Negotiated peace for extortion: the case of Walikale territory in eastern DR Congo

Abstract

War in the Democratic Republic of Congo has increasingly been explained as a means to get access to natural resources and as a strategy to get control over informal trading networks linking the DRC with global markets. In most of these accounts, the complexity of war economies is underestimated. One element that is often missing is that systems of economic exploitation, which have been developed by armed groups during the Congolese war, tend to persist in the post-conflict context and seem to be hardly affected by the peace process. Based on an evaluation of the case of the Congolese National Army's (FARDC) non-integrated 85th Brigade, a former Mayi-Mayi militia now operating under the banner of the FARDC and deeply involved in the exploitation of cassiterite in Walikale (North Kivu), this paper illustrates how mechanisms of exploitation that have been instituted during the war can largely survive in peacetime conditions. In purely economic terms, this case would suggest a departure from patterns of profit accumulation in war conditions towards profiteering under the seeming order of the DRC's reestablished state institutions. The same case also suggests though that in the present situation of no-war-no-peace, a negotiated, mutual accommodation of economic and political interests linked with security provision can be found. This accommodation explains the “success” of this exploitation structure yet at the same time disincentivizes the national government to undertake serious attempts to dislodge this brigade from the Walikale territory. Eventually, these pockets of parallel economic and political control, which are still being observed in many parts of eastern DRC, undermine the DRC's reconstruction process, as it prevents the expansion of a formalized peace economy. The first part of this paper analyses the role of natural resources in North Kivu's economy. The second part describes the structure and functioning of artisanal mining in the Walikale territory. The third part explores Walikale's “war economy” and the role played by the 85th Brigade of the FARDC. The final parts aim at illustrating local processes of negotiating peace in return for extortion.

Keywords:

• war economy
• protection
• North Kivu
• post-conflict
• natural resources

Notes

1. E.g. the United Nations Security Council, which decided to institute a Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other sources of wealth by foreign armies and Congolese rebel movements. International non-governmental organizations have focused numerous campaigns on the illegal extraction of Congo's natural resources. Compare United Nations Panel of Experts reports; Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold.

2. These are the 1996 war against Mobutu, and the 1998 war started by the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) against the Kabila regime.

3. Montague, “Stolen Goods,” 103–18.

4. Le Billon, “Political Ecology of War,” 561.

5. Goodhand, “From War Economy to Peace Economy?” In his analysis of the Bosnian war economy, Andreas makes a similar point and points at the need for a bottom up, clandestine political economy approach. Andreas, “Clandestine Political Economy.”

6. Korf and Fünfgeld, “War and the Commons,” 392.

7. See Cramer and Goodhand, “Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better?”

8. The term “non-integrated” implies that the brigade has not yet joined the countrywide “brassage” (redeployment) process, which is elaborated upon below.

9. Nicholas Garrett and Harrison Mitchell, “Congo Rebels Cash in on Demand for Tin,” Financial Times, March, 2008.

10. The rest of Walikale territory is predominantly controlled by the Force for Liberation of Rwanda/Forces Combatants Abacunguzi (FDLR/FOCA) (FDLR) with whom the 85th brigade collaborate in mineral transport.

11. The concept of security governance will be explained and developed further below.

12. Vlassenroot, “Negotiating and Contesting”. See also: Bakonyi, Siegelberg, and Hensell, eds., Gewaltordnungen bewaffneter Gruppen.

13. Raeymaekers, “Sharing the Spoils”; United Nations, Letter dated 26 July 2005.

14. Callaghy, The State–society Struggle.

15. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Renewed Crisis in North Kivu; Human Rights Watch, Civilians Attacked in North Kivu.

16. Keen, Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars.

17. Joe Bavier, “Smugglers Bypass Eastern Congo Mining Ban – Minister,” Reuters, March 12, 2008.

18. Richards, No Peace, No War.

19. The national government has for the first time imposed a blanket production stop on cassiterite from Walikale, however this was only a temporary measure with no real impact on the ground. Compare Garrett, Walikale.

