The defining components of the cyborg: cyborg-athletes, fictional or real?

Abstract

In this paper, I engage in the debate on the definition of the cyborg. I identify the two defining components of the traditional definition of the cyborg: (a) the symbiotic relationship between human nature and technology; and (b) the embodiment of a superhuman or inhuman feature or ability. Then, I trace these two components in the scholarly debate on the cyborg. To conclude, I explore the role the scholarly view of the cyborg plays in the debate on cyborg-athletes in the philosophy of sport.

In diesem Beitrag steige ich in die Debatte der Definition eines Cyborgs hinein. Ich identifiziere die zwei ausschlaggebenden Komponenten der herkömmlichen Cyborgsdefinition: (a) die symbiotische Beziehung zwischen menschlicher Natur und Technologie; und (b) die Verkörperung einer über- oder nichtmenschlichen Eigenschaft oder Fähigkeit. Dann zeichne ich diese zwei Komponenten in der wissenschaftlichen Debatte über den Cyborg nach. Zum Schluss untersuche ich die Rolle, welche die wissenschaftliche Sicht auf den Cyborg bei der Debatte über Cyborgathleten in der Philosophie des Sports spielt.

En este trabajo, participo en el debate sobre la definición del cíborg. Identifico los dos componentes definitorios de la definición tradicional del cíborg: (a) la relación simbiótica entre la naturaleza humana y la tecnología; y (b) la posesión de una cualidad o habilidad sobrehumana o inhumana. Entonces, localizo estos dos componentes en el debate académico sobre el cíborg. Para concluir, analizo el papel que la visión académica del cíborg juega en el debate relativo a los cíborg-atletas en la filosofía del deporte.

在本文中，我们置身于对电子人定义的讨论。我认为传统意义的电子人有两个决定性因素：（1 ）人性与科技之间的共生关系；和（b）超人或非人特征或能力的具体化。然后，我在学术辩论中追索了这两个因素。最后，我们探讨了有关电子人的学术观点在体育哲学里有关电子人—-运动员的争论中所起的作用。

Keywords:

• Cyborg
• sport ethics
• technology
• human nature

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of my manuscripts for the valuable comments.

Notes

1. In a different place, I seek for a more restrictive use of the concept ‘cyborg.’ (There, I regard the cyborg as a human being whose nature has been radically altered through prosthetic implants (Lopez Frias 2014). I draw on Jose Luis Perez Trivino’s view of cyborg and on the views of the cyborg that emphasize its transgressive character. Using the term ‘radical,’ instead of ‘transgressive,’ I draw on Nicholas Agar’s distinction between radical and moderate human enhancement interventions: ‘Radical enhancement involves improving significant capacities to a degree that greatly exceeds what is currently possible for humans. The chief debating examples in the philosophical literature involve cases of what I will call moderate enhancement’ (Agar 2010, 17, 2014). An example of moderate enhancement is the alteration of the human brain to make people as smart as the physicist Stephen Hawking, or as good at playing chess as Gary Kasparov. Should human enhancement technologies provide people with an intelligence, or a chess performance, far superior to those ever achieved by human beings, then such interventions should be regarded as radical. Such radical enhancements call into question deep-seated assumptions, practices, and activities, and promote critical thinking on them.

2. For Miah, fear of technological progress is unsound for, at least, two reasons. First, enhancement technologies will be applied with precaution. Second, ‘transhuman technologies do not, in fact, go beyond humanity; they might simply alter it’ (Miah 2003). Miah does not distinguish between different gradations of enhancements like Agar. Most of the enhancements Miah addresses are moderate types of enhancements: altitude chambers, biomechanically modeled running shoes, abnormal diets, and more efficient equipment. I wonder whether Miah’s attitude would change if he reduced the concept ‘human enhancement,’ in line with Agar, to radical alterations of the human body.

3. John had the ligament of his left elbow replaced with a tendon from his right forearm. This surgical procedure, which is widely known as ‘Tommy John surgery,’ allowed him to throw harder than he was able to do before and for a longer period of time in comparison with other pitchers (Rohan 2015).

4. Griffin, Pistorious, Rehm, John, and Rabil are certainly referred to as cyborgs for different reasons symbolically and physically. Yet, the use of the image of the cyborg relates to the fact that their physical performance, in one way or another, looks radically different, or revolutionary, in comparison with average athletes. For instance, Griffin´s ‘aerial feats’ and physical prowess revolutionized the NBA (Rohde, 2011).

5. Clark uses the following example to strengthen this argument: ‘Consider a normal case of belief embedded in memory. Inga hears from a friend that there is an exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, and decides to go see it. She thinks for a moment and recalls that the museum is on 53rd Street, so she walks to 53rd Street and goes into the museum. It seems clear that Inga believes that the museum is on 53rd Street, and that she believed this even before she consulted her memory. […] The belief was sitting somewhere in memory, waiting to be accessed. Now consider Otto. Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease, and like many Alzheimer’s patients, he relies on information in the environment to help structure his life. Otto carries a notebook around with him everywhere he goes. When he learns new information, he writes it down. When he needs some old information, he looks it up. For Otto, his notebook plays the role usually played by a biological memory. Today, Otto hears about the exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, and decides to go see it. He consults the notebook, which says that the museum is on 53rd Street, so he walks to 53rd Street and goes into the museum’ (Clark and Chalmers 1998, 12,13). In this example, Clark argues that both an internal memory and the notebook which is an external storage device, are alike because the two technologies allow the individual to achieve the same goal: get to the museum on 53rd Street. In line with the Tetris example above, we could come up with a third hypothetical scenario. Suppose that Otto had an external drive implanted in his brain. This artificial memory would also be at the same level as Inga’s memory and Otto’s notebook, as long as the external drive becomes transparent; that is to say, as long as the external drive is available and accessible when required.

6. In this vein, Nietzsche depicts the human being as a fantastic animal: ‘Man has gradually become a fantastic animal that must fulfil one condition of existence more than any other animal: man must from time to time believe he knows why he exists’ (Conill 1991; Nietzsche 2001, 29).

7. Is the case of Haraway’s view of the cyborg? On the one hand, she argues that cyborgs are revolutionary, especially because their existence will make society progress to the point where important social problems, such as those linked to gender differences, will be overcome. But, on the other hand, she argues that we are already cyborgs. This is paradoxical because, according to her view on cyborgs, a society of cyborgs would have overcome social problems related to gender differences. Yet, if we take a look at our cyborgized society, we can easily see that such problems remain.