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ABSTRACT
The Park Geun-hye administration in South Korea indicates that the engagement policy towards North Korea lacked reciprocity in terms of inter-Korean relations even if it emphasized inter-Korean cooperation. On the other hand, South Korea’s hard-line policy towards the North lacked policy flexibility. Therefore, the Park Geun-hye administration recognizes that unstable inter-Korean relations have stemmed from mutual distrust. Therefore, as a solution to the issue of the Korean peninsula from a long-term perspective, the South Korean government has pursued a trust-building policy between the two Koreas and expects to create a different environment.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse how this trust-building policy between the two Koreas has been implemented and how North Korea has reacted to the new South Korean policy towards them. The goal of this analysis is to infer specific strategies or alternatives to achieving better inter-Korean relations. This study looks at South and North Koreas’ policies towards each other and mutual perceptions based on the policy analyses. With a focus on issues and circumstances in inter-Korean relations since the inauguration of the Park Geun-hye administration, we attempt to identify implementation tasks relevant to the Park administration’s policy towards North Korea and contribute to better inter-Korean relations.
Notes
1. North Korea refers to this as ‘April 6 Dialogue’ and cherishes it. It includes statements such as ‘We should accomplish the historic cause of national reunification true to the lifelong intention and behests of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’. This dialogue was printed in Rodong Sinmun, 17 April 2012, pp. 1–2.
2. While claiming such, the North Korean regime also emphasized the peaceful use of atomic energy in its nuclear policy and military policy, saying that the Byungjin line is a rational one that makes it possible to settle the nation’s electricity shortage based on the development of the Juche-oriented atomic power industry.
3. On 1 April 2013, edition of Rodong Sinmun published verses 1, 2, and 3 of a song titled, ‘March Korea, towards Byungjin’. The lyrics include contents such as advance of great nation of Mt. Paektu, enemy of invasion, and economic construction with every verse ending with ‘economy and nuclear arms, forward Byungjin’. Rodong Sinmun, 13 April 2013, p. 2.
4. On the 2013 ROK-US joint military exercise, many media outlets covered that nuclear-powered carrier flotilla, USS George Washington, F-22 Stealth fighter jets, B-52 strategic bombers would take part in the Key Resolve. In reality, the nuclear-thrusted submarines, B-52 strategic bombers, B-2, F-22, etc. participated in the exercise.
5. Even on March 26, the KPA Supreme Command stated, ‘we will demonstrate with the practical military action the firm will of the army and people of the DPRK to take counteraction to defend the sovereignty and dignity of the supreme leadership of the country’. Here they claimed to take counteraction to defend the sovereignty and dignity of the supreme leadership of the country, demonstrate the strong will of the DPRK army with physical action, to call upon progressive people of the world opposing war and loving peace. Rodong Sinmun, 27 March 2013, p. 1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement on the same day, which reads ‘a nuclear war in the Korean peninsula is no longer a preventative meaning but realistic one’. Rodong Sinmun, 27 March 2013, p. 2. Also CPRK issued a statement, which stated, ‘we can never tolerate the serious situation in which the sovereignty and dignity of the supreme leadership of the country are ruthlessly trampled down’. Rodong Sinmun, 27 March 2013, p. 3.
6. Through the CPRK spokesperson’s statement on 28 May, North Korea insisted, ‘we did not deny the dialogue itself, and asserted to solve the fundamental issue for normalization of KIC persistently’.
7. A CPRK spokesperson announced that it would postpone until the atmosphere was appropriate for dialogue and negotiations listing South Korea’s policy on North Korea, its military exercise, and the issue of United Progressive Party incident, etc. as reasons for postponing.
8. ‘Anti-unification policy under the banner of trust,’ Rodong Sinmun, 23 October 2013, p. 5; ‘Commenting on the “confidence-building process”’,Rodong Sinmun, 24 October 2013, p. 5, ‘“Confidence-Building Process” Is Source of North-South Distrust, Confrontation’ Rodong Sinmun, 30 October 2013, p. 5.
9. At the New Year’s Press Conference on 6 January 2014, President Park expressed that ‘unification is bonanza’ emphasizing the significance of unification on one hand, and the confidence under North Korean instability, on the other.
10. Receiving an honorary doctorate degree at Dresden University of Technology, President Park proposed ‘An Initiative for Peaceful Unification on the Korean peninsula’. Here she described, ‘as the fastest-growing region in the former East Germany, Dresden is an iconic community that has moved beyond division and toward integration’.
11. US Forces Korea Commander Curtis Scaparrotti explicated what many experts generally presumed. At the Department of Defense Press Briefing on 24 October 2014, General Scaparrotti said, ‘I believe [North Koreans] have the capability to have miniaturized a device at this point, and they have the technology to potentially actually deliver what they say they have’. Major South Korean media reported this on October 27.
12. For South Korea to be the negotiating party in the nuclear talks, ‘South Korea needs to pursue a strategy that enables itself to have capability for pre-emptive strike and missile defence to deny North Korea’s use of nuclear missiles on its own’.
13. The NDC statement to the Office of National Security of Cheong Wa Dae on 29 October, reads, ‘it is up to the South to decide whether it wants to hold a high-level contact or continue allowing the leaflets to be dispatched’ elucidating the termination of anti-regime leaflets as a precondition for the high-level talks. JoongAngIlbo, 30 October 2014, p. 34.