on procedural and working memory, and discusses what contributions they give to sport science and philosophy of sport. It is argued that memory research gives important insights to the neuronal structures and events involved in knowledge and consciousness contributing to sport skills, but that these explanations are not exhaustive. The article argues that phenomenal consciousness in skills is not explained by the neuroscience of memory, and hence neither are skills.

Resumen

El propósito de este artículo es el indagar en la investigación neurocientífica sobre la memoria y relacionarla con los temas de la habilidad, el saber, y la consciencia. El artículo bosqueja algunas teorías contemporáneas sobre la memoria de procedimiento y la de trabajo, y discute qué contribuciones hacen estas a la ciencia deportiva y la filosofía del deporte. Se argumenta que la investigación sobre la memoria da como resultado revelaciones importantes en cuanto a las estructuras y acontecimientos neuronales implicados en el saber y la consciencia que contribuyen a las habilidades deportivas, pero que tales explicaciones no son exhaustivas. El artículo sostiene que la consciencia fenomenal de las habilidades no se aclara con la neurociencia sobre la memoria, y por ende tampoco las habilidades en sí mismas.

Zusammenfassung

Das Ziel dieses Artikels ist eine Analyse der neurowissenschaftlichen Gedächtnisforschung und das Aufzeigen Ihrer Verbindungen zu Themen wie Fertigkeiten, Wissen und Bewusstsein. Der Beitrag skizziert einige zeitgenössische Theorien über das prozedurale und Arbeitsgedächtnis und diskutiert, welchen Beitrag sie zur Sportwissenschaft und zur Philosophie des Sports liefern. Es wird dargelegt, dass die gedächtnisbezogene Forschung wichtige Erkenntnisse über neuronale Strukturen, Wissens- und Bewusstseinsvorgänge in Bezug auf sportliche Fertigkeiten liefert, dass diese Erklärungen jedoch nicht ausreichend sind. Der vorliegende Artikel erläutert, dass das phänomenale Bewusstsein bei Fertigkeiten – und bei Fertigkeiten selbst – nicht durch Neurowissenschaften des Gedächtnisses erklärt werden.

Résumé

Le but de cet article est d'explorer la recherche sur la mémoire en neurosciences et de la rapprocher du sujet des habiletés, de la connaissance et de la conscience. L'article décrit quelques théories contemporaines sur la mémoire procédurale et de travail, et discute leurs contributions à la science du sport et à la philosophie du sport. Il est démontré que la recherche sur la mémoire fournit un aperçu important sur les structures neuronales et sur les événements impliqués dans la connaissance et la conscience qui contribuent aux habiletés sportives, mais que ces explications sont incomplètes. L'article soutient que les neurosciences de la mémoire n'expliquent ni la conscience phénoménale dans les habiletés ni les habiletés elles-mêmes.

Keywords:

• skill
• knowledge
• memory
• consciousness
• neuroscience

Notes

See e.g. Horn (2008), Tenenbaum and Eklund (2007), Weinberg and Gould (2003). Beilock, Wierenga and Carr (2003) review memory research in sport. They show that most work is done on the ability to recall and describe performance. I will try to show it is the work on working memory and long-term memory that deserves interest, not episodic memory.

The belief that a mental act comes before, and is distinct from a motor act has a long tradition. Works of Davidson (1963) and Goldman (1970) are related to Aristotle's (2004a) practical syllogism, but also to Descartes' (1996) writings.

See e.g. Schmidt and Lee (2005).

Both Plato (1997, 85) and Aristotle (2004b, 449b–450b) discuss memory, but memory has hardly been present when philosophers have discussed knowledge and consciousness since.

For discussions, see Roediger, Dudai and Fitzpatrick (2007).

There is a philosophical distinction here between being able to, and knowing how to. One might say that I still know how to ride a bicycle after I paralysed my legs, but I'm not able to. This leaves the question if skill and know-how are the same. It is strange to claim that a paralysed person has cycling skills, but perhaps (s)he has know-how? We usually say it is possible to lose a skill, like when ‘choking’ before an audience, but perhaps the person still has know-how. This article does not leave room for debating such subtleties. For a discussion connected to neuroscience and memory, see Bennett and Hacker (2003, ch. 5).

