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Original Articles

The Precarious Position of Politics in Popular Imagination: The Burundian Case

Pages 93-106 | Published online: 01 Mar 2007
 

Abstract

Based on ethnographic fieldwork among Burundians in exile (Tanzania, Kenya, Belgium and Denmark) and at home, this article explores the perception and position of politics in popular imagination. It argues that politics is perceived ambiguously. On the one hand, politics is seen to corrupt those involved – economically and not least morally. On the other hand, pure politics is perceived as untainted by moral corruption. The popular critique of politics and politicians is thus that they are not political enough – they have lost sight of political ideology and only see power and money. This unresolved and irresolvable paradox is the subject of much debate – especially among the Burundian diaspora – and is what compels most Burundians to continue to discuss politics in spite of their declared dislike of the issue. It is argued that such paradoxes and ambiguities in perceptions of politics may fruitfully be analysed through rumours and conspiracy theories. Through rumours and conspiracy theories about political adversaries and other powerful public figures, ordinary Burundians are able to express their fears, hopes and anxieties. Attitudes and opinions that would not emerge in interviews or other discourse are set free in rumours. By comparing these various levels and kinds of discourse, we get a picture of public imagination on politics – revealing the ambiguities and paradoxes that drive the process.

Notes

1. For a detailed overview of the political transition and in particular the 2005 elections, see Reyntjens, ‘Breaking the Cycle’. See also International Crisis Group's report for an analysis of the first year of the post-transition government, Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk.

2. The main contenders in the election were CNDD-FDD and Frodebu (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi), which had previously been by far the largest ‘Hutu’ party in the country, winning a landslide victory in the 1993 elections. Thus, for the first time, political competition was among Hutu rather than between Hutu and Tutsi. Feeling the pressure, Frodebu launched a smear campaign, accusing CNDD-FDD of collaborating too closely with the Tutsi (Reyntjens, ‘Briefing: Burundi’).

3. CitationInternational Crisis Group, Burundi Rebellion. Exploring contemporary politics in Burundi is like exploring a moving target. When research was initiated, Burundi was still engulfed in a bloody civil war. When much of the fieldwork for this article was gathered, the country was in the process of implementing a transition process. At the time of writing, the political landscape has transformed dramatically once more, creating new conspiracy theories, new lines of tension and a new public political imagination.

4. For a definition of organic versus cyclic crises, see CitationLaclau and Mouffe, Hegemony & Socialist Strategy, and CitationSalecl, ‘Crisis of Identity’.

5. CitationFine, ‘Redemption Rumors’, and CitationTurner, I Heard it through the Grapevine, show how rumours and urban legend flourish about big corporations masterminding secret plans against ordinary people.

6. CitationAllport and Postman, The Psychology of Rumor, 47. Rumour is a kind of ‘wide-awake dreaming’ that intermingles fact and fiction and not only tries to make sense of the past but also tries to be prognostic about possible outcomes in the future (CitationFeldman, ‘Ethnographic States of Emergency’; CitationFeldman, ‘Violence and Vision’). Rumours do not necessarily attack what was once taken for granted. Rather, by its nature of ‘wide-awake dreaming’, rumour tries to prop up the social-symbolic order while simultaneously revealing the constructedness of this order. Rumours respond to a sense of disorder and produce on the other hand, an order that is ‘over-structured’, seeking causal links and ulterior motives in every event.

7. CitationWest and Sanders, Transparency and Conspiracy, 17.

8. For a more thorough discussion of secrecy and sovereignty see CitationTurner, ‘The Tutsi are Afraid’, 41–61.

9. CitationWest and Sanders, Transparency and Conspiracy.

10. For his safety I cannot mention the specific association. There is a range of such associations (Puissance Autodéfense Amasekanya, Action Contre Génocide, www.tutsi.org, RADECO (Rassemblement pour la Défense des Communautés)). As Jean-Pierre explains, they are closely related, with individuals being members of several and all the key players knowing each other personally. I have interviewed key players in Belgium, Denmark and Burundi.

