Accounting for pre-conditions for a harmonious community of states: democratization and the security complex in East and Southeast Asia

Abstract

This article addresses the relationship between the character of political regimes and security in East and Southeast Asia. In doing so, it draws on the insights of both regional security complex and liberal peace theories. The analysis of democratization processes is therefore juxtaposed with the general underdevelopment of democracy in the region. It is ascertained that the security paradox that features prominently in East and Southeast Asian international relations can be transcended. Democratization and modernization alone, however, do not suffice, in which case another normative basis is needed. The main conclusion takes the author to accept the importance of culture in political community building. In that respect, a common denominator is sought in building a genuine Asian identity based on human values, to which major political philosophies and religions in the region subscribe. Consequently, the convergence among social norms, political norms and peace is theorized.

Keywords:

• regional security complex
• security paradox
• East and Southeast Asia
• democratization
• identity

Acknowledgements

This is a revised version of a paper that was presented at the 6th Asian Political and International Studies Association Congress 2012: Policy and Politics in Changing Asia, Hong Kong, China, 31 November–1 December 2012.

The Author thanks Professor Ting Wai of the Government and International Studies Department of Hong Kong Baptist University for his insightful comments and suggestions.

Notes

1. A day later, the captain and the crew were released by the Japanese Coastguard after the Chinese Consulate in Fukuoka guaranteed payment of a 4 million yen (USD ca. 43,000). See more at Gazette (2013).

2. In 2006, Vladimir Putin offered the Island of Shikotan but the Japanese government declined the offer on the basis of claiming full sovereignty over all four Kuril Islands.

3. The Delta itself has been reported shrinking in recent years. To make matters worse Vietnam rice crops are vulnerable to rising sea level and severe weather conditions.

4. That is, of course, even when one factors the inflation and currency appreciation across the region. Regional expenditure rose by 13% in nominal terms – from US$258.96bn in 2010 to US$294.04bn in 2011 (The Military Balance 2012, p. 209).

5. Interestingly, the Chinese have also been recently reported to achieve initial operational capability of its DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. See The Military Balance (2012, p. 212) for more.

6. Japan is already the site of one American X-band radar, officially known as the AN/TPY-2, which is a central element in a complex technical architecture for identifying ballistic missiles and coordinating a defence by interceptors.

7. Under a 2001 accord, South Korea had been prevented from developing and deploying ballistic missiles with a range of more than 300 km (186 miles) because of concerns this could trigger a regional arms race. The new capabilities will allow South Korea to cover the whole of the North, along with parts of China and Japan (BBC NEWS Asia 2012b).

8. Explained in later parts of this article.

9. For deeper analysis of regional security paradox, please refer to Till (2012, p. 432–433).

10. In mid-September, some major Japanese brands closed down their factories in China amid rising tensions between the two countries. See more at Reuters (2012a).

11. Ninety percent of global trade by volume travels by sea and 25% of that, approximately 50,000 vessels a year, travels through a 1.7-mile-wide sliver of ocean at the Strait of Malacca. See more at Schwartz and Greenert (2012).

12. For a telling argumentation, see Honda (2012).

13. A society divided between a large improvised mass and a small favoured elite results, according to Lipset, either in oligarchy (traditionalist dictatorships found in parts of Latin America, Thailand, Spain or Portugal) or in tyranny (exemplified by communist regimes in Asia and Eastern Europe).

14. The World Factbook at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html#ch [Accessed 11 September 2013].

15. For example, China had 22,500.000 Internet users in 2000 compared to 538,000.000 in 2012. See more at Internet World Stats (2013).

16. Democracy by itself, as defined by Laurence Whitehead (2002, p. 6–26), is best understood not as a non-predetermined end state, but as a long-term and somewhat open-ended outcome.

17. It is no place to laboriously and in a detailed fashion consider each and every country from that perspective. Instead, a general approach will suffice for the purpose of this article.

18. Even the ‘repressed’ economy of North Korea has recently seen the introduction of market economy elements. Recently, international media were busy reporting news on the decisions taken in Pyongyang, indicating North Korea might allow farmers to keep surplus food to sell or barter. ‘Peasants will have incentive to grow more food. They can keep and sell in the market about 30–50% of their harvest depending on the region’ (see Boghani 2012 and Reuters, 2012 for more).

19. The new regulations allow even foreign developers to lease land in Vietnam. In the case of China, the Property Law introduced in 2007 protects the rights of private investors, allowing them to possess, utilize, dispose of and obtain profits from the real property under the category of ‘ownership rights’.

20. In March 2009, county-level Party Committees launched by the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Organization Department of the Party’s Central Committee initiated a pilot project aimed at promoting ‘transparent exercise of power’ in three localities. Next year it was expanded to include 69 counties across People’s Republic of China. See Lu (2013) for more.

21. See Shin (2012, p. 63–65) for more.

22. Institutionally speaking relevant is a model ‘Confucian democracy’ proposed by Bell (1995).

23. See more on weaknesses of ASEAN at Friedrichs (2012, p. 754–776).

24. The 21st ASEAN Summit in November last year serves a good example here. The summit produced no agreement towards South China Sea disputes, as the Philippines and Vietnam prefer a multilateral approach to the problem, whereas Cambodia and Laos supported a resolution based on bilateral negotiations with China. See Bland (2012) for more.

25. There is, however, a considerable drive towards some kind of political community based on the East Asia Summit designed to lead to the creation of an East Asian Community. This idea is, however, marred by the potential leadership disputes between China and Japan. See more at Breslin (2007).