Is the development of an indigenous perspective on social work values justified? A preliminary conceptual exploration

Abstract

The present paper explores whether sufficient grounds exist for articulating an indigenous value base for social work practice. Since the value base is fundamental for practice, it seems that the call for the development of an indigenous social work practice requires an indigenous value base to guide it. However, in the eyes of skeptics, the idea of an indigenous value base for social work practice may be the result of a conceptual confusion between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ morality. To illustrate the need for making this distinction, this paper critically appraises the literature that argues for indigenization based on the recognition of the diversity and differences of cultural values. Building on this analysis, the paper suggests that we need to re-examine the conceptual issue of whether the assumption of the discontinuity of social explanation and normative evaluation is warranted.

Keywords:

• social work values
• indigenization
• justification
• cultural differences

Notes

^1. One should note that recognizing that social work as a moral activity does not necessarily contradict claims that see social work as a scientific, technical activity. See Tsang (2000, pp. 429–430).

^2. To determine whether social work is distinct as a moral enterprise, we need to clarify in what sense/s may social work be understood as a moral enterprise. For further discussions of the different senses of social work as a moral activity, see [Ruan, Xinbang] (2004, pp. 1-59). For discussions of the moral status of other professions see Daryl Koehn (1994). For a more social-theoretical treatment of professional ethics see Larry May (1996).

^3. See Bar-On, A. (1999), Chow, N.W.W. (1987), Chow, N. (1996), Lum, D. (1995), Osei-Hwedie, K. (1993), Osei-Hwedie, K., Ntseane, D. and Jacques, G. (2006) and Yip, K.S. (2004).

^4. Not every scholar will concur with this view. See [Chow, N.W.W.] (1994, pp. 10–12).

^5. Though different authors may have different lists of specific core values, it is observed that there is considerable consistency among these formulations. For a commonly cited list of core values see Frederic Reamer (1999, p. 21).

^6. To facilitate appreciation of key questions that may be involved in a re-examination of our heritage of social work values, I would take the cherished professional principles of self-determination, respect for person, and individualization as examples. In developing an indigenous social work ethics, one cannot avoid the question whether these principles, grounded in a Kantian paradigm of human nature and tenets of substantive conceptions of freedom, equality of opportunity and outcome should still be upheld. The reason for this critical examination is that the image of an autonomous, rational individual who is a bearer of rights and a rational agent who makes free choices cannot capture the cultural understanding of what counts as a person for the local community. Even if these principles were upheld after critical examination, we would like to know whether they should be grounded in a different understanding of human nature and social values, or how they should be expressed in the local setting.

^7. For further discussions of examples in Hong Kong see Social Workers Registration Board (2010).

^8. Gewirth's seminal work may serve as an example in this regard. In his Reason and Morality, Gewirth argue that the principle of generic consistency: ‘Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself’ is ‘the supreme principle of morality, taking precedence over all other moral or practical principles of interpersonal conduct’ (Alan Gewirth 1978, p. 145). This principle Gewirth argued is committed by every agent, by the fact of engaging in action, and that self-contradiction is incurred by any actual or prospective agent who rejects the principle. Based on this principle, Gewirth derived a system of duties and moral rules that Frederic Reamer applied to social work as a guide to ethical decision-making. See Frederic Reamer 1990.

^9. In this regard, though Lam Chiu Wan has made an important comparative study of social work values of the local community and that of Britain, the author thinks that he has not paid sufficient attention to this issue. See Lam Chiu Wan (1997).

^10. In this regard, Reamer relied on the work of Alan Gewirth, particularly Reason and Morality, see Alan Gewirth (1978). Others have pursued different approaches, such as Jim Ife, who attempted to appeal to human rights as value base for social work practice, see Jim Ife (2001).

^11. Exploration of the distinction between normative evaluation and fact and value is well-discussed in the philosophy of social sciences. See Richard Bernstein (1976, pp. 3–54); Alexander Rosenberg (2008, pp. 225–230). For the distinction of positive and normative economics see Mark Blaug (1992, ch. 5).

^12. See Chow, N.W.W. (1987, pp. 37–39).

^13. [Chow, N.W.W.] (1994, p. 12). My translation.

^14. See [Chow, N.W.W.] (1994, pp. 10–12). However, the author would contend that such a view may be based on the belief that modernized societies exhibit certain similar institutional and cultural arrangements. This belief is under serious challenge, or may even be said to be rejected in recent discussions of modernity. See Shmuel Eisenstadt (2001, p. 100), see also Charles Taylor (1992, pp. 88–110).