A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab

Abstract

Al-Shabaab appears today as an offspring of al-Qa’îdah: a Jihadist organization that is articulating a project beyond Somalia to fight Western interests and set up Islamic States in the region. Its growth has pushed Somalia again into the headlines to the extent that Western states and their allies in the region have been developing security policies to contain and eradicate it. Those policies for the last three years seem to have been dysfunctional and have fostered rather than hindered the influence of this organization within Somali society, contributing to its fame among the global Jihadist trend. A study of political Islam in the civil war period offers a different view; this organization is made up of Islamists who had fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s and others who always gave priority to military struggle against da'wa. Its exclusivist neo-Salafi ideology is both a way to become global and connect with other groups such as al-Qa’îdah, and to keep at bay Somali customs that, if accepted, would eventually provoke their collapse. To a large extent, they express a new trend in the civil war where political Islam has become the main instrument of recentralizing Somali politics.

Keywords:

• Islam
• Somalia
• civil war
• terrorism
• Islamic Courts

Acknowledgements

The author thanks a number of readers who commented the draft of this paper. He is the only responsible for the mistakes it contains.

Notes

1. Also known as as Harakah al-Shabaab al-Muja'eddin. In this text, they refer to the same movement.

2. Marchal “Warlordism and Terrorism.”

3. Somalis divide themselves into a series of clan families: Daarood (including Marreehaan, Majeerteen, Ogaadeni, and others), Hawiye (including Abgaal/Muduulood, Sa'ad, Saleebaan, ‘Ayr and Duduble of sub-clans of Haber Gidir, Murosade, Hawaadle, Garre), Dir (Ishaaq, Gadabuursi, Isse, Qubeys, Biimaaal, Sureh and the like), Rahanweyn or Digil-Mirifle (including Leyssan, Hadamo). Other Somalis belongs to other groups such as Jareer and Gibil ‘Ad. See Lewis, Understanding Somalia.

4. ‘Abdi, Divine Madness.

5. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia.

6. Marchal, “Islamic Political Dynamics.”

7. Marchal et al., Globalisation.

8. For a definition and historical background, see Commins, The Wahhabi Mission.

9. Salafiyya is a neo-orthodox brand of Islamic reformism, originating in the late nineteenth century and centred on Egypt, aiming to regenerate Islam by a return to the tradition represented by the “pious forefathers” (al-salaf āli, hence its name) of the Primitive Faith. See Shinar and Ende, “Salafiyya.”

10. Tabliigh is a Muslim missionary organization founded in India around 1927 and established after 1947 throughout the world. The primary objective is the deepening of the faith of those who are already Muslims, preachers as well as congregations; proselytism directed towards non-Muslims remains a marginal activity. The promotion of Muslim unity is a fundamental objective; theological controversies are prohibited and the political sympathies of members must not interfere with the activity of what is ostensibly an apolitical movement.

11. For a discussion that would be helpful, in the view of the author, to understand the success of al-Shabaab among the youth, see Roy, Globalized Islam.

12. For a description that shows the great variety of the reformist movement, see Merad et al., “Islāh.”

13. A Somali Islamist motto is “We have only one clan: Islam.” This is an attempt to prevent clan allegiance from dividing believers. Yet, as the last 17 years of civil war in Somalia demonstrate social structures and habits cannot be eradicated overnight.

14. How many communists actually read Marx and were knowledgeable about Marxism, Leninism and the like?

15. Many analyses focus on websites and take for granted what is stated there. Caution is required and a deeper analysis of the collection of the items put on the websites.

16. For background on al-Qâ'idah, one can refer to the solid work of Wright, The Looming Tower, and Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa.”

17. http://www.longwarjournal.org/

18. Tawhid means uniqueness (of God) and is the key concept of Wahhabism.

19. This is not the only one attempt to do so. People may, among others, read the following texts: Hansen, “Misspent Youth”; Bryden et al., Report to the UN Security Council; and various International Crisis Group Reports as well as the March 2009 issue of the CTC Sentinel. This author differs in key points with those texts that nevertheless should be carefully read.

20. See for details, Abuubaker, The Islamic Movement in Somalia.

21. Haber Ja'alo/Ishaaq graduated in Sudan and was a (non Salafi) member of Whadat al-Shabaab from 1983. Subsequently, Whadat adopted the usual ideological viewpoints of Wahhabism.

22. Hagmann and Khalif, “State and Politics in Ethiopia's Somali Region.”

23. See Harmony Project/Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, “Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa,” http://ctc.usma.edu/aqII.asp

24. Normalization between Addis-Ababa and Khartoum started in the aftermath of the sanctions taken by the United Nations Security Council after the attempted killing of Hosni Mubarak in Addis-Ababa in June 1995. It was completed by September 1998, a few months after the beginning of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

25. Colonel of the Somali Army, he went to jail several times after 1979 for his Islamist faith. He was not executed because his sub-clan, Ayaanle/'Ayr, was very influential among the army officials and he was a lone figure, not the leader of a group or an organization. As Somali people say: “he speaks his mind, is courageous and a very accessible man, but not a scholar in Islam.” He is respected for his long-time involvement in the Islamist movement. He made trips to Sudan, Middle Eastern countries and to Pakistan and has international connections. Although his ambition has always been to build an Islamic State in Somalia, not wage Jihad in Nairobi or in Washington, DC, he was put on the US list for being the leader of al-Itihaad but no specific accusations have been made against him as a person.

26. Marchal, “Forms of Violence.”

27. ‘Ulema is the plural of ‘alim: scholar.

28. In the Shari'a, huduud usually refer to the class of punishments that are fixed for certain crimes that are considered to be “claims of God.” They include theft, fornication, consumption of alcohol, and apostasy. Huduud include cutting hands and feet or stoning to death. Yet huduud cannot be enforced without very hard evidence and due legal process.

29. In 1992 Al-Barakat was the main money transfer company in Mogadishu (Hawaalad). Later, it developed into a holding including a very successful telecommunication company. All its assets were frozen on 6 November 2001 by the US government followed by the United Nations and the European Union under the assumption that it was financing al-Qâ'idah. After more than seven years of investigation, no evidence has been provided to support the case.

30. This discrepancy between the claimed priorities and the poor intelligence created tension within the US diplomatic and security community to the extent that the Nairobi based diplomat who was handling the Somali file was called back to Washington because he regularly disagreed on the lists of targets.

31. For an analysis of this period, see Marchal, “Somalia: A New Front in the War on Terror?” A quite different analysis is provided in Terdman, Somalia at War.

32. Although at the time he had no position, he had contact with Western interlocutors due to his former position within the TNG and his staunch opposition to Islamism.

33. Sing. Kaafir: “infidels.”

34. This is a very peculiar Islamist group that started in Egypt and is responsible for the killing of President Anwar Sadate.

35. Interviews underscore that Italy paid a substantial amount of money to get back the mortal remains; this money helped al-Shabaab at a critical moment.

36. In the Islamist ideology, there is a distinction between Takfiir bil Hukum and Takfiir bil ‘Aqiida according to the emphasis put on the individual versus the State and society.

37. Wax and de Young, “U.S. Secretly Backing Warlords.”

38. Besides the listed Islamic Courts, there were al-Itihaad, al-Shabaab, the Lower Shabelle Administration led by Yuusuf Mahamed Siyaad Indha Adde, the Administration of ‘Eel Garas, the Ras Kambooni group led by Hasan Turki, the newly established Dayniile Islamic Court led by Sheekh ‘Abdirahmaan Mahamuud Faarah Janaqow, the wing led by Colonel Yuusuf Seraar and Mahamed Gobaale of the very secular faction Jubba Valley Alliance, the Bal'ad Administration led by Ma'allin Haashi and the ‘Eel Ma'aan business group led by Abuukar Adaane. There were also other unarmed groups, including al-Tabliigh, a section of al-Islaah Damul Jadid (‘New Blood’), and most of the ‘ulema.

39. Also known as Sheekh Mukhtaar Abu Zubayr. Godane is the nickname of his father who was a member of a Sufi order. His own nickname is Afgaduud.

40. Shongole was the nickname of his father, a celebrated sports man in Somalia.

41. He was killed alongside ‘Ayro on 1 May 2008 in Dhuusa Marreeb. He was also a former al-Barakat employee.

42. In Islamic terminology, the term hadith refers to reports about the statements or actions of the Prophet Muhammad, or about his tacit approval of something said or done in his presence.

43. This hadith is crucial in the Wahhabi doctrine: “commanding the good and chasing evil.” According to one interpretation, it provides the right (and the duty) to stop incorrect behaviour.

44. A tropical evergreen plant whose leaves are used as a stimulant. See Anderson et al., The Khat Controversy.

45. Qaat trading provides employment for poor women and teenagers. Taxes could have been raised at a time the ICU wanted to build a stronger military wing.

46. Khaliif ‘Adaale was the Deputy Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and made any progress impossible.

47. Somalia is not restricted to southern Somalia. For an overview of political developments in Puntland and Somaliland throughout this period, see Hoehne, Somalia.

48. See Human Rights Watch, Civilians Under Siege and War Crimes and the Devastation of Somalia; Amnesty International, Routinely Targeted.

