Abandoned orphan, wayward child: the United Kingdom and Belgium in Rwanda since 1994

Abstract

Analyses of the nature and policies of the Rwandan government since 1994 vary widely. On the one hand, the country is regarded as having made remarkable progress from a developmental perspective; on the other, concerns abound over the attitude of the government with respect to democratisation, human rights and regional stability. Donor agencies active in Rwanda engage with these governmental aspects in different ways, with some taking a more favourable view vis-à-vis such issues than others. This article examines the aid policies of Belgium and the United Kingdom in Rwanