Concerning a Moral Duty to Cheat in Games

Abstract

Stimulated by Hugh Upton's recent article in this journal, in which he argues that there can be a moral duty to cheat in games, I attempt to examine his claims. Much of what he writes revolves around examples from two sports, cricket and rugby, and with differing connections to those games' rules. While the example from cricket is said to involve a breach of the spirit of that game, it is contravention of the written rules of rugby on which the latter part of Upton's case focuses. Given limited space I concentrate on the cricketing example, but several of the points I make about that apply also to when rule-breaking itself is involved. My conclusions express doubts about whether a case for a moral duty to cheat in games has been established.

Resumen

Estimulado por el artículo reciente de Hugh Upton en esta revista académica, en el cual el argumenta que puede existir la obligación moral de hacer trampa en los juegos, intento poner a examen sus afirmaciones. Mucho de lo que escribe torna alrededor de ejemplos en dos deportes, cricket y rugby, con diferentes puntos de connexion con las reglas de esos juegos. Mientras que el ejemplo del cricket se presenta como algo que acarrea una ruptura del espríritu del juego, es en la infracción de las reglas escritas del rugby sobre las que la a parte del argumento de Upton se centra. Por cuestiones de espacio me limito al ejemplo del cricket, pero varias de las cuestiones que planteo acerca de este tema vienen al caso también cuando la ruptura misma de las reglas se ve implicada. Mis conclusiones expresan dudas acerca de si se ha podido establecer un caso que soporte la obligación moral de hacer trampa en los juegos.

Zusammenfassung

Angeregt durch Hugh Uptons letzten Artikel in dieser Zeitschrift, in dem er argumentiert, dass es eine moralische Pflicht gäbe, in Spielen zu betrügen, versuche ich, seine Behauptung zu überprüfen. Vieles von dem, was er schreibt, dreht sich um Beispiele aus zwei Sportarten, Cricket und Rugby, und unterschiedlichen Verbindungen zu deren Reglement. Während das Beispiel Cricket einen Verstoß gegen den Geist dieses Spiels behandeln soll, ist es bei Rugby eine Regelverletzung, auf die der Fokus im letzten Teil von Uptons Darstellung liegt. Angesichts des begrenzten Platzes konzentriere ich mich auf das Cricket-Beispiel, aber einige der Punkte, die ich diesbezüglich anspreche, lassen sich auch auf das Regelbrechen selbst anwenden. In meinen Schlussfolgerungen äußere ich Zweifel, ob sich die moralische Pflicht, in Spielen zu betrügen, bereits etabliert hat.

Résumé

Stimulé par le récent article de Hugh Upton dans ce journal, dans lequel il soutient qu'il peut y avoir un devoir moral à tricher dans les jeux, j'essaye d'examiner ses observations. Beaucoup de ce qu'il écrit tourne autour d'exemples pris dans deux sports, le cricket et le rugby, et avec des rapports différents aux règles de ces jeux. Alors que l'exemple du cricket permet de montrer qu'il implique une infraction de l'esprit de ce jeu, c'est l'infraction aux règles écrites du rugby sur laquelle la dernière partie de l'étude d'Upton se concentre. Étant donné l'espace limité je me concentre sur l'exemple du cricket, mais plusieurs des points que je soulève s'appliquent aussi à la situation o[ugrave] la règle elle-même est impliquée. Mes conclusions mettent en doute l'idée qu'un devoir moral de tricher dans les jeux a bien été établi.

Keywords:

• cheating
• rules
• spirit of the game
• sport

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks to two anonymous reviewers for pointing out errors in an earlier draft of this article, and for suggestions concerning where I might strengthen it. Weaknesses that remain are entirely my responsibility.

Notes

 1. For discussion here see, for example, Simon 1991: 40; Fraleigh 1984, 72 and Fraleigh 2003, 168; Tamburrini 2000, 13–14; and Loland 2002: 96.

 2. A point also emphasised by Tamburrini (2000) several years ago.

 3. At times Upton appears to make a condition of cheating that the rule-breaking is intentional, whereas a post hoc opportunistic use of an unintended breach will suffice.

 4. While MCC (2011) states it is against the spirit of the game of cricket ‘to indulge in cheating or any sharp practice’, no discussion is given to the issue of batsmen keeping their ground, nor is the issue cited as an example. Whatever the truth about its being the usual practice current in the game, not-walking receives no mention as being part of the spirit of cricket.

 5. The moral status of helping teammates win is considered later.

 6. This proviso is relinquished under ‘the second alternative’, below.

 7. Williams claimed that obligation ‘is grounded in the basic issue of what people should be able to rely on’. Ethical life proceeds best when certain thoughts are not entertained. He wrote: ‘An effective way for actions to be ruled out is that they never come into thought at all, and this is often the best way. One does not feel easy with the man who in the course of a discussion of how to deal with political or business rivals says, “Of course, we could have them killed, but we should lay that aside right from the beginning”. It should never have come into his hands to be laid aside’ (Williams 1985, 185).

 8. Some clarification of my remarks here can be given as a reply to one anonymous reviewer who points out that soccer, for example, might have ‘local rules’ applicable to playing it in the park. Players might permit use of the hand to prevent the ball zooming off in a particular direction; otherwise some players might become unfairly tired out. But in this example either there is no referee or his view needs to be taken into account; one assumes the local rule is agreed by all players; and the reason given for the rule change is moral. This contrasts with a practice based on mere convention and with Upton's attempt to defend cheating in which there is always something morally wrong. Agreed park-rules soccer can have its spirit, but cheating in such a game is still possible and outside its rules.

 9. If by pro tanto moral reason is meant a reason which identifies a duty one has or an obligation one is under, then identifying that there is a moral reason for action is insufficient to establish that the reason is pro tanto. Having drawn up a list of moral reasons for action, one then needs to defend any as pro tanto moral reasons. To deny this distinction is, for example, to deny supererogation.

10. Although I know of no counter-examples in team sports, it is not difficult to think of rule-governed activities where breaking the rules would be the only moral choice.

11. See Suits 1988, 39–48.

12. The batsman might– feel morally motivated to give the opposition a good quality game, but if so, it would be inconsistent to cheat them.

13. ‘Being a means to’ does not necessarily explain the end. The M4 motorway is a means to get to Bristol, but does not explain why anyone intends to head there.

14. In this I have some disagreement with Dunlop (1975, 156–7) when he claimed: ‘Virtuous behaviour, which proceeds from a virtuous disposition, is still virtuous even though the ends of the behaviour are deplorable. The courage that was displayed by some of Hitler's SS men was still courage, and hence morally admirable, even when the courageous acts were part of Hitler's “Final Solution”. So, when men display courage or generosity of mind on the games field, even in the pursuit of reprehensible ends, we cannot deny it the title of virtue. For virtue is a quality of character, not a property of kinds of action, and a man's character may possess some virtues even when the ends he seeks are mostly despicable.’

15. I write ‘loosely’ because one might, for example, be contracted as a defender in a game, but then be required to move to the forwards following a teammate's sending off. Is this as much a ‘change of activity’ as is moving from soccer when keeping 100% of the rules, to soccer keeping 98% of them?

16. For the others, assume a rule has been intentionally broken to gain an advantage in the game. Since batsmen's actions might fortuitously lead to an umpire being deceived, we can set aside the first alternative. Here we might understand ‘deceived’ as the umpire having ‘misunderstood’ or ‘misinterpreted’. There is no wrongful act of deception by the batsman who is not responsible for all occasions when something he does results in anyone being deceived about it, whether or not it results from a cheating act. The second alternative appears unlikely too, because if deception of umpires is a requirement of cheating, then the cheating will never be detected, at least not by the umpires and at the time. Perhaps they become enlightened after the match, however, so they know it takes place but are powerless to prevent it during play. Since cheating is detected during play, however, neither the first nor the second alternative can be correct. Third is the mere intention to deceive, but this raises problems of needing to ascertain players' intentions before convicting them of cheating; ignores the fact that they might hold but not take action to pursue such an intention; and suggests the unfairness of imposing sanctions on players on the basis of their intentions rather than their actions.

17. Understanding ‘attempt’ to be the operative factor here also applies well to its governing the opening of the account of cheating, because an attempt to gain game advantage by rule-breaking can be cheating irrespective of whether such an advantage is gained.

18. Following an appeal by opponents who believe he was out. But in our example, any such appeal was turned down by the umpire.