49. See the conclusion of Marchal, Somalia: A New Front in the War on Terror?

50. A middle rank commander killed in Kismaayo in January 2007. He was Murosade.

51. Gordon and Mazzetti, “U.S. Used Base in Ethiopia to Hunt Al Qaeda.”

52. Pilgrimage to Mecca: 150 cadres of the ICU were invited to attend by the Saudi Kingdom.

53. Human Rights Watch, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

54. The last example is the director of HornAfrik, the most successful radio station in Mogadishu. He was killed near Bakaraha market early February 2009. Mukhtaar Roobow stated that his own organization was not involved and that he himself had a cordial relationship with this journalist. The same kind of denial occurred when a leading member of an advocacy NGO was killed in Mogadishu in 2005: although al-Shabaab was named as being responsible, ‘Ayro adamantly denied being involved. In both cases, outsiders have narratives (but no hard evidence) that support the al-Shabaab denials.

55. To the extent that rumours in March 2009 attribute the position of leader to a Saudi Arabian citizen from Yemeni origin, Sheikh Fayed bin Mohamed, a member of al-Qâ'idah and appointed head of al-Qâ’'idah for the Horn of Africa in December 2008.

56. Da'wa means Preaching of Islam.

57. For instance, basic commodities are bought outside the country and sold in Somalia and the whole profit of the sale is given to the movement; such kind of financial support is very difficult to trace.

58. Sengupta, “Exclusive”; CBS News, “FBI Watching Somali Muslims in Minneapolis”; CBS Evening News: “20 From Same Mosque Have Repatriated, One Became A Suicide Bomber; Mosque Officials Deny Radical Agenda,” available online at:http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/03/eveningnews/main4841761.shtml?source=RSSattr=U.S._4841761 (accessed August 12, 2009).

59. Roy, La sainte ignorance.

60. This, by itself, does not imply that ‘Ayro was aware of the plan or directly involved, although his relationships with Hasan Daahir had become very tense by December 2006.

61. This event shows also the complexity of Somali politics. Asmara did not want to fight al-Shabaab at a time they were once again trying to narrow their differences. But Yuusuf did not intervene because he would have fought against people from his own Ayr clan who led the attack on Merka. From a clan perspective, he did the right thing and prevented a fight among his Ayr clan. From a political perspective, he just let Khalif ‘Adaale and his friends take over the city.

62. This movement was born in 1992 as a result of General ‘Aydiid's concern about the growing influence of the Islamists, and is supposed to gather the supporters of the three main Sufi orders in Somalia: Ahmadiyya, Qadiriyya and Salihiyya. Business people who belong to the three orders fund it and lend military hardware when necessary.

63. Some of his translated texts appear in the Militant Ideology Atlas edited by a team on Westpoint Military Academy: at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/atlas/

64. http://www.hiiraan.com/news2_rss/2008/Dec/kismayo_somali_fighters_destroying_shrines.aspx (accessed August 12, 2009)

65. Despite obvious ideological differences, in both cases, appealing to the youth is a way to challenge an old order.

66. The last Somalia Monitoring Group confuses military bases and contingents.

67. When al-Shabaab decided to move the Jihad to Region 5, it was not specifically welcome and after a couple of bloody incidents against the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), al-Shabaab retreated back to Somalia. Jihad, yes but on national territory! One may suppose that the US played a role in that failure since they threatened to put ONLF on the terror list, had this latter cooperated with al-Shabaab. The fact that ONLF is not seen as a terrorist organization embarrassed Jendayi Frazer, a staunch supporter of Meles Zenawi, but it avoided repeating in Region 5 the mistakes made in Somalia.

68. This is what the Monitoring Group and ICG (based on the same interviews) stated: I am of the opposite view.

69. A number of insurgent groups rallied early February 2009 in Afmadow under a new umbrella: the Hisbul Islaam led by Dr Omar Imam Abuubaker (Badiadde/Hawiye), a deputy of Hasan Daher Aweys while he was chairing the Islamic Shura in the second semester 2006. Among the groups, one should quote Jebhat Islaami led by Abduqaader Kumaandos (Ajuuraan) – a group recruiting mostly among Garre and Gaalje'el; Al-Maqawama Islaamiyya (mostly Ayr, Duduble, both being Haber Gidir sub-clans and even Gugundhabe; therefore all three belonging to Hawiye); Ras Kambooni group led by Hasan Turki – a group mostly made up of Ogaadeni – and Mu'asker Aanoole made up of mostly Majeerteen and Leykasse from the Kismaayo area. This unity is fragile, yet if lasting, one may expect Hisbul Islaam to take over a large part of the area south of Mogadishu.