Intentional and Skillful Neurons

Abstract

In the mid-1990s, there was a major neuroscientific discovery which might drastically alter sport science in general and philosophy of sport in particular. The discovery of mirror neurons by Giacomo Rizzolatti and colleagues in Parma, Italy, is a substantial contribution to understanding brains, movements, and humans. Famous neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran believes the discovery of mirror neurons ‘will do for psychology what DNA did for biology’ (http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/ramachandran/ramachandran_p1.html). Somehow mirror neurons have not received the deserved attention in the philosophy of sport, but perhaps now is the time to reflect on some implications and consequences. The discovery of mirror neurons may increase our insights about our ability to learn, understand, intend, and produce skillful motor actions. In this article I will first examine what mirror neurons are and how they function in monkeys and humans. Second, I will review some objections to the so-called mirror neuron theory of action understanding, and try to reconcile some of these objections. Third, I will inquire into some implications for philosophy, which I believe are also fundamental to several topics in the philosophy of sport. I will then try to relate some of the most interesting aspects of mirror neurons to recent debates in the philosophy of sport. Finally, I will speculate on what further neuroscientific research might teach us about the nature of being a moving subject.

Keywords:

• Skill
• intentionality
• mirror neurons

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for constructive comments and suggestions.

Notes

1. A single-cell recording measures neural events (action potentials) in the brain by inserting electrodes into axons and/or dendrites.

2. Primary motor cortex is often referred to as M1. Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia use F1.

3. Rizzolatti and Fogassi (2014) distinguish between (mechanical) movements (the flexion of a finger), motor act (movements to achieve a specific goal: flexing a finger to grasp), and action (a series of linked motor acts: reaching, grasping, and bringing food to the mouth to eat).

4. fMRI measures changes in metabolism or blood flow in the active brain. With fMRI, imaging is focused on the magnetic properties of haemoglobin. The fMRI detectors measure the ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated haemoglobin—called the blood oxygenation level-dependent effect (BOLD). For a more extensive treatment of the methods of (cognitive) neuroscience, see Gazzaniga et al. (2002, ch. 4).

5. Mukamel et al. (2010) recorded extracellular activity from 1177 neurons in 21 epileptic patients.

6. As I have already stated, there is the problem of attaching mirror neurons in the strict sense to humans due to lack of single-cell recordings.

7. EEG provides a continuous recording of overall brain activity through electrodes placed on the scalp, which measure large, active populations of neurons producing electric potentials (see Gazzaniga et al. 2002, ch. 4).

8. Brain imaging cannot distinguish between inhibitory and excitatory activity in neurons. This means that we can only see similar activation, but not what kind. Although spatial and temporal resolution in fMRI is increasing all the time, neither localization nor firing rate can be established at the level of identity by brain imaging techniques.

9. Other objections have been raised by De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007), and Hutto (2008). Sinigaglia (2009, 322–325) has tried to conciliate these objections. See also Csibra (2017).

10. Hickok also objects to the lack of empirical support for a generalization of a mirror neuron system to speech recognition (problem number eight). This critique is mostly connected to theories linking mirror neurons and early language learning. It does not seem to be the most crucial issue for philosophy of sport, and will not be discussed here.

11. Mukamel et al. (2010) argue there is no denying the similarities between monkeys and humans regarding the matching mechanism of mirror neurons.

12. See also Vigneswaran et al. (2013).

13. In discussing fine-grained vs coarse-grained individuation of actions, mirror neurons support a coarse-grained approach; probably more coarse grained than say Davidson’s account (see e.g. Davidson 1963).

14. An example: analytic philosophers have tried to resolve Jackson’s (1986) ‘knowledge argument’ by claiming what Mary learns is a knowing how which is not considered knowledge, and hence Mary does not know anything new when seeing colors. This answer is perhaps excluded by the mirror neuron theory.

15. See also Chalmers (1996).

16. The same claim is raised by Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008b, 130, ch. 7). Mukamel et al. (2010) found mirror neurons were active in both facial emotional expressions and hand grasping actions.

17. I state ’classical’ in parenthesis because connectionism might also be undermined by these discoveries. Evan Thompson (2007) holds that connectionism is a contemporary neuroscientific information processing theory.

18. Evidence has suggested a mirror mechanism in infants as young as 6 months (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008b, 327).

19. An excellent review of neuroscientific research on sporting skills is provided by Yarrow et al (2009). They urge ‘neuroscientists to consider how their basic research might help to explain sporting skill’ (Yarrow et al. 2009, 585). We are probably only beginning to see the impact neuroscience is going to have on sport science and the philosophy of sport.

20. There is a neuronal link between motor knowledge and motor memory (see Mukamel et al. 2010) in Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia’s (2008b, 106–114) theory. For a discussion on memory, knowledge, and skill, see Birch (2011).

21. The neurophysiological explanation is: if you do not have the motor knowledge x, you will not have the neural network z necessary for producing motor action y, so when observing someone capable of y and having x and z, your brain cannot have strict congruent neural activity. You may have broad congruence, but of course the similarity will widen with the difference in x and z, which are (some of) the reasons you cannot do y.

22. Although not treated in this article, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia’s (2008b, ch. 3) philosophical considerations lean on Merleau-Ponty. This link should be most interesting to the philosophy of sport.

23. The mirror neuron theory has philosophical relevance for both body and action. The theory argues for the body as the ‘great reason’ (Nietzsche 1961, ‘Of the Despisers of the Body’).