11. It has yet to be seen whether these allegations hold water. The UN sent a mission to explore the killings and it did indeed conclude that it amounted to genocide. However, the mission has been heavily criticised by Burundi experts (Reyntjens and Lemarchand). Unsurprisingly, the abovementioned organisations put a lot of value into the UN document, which is usually referred to on the front page of their websites, where one can download the whole report.

12. CitationLemarchand, Burundi; CitationReyntjens, ‘Breaking the Cycle’.

13. For Hutu versions, see CitationTurner, ‘The Barriers of Innocence’.

14. This is also the interpretation of the events of 1972 given in the government's ‘White Paper’. The Hutu peasantry is portrayed as innocent in its ignorance, manipulated by foreigners and a small Hutu elite into killing Tutsi. CitationRepublic of Burundi, The White Paper on the Real Causes and the Consequences of the Attempted Genocide against the Tutsi Ethny in Burundi.

15. In July 2003, I met groups of young Tutsi walking/jogging the perimeters of Bujumbura on Sunday mornings, chanting slogans against Buyoya the traitor.

16. Lemarchand, Burundi.

17. However, a precondition for these politicians to return from exile was that they be granted 24 hour protection by the South African defense force. Given the past lessons, they did not trust the Burundian army to protect them.

18. I have not had the opportunity to explore the relevance of this genre, the political joke, although it undoubtedly could be very illuminating.

19. CitationTurner, ‘Under the Gaze’.

20. Turner, ‘Under the Gaze’; Turner, ‘The Tutsi are Afraid’.

21. CitationMalkki, Purity and Exile; CitationMaquet, The Premise of Inequality; Turner, ‘The Barriers of Innocence’.

22. The Hamitic thesis claims that the Tutsi were a superior race that immigrated from the north in the sixteenth century, bringing with them a civilisation superior to that of the indigenous Bantu people. CitationGahama, Le Burundi; CitationMamdani, When Victims become Killers; CitationPrunier, The Rwanda Crisis.

23. See, however, CitationInternational Crisis Group, Burundi Rebellion and Reyntjens, ‘Briefing: Burundi’.

24. Usually these rebel movements held different territories in Burundi, with bases in Tanzania and Congo respectively. They did, however, clash at times, although it is very difficult to obtain exact facts about the movements.

25. Power in Burundi also is related to being able to ‘speak well’, i.e. to convince others of one's point of view. The traditional elders in Burundi are called the Abashingantahe, which literally means those who are given the word. A strong ethnic stereotype about the Tutsi is their ability to articulate themselves. This is very different to the brute power of the army and the rebels. In fact, many Hutu see it as a sign of Tutsi weakness and loss of absolute power when the Tutsi ‘openly’ massacred the Hutu in 1972 and 1993 (Turner, ‘The Barriers of Innocence’).

26. Since fieldwork, in July 2006, Mugabarabona was arrested, along with a number of others, and accused of planning a coup d’état. In this manner, it seems that he continues to occupy the position of the traitor and collaborator in the Burundian political field.

27. Similar struggles have been taking place within the more powerful CNDD, which has split into even more factions. Here, however, it seems to have been the new leaders that have succeeded in maintaining the support of the largest contingents of combatants.

28. This position is quite widespread among scholars on African conflicts. They reduce them to a question of greed or need (CitationVlassenroot and Raeymaekers, ‘The Politics of Rebellion and Intervention in Ituri’), without leaving room for political ideology (see also CitationTurner, ‘The Barriers of Innocence’).

29. Interview, Bujumbura, June 2003.

30. International Crisis Group, Burundi Rebellion.

31. CitationReyntjens, ‘Breaking the Cycle’.

32. Interviews, Nairobi, May 2004.

33. CitationBourdieu and Thompson, Language and Symbolic Power.

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