Kandel (2006, 132–3) uses the distinction between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’ unreflectively, where the first is equivalent to explicit memory, the latter to implicit memory.

Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) present a theory of how experts encode information into long-term memory faster and keep information more directly accessible than non-experts. I will not discuss their theory since it limits itself to a difference in explicit memory performance. For a critique of Ericsson and Kintsch, see Gobet (2000).

See Baars (1997, ch. 4), Gazzaniga, Ivry and Mangun (2002, ch. 7, 16), Kandel (2006, ch. 23) and Koch (2004, ch. 9–11).

Goldman-Rakic (see e.g. 1996) used single-cell recording to identify the neuronal events of working memory. If consciousness just is working memory, the identity reduction is fulfilled.

Sport psychology underestimates attention as part of skill since ‘less is more’ – meaning less cortical activity associated with attention is better for high performance. I would rather interpret attention in skills as better attention.

For a more thorough treatment of psychological and phenomenal consciousness in sport, see Birch (2009).

There's a link here to Polanyi's (1962) concepts of focal and subsidiary/tacit awareness/knowledge worth investigating.

Rowlatt uses the term access consciousness, but I believe we can substitute the terms without much further ado. This has not been controversial in philosophical literature lately.

See e.g. Roediger, Zaromb and Goode (2009).

Pain, a raw feel, is standardly considered a prime example of phenomenal consciousness; it is something it is like to be in pain (Kim 2006, ch. 1, 8).

For a philosophical discussion on blindsight and consciousness, see Holt (2003).

Brain regions involved in sensory memory have so far been difficult to pinpoint, as Rowlatt admits (2009, 73). They range from regions in sensory cortex, to the lateral prefrontal cortex and inferior temporal lobe and the hippocampus, temporal parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Koch 2004, 203). It could be argued that one can have perceptions without having sensory memory. One could have neural events in the V1 of visual cortex without having neural events in the brain regions associated with sensory memory.

See Milner, Corkin and Tauber (1968) and Wearing (2005).

Does one need to be awake to have a phenomenal state? It is common to claim that we have to be awake to be conscious (Searle 2002, 7), but I believe this refers to psychological consciousness. It seems there's something it's like being asleep, distinct from what it's like being awake. Maybe there's even a phenomenal state of a coma?

In the philosophy of mind, a zombie is usually described as an agent with psychological consciousness (showing intention, attention, rationality) but without phenomenal consciousness. There's no ‘what's it like’ state to being a zombie, (Chalmers 1996). Both Wallace (2006) and Koch (2004, 194) seem to have a zombie view of athletes. But they must be wrong: there is a very strong ‘what's it like’ state when performing sport, as most can confess.

See e.g. Gazzaniga, Ivry and Mangun (2002, ch. 8), Kandel (2006, ch. 8, 10), LeDoux (2002, ch. 5), and Koch (2004, ch. 11).

See e.g. LeDoux (2002, ch. 6).

Interesting investigations important to understanding sport skills not covered here concern the ability to predict and plan the future. This is seen as a memory capacity by e.g. Schacter, Addis and Buckner (2007).

This obscure view is presented by famous neuroscientist LeDoux, claiming that ‘you are your synapses’ (2002). Imagine having synapses over for dinner: certainly a strange ‘guest’.

For a critique of expert performance as automation, see Birch (2010).

Dreyfus (2007) argues that expert skills are intuitive and hence goes on without consciousness interfering. Bargh and Chartrand (1999) argue that most of our life is automated and consciousness is more or less an epiphenomenon. Although Dreyfus's view is more nuanced (see Eriksen 2010) than simply stating ‘experts are not conscious’, Breivik's (2007) and Montero's (2010) critiques of Dreyfus's exclusion of consciousness are on target.

An important contribution here is Montero (2010). She challenges the idea that (conscious) attention and (bodily) awareness hinders highly skilled movement.

Thompson (2007, ch. 8) delivers a broadside to the idea that consciousness is reducible to the brain. His counter-example to the brain-in-the-vat argument is somewhat analogous to the rejection of the reducibility of skill presented here.