20. Sunman and Bates, Trading for Peace.

21. World Bank, Growth with Governance in the Mining Sector, 13

22. D'Souza, Artisanal Mining in DRC, 16.

23. Nicholas Garrett and Dominic Johnson, “Die Zinnsoldaten von Bisie,” TAZ, July 5, 2008.

24. While due to a lack of modern geological surveying the true size of these reserves is largely unknown, they are thought to be substantial. German government's estimates speak of around 35% of the world's cobalt reserves, for example, and 25–65% of the global coltan reserves, see KfW, Rohstoffe in der DR Kongo, 22.

25. Garrett, Walikale, 12.

26. Garrett, Walikale, 12.

27. The state held a 28% share in the company, while the Belgian companies that had originally found it were controlling it, compare Salter, The Impact of Mining in Kalima.

28. Garrett, Walikale, 12.

29. Garrett, Walikale, 13.

30. About these “comptoirs,” De Boeck writes “the political economy of the comptoir has always been colonial in its very essence. In the past it contributed a lot to the urbanization of the African material and mental landscape. The contemporary comptoir economy in Congo and Angola has contributed a great deal to the frontier urbanisation.” De Boeck, “Garimpeiro Worlds,” 551.

31. Garrett, Walikale.

32. Garrett, Walikale, 43.

33. Price based on LME September 2008 price of US$19.500 per ton of tin.

34. Nicholas Garrett and Dominic Johnson, “Die Zinnsoldaten von Bisie,” TAZ, July 5, 2008.

35. Nicholas Garrett and Dominic Johnson, “Die Zinnsoldaten von Bisie,” TAZ, July 5, 2008.

36. Compare Sunman and Bates, Trading for Peace.

37. Garrett, Walikale, 27.

38. A “coping economy” includes population groups that are coping or surviving. A “shadow economy” includes those actors who profit from war, but whose objective is not necessarily to wage war, and who may have an interest in peace, as long as they regard peace as compatible with their profit motive. A “war economy” includes the production, mobilization and allocation of economic resources to sustain a conflict and economic strategies of war aimed at the deliberate disempowerment of specific groups Goodhand, “From War Economy to Peace Economy,” 7.

39. Compare Goodhand, “From War Economy to Peace Economy?”

40. D'Souza, Artisanal Mining in the DRC, 2. In reality, no one knows the true extent of the DRC's artisanal mining sector (ASM), as global census data is non-existent.

41. This perception is due to a variety of factors, such as rising global mineral demand and related higher commodity prices; an only slowly progressing domestic economic recovery process and therefore limited income opportunities in the formal sector; both domestic and external migration into a sector that provides an income opportunity of last resort; the end of the conflict in some areas, which has seen many marginal social groups, such as ex-combatants, war-related orphans and IDPs (Internally Displaced People) move into the sector; and the continued instability in some areas, which has led many to give up their traditional longer-term income sources of income, such as farming. Garrett, Walikale. See also CASM and IFC, Mining Together.

42. MacGaffey, “Issues and Methods,” 22.

43. Mwanasali, “The View from Below,” 140.

44. Nest, Grignon, and Kisangani. The Democratic Republic of Congo. In this sense, William Reno states that it is more likely that resources from clandestine commerce are mobilized for the provision of public goods (including security) when those networks exploiting this commerce “favour interests of older political networks and commercial actors (…) over interests of a new local or outside elite.” Reno, Sovereign Predators.

45. Raeymaekers, Intermediate Governance.

46. Tull, Reconfiguration of Political Order, 281. An example is cassiterite. At the height of the RCD–Goma rebellion in 2003, Rwanda produced 427 tonnes of cassiterite but exported 1,458 tonnes, five times what it produced. US Geological Survey, Minerals Yearbook 2003, 7.5.

47. Miller, Congo's Tin Soldiers.

48. Tegera and Johnson, Rules for Sale.

49. Garrett, The EITI and Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining, 11.

50. Garrett, Walikale.

51. Garrett, Walikale.

52. Garrett, The EITI and Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining, 24.

53. Nicholas Garrett and Harrison Mitchell, “Congo Rebels Cash in on Demand for Tin,” Financial Times, March 4, 2008.

54. Various interviews, Bisie, June 19, 2007.

55. The Force for Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) is the political wing of the Forces Combatants Abacunguzi (FOCA). When talking about the FDLR/FOCA, their political wing's abbreviation FDLR is used. It is ethnically composed of Hutus who are responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, namely the Interahamwe militia and ex-Rwandan Army Forces (FAR), and ex-FAR who did not participate in the genocide. Furthermore the FDLR comprises of post-genocide recruits who had mainly been recruited in refugee camps in Congo and Tanzania. A common goal is the overthrow of the Rwandan government. The FDLR have been living in the forest for 13 years and are in many cases married to Congolese women who are now living together with their husbands in the forest. Although a high degree of integration in the local population has to be questioned, a certain modus of cohabitation has developed over time. See Sergiou, Security Provision in North Kivu.

56. Johnson and Tegera, Digging Deeper, 32.

57. Johnson and Tegera, Digging Deeper, 31–2.

58. Global Witness, Under-Mining Peace, 16.

59. Johnson and Tegera, Digging Deeper, 31–2.

60. Johnson and Tegera, Digging Deeper, 32.

61. Garrett, Walikale, xx.

62. The relative ease of monitoring the flow of goods through the airstrip as opposed to a road network will increase the opportunities for illicit trade and roads will also mean better access for all, including for armed groups (Garrett et al., SCA 2008, DFID, forthcoming).

63. Franz Wild, “Congo Bans Tin Mining in Eastern Region Over Safety,” Bloomberg, February 25, 2008. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aLzlwytXeu54 (accessed September 10, 2008).

64. “Congo Suspends Mining in Tin Ore-rich Eastern Area,” Reuters, February 25, 2008.

65. Vlassenroot, “Violence et constitution de milices dans l”est du Congo,” 115–52.

66. See: Bwenge, “Les milices Mayi-Mayi, 73–94; van Acker and Vlassenroot, “Les ‘Mai-Mai’,” 103–16; Vlassenroot, “Violence et constitution de milices dans l'est du Congo,” 115–52; Bilali, Qui arme les Mai-Mai?; Morvan, Réinventer le Quotidien.

67. It has to be acknowledged that the cover term Mai-Mai was increasingly used since 1998 by other armed groupings that were mainly instituted to get access to local economic resources. This banner had to give these groups the necessary ideological cover in their attempts to achieve their parochial interests.

68. International Crisis Group, The Kivus.

69. Only some of these parties were able to gain one or two seats in the national parliament.

70. For an analysis, see International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the Congo .

71. The integration and restructuring of the army had started in 2004 within the framework of security sector reform (SSR). Efforts to reform Congo's military had to start from very basic levels. Since the foundation of the “force publique” under King Léopold, the army did not exist to provide security for the public in any normal sense. On the contrary, the army acted as a predatory organ, used by politicians and officers to pursue their individual political and economic goals. See: International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, 2.

72. Interview with MONUC Political Affairs Officer in Goma, North Kivu, 9 April 2007.

73. It is noteworthy to mention that there are two processes of demobilization ongoing in DRC: a national process to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate (DDR) the signatories to the Global and All-inclusive Agreement and the Final Act of 2 April 2003, and the process of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) of the foreign forces.

74. See Sergiou, Security Provision in North Kivu.

75. The 85th brigade is mainly composed of soldiers recruited from Walikale territory and to a lesser extent from South Kivu. The 85th brigade therefore differs from North Kivu's other Mai-Mai groups in its ethnic composition, as it is mainly composed by the Nyanga and Tembo ethnic group, which also reflects the current population profile of Walikale territory.

76. The 13th and 14th Mai-Mai brigades have been formally integrated in the FARDC and deployed as the 84th and 85th brigade. When the 84th brigade received its order to go to brassage, the brigade followed the order and marched through the impassable terrain up to the distant Kisangani brassage centre.

77. MONUC Memo, Available from the author.

78. Interview with Viktor Kasongo, Berlin, December 14, 2007.

79. Nicholas Garrett and Harrison Mitchell, “Congo Rebels Cash in on Demand for Tin,” Financial Times, March 4, 2008.

80. Compare Garrett, The EITI and Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining.

81. Compare Garrett, The EITI and Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining.

82. Compare Garrett, The EITI and Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining..

83. Garrett, Walikale, xx.

84. Garrett, Walikale, xx.

85. Garrett, Walikale, xx.

86. Garrett, “Observations from the DRC.”

87. For an in-depth discussion of the ownership dispute, please refer to: Garrett, Walikale, xx.

88. For an in-depth discussion of the ownership dispute, please refer to: Garrett, Walikale, xx.

89. The share was 10% of the weekly production of the Bisie mine, US$0.05 per kilogram of all cassiterite extracted by the company in the mine and 50% of the receipts generated at the intermediary cassiterite selling stations in the territory. Garrett, Walikale, xx.

90. Compare Reno, Warlord Politics.

91. For the concept of “governance” see the collaborative research centre “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood” and for “security governance” in particular its projects of unit C Security: http://www.sfb-governance.de/engl (accessed September 10, 2008).

92. Compare Duffield, Global Governance; Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives,” Reno, “Shadow States”; Jackson, “Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance.”

93. The following conceptual explanations are mainly based on: Chojnacki and Branovic, “Räume strategischer (Un-)Sicherheit”; see also Chojnacki and Branovic, “New Modes of Security.”

94. We define security following Chojnacki and Branovic in a narrow sense as the absence of threats to a defined social group or, more precisely, as a situation in which means applied with the intention of maintaining protection against a defined group succeed in reducing the risk level with respect to existential threats.

95. Bakonyi and Stuvoy build ideal types of what they call “orders of violence” by armed groups that emerge under the absence of the state monopoly over the means of violence. They put the focus on the structures and institutions that emerge in an area under control of an armed group and thereby question the mainstream assertion of anarchy. Chojnacki and Branovic take this further with the concept of security governance. See: Bakonyi and Stuvoy, “Zwischen Warlordfirguartion und Quasi-Staat”; see also Bakonyi and Stuvoy, “Violence and Social Order Beyond the State.”

96. For example, the 2nd integrated brigade that is deployed in Lubero and Beni territory is known for massive human rights abuses. Various interviews in North Kivu by the authors.

97. One incidence saw a soldier, who had been on drugs and had stolen from a trader, being immediately detained.

98. Sergiou, Security Provision in North Kivu.

99. Interviews, UN representatives, April 2008

100. For North Kivu as a whole, when asked about the ethnic affiliation of their victims, no selectivity was to be found. The households who are supposed to be the most lucrative sources are object of raids and victims of rape are chosen arbitrarily and accord to their easy accessibility mainly women who are doing agricultural work, or fetching water on their fields are the most likely victims. Various interviews in North Kivu in April and May 2007. In Walikale, where hardly any Tutsis live, a corresponding ethnic selectivity could accordingly not happen.

101. Compare Ross, “What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?” Highly lootable resources are those that can be exploited and transported by unlearned workers without great technical means. Compare Ballentine and Nitschke, The Political Economy of Civil War, 5.

102. Le Billon (2001), “Political Ecology of War,” 572.

103. Compare Ross, Natural Resources and Civil War.

104. Kalyvas, “Ontology of ‘Political Violence’,” 475–94.

105. Kalyvas, “Warfare in Civil War”; Eck and Hultman, “One-Sided Violence”; Olsen, Violence Against Civilians.

106. See Le Billon, “Political Ecology of War,” 572.

107. Chojnacki and Branovic, in “Räume strategischer (Un-)Sicherheit” explain the emergence of security governance with geographic and economic opportunities and echo thereby Le Billon, “Political Ecology of War”. See also: Bates, Greif, and Singh, “Organizing Violence.”

108. International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, 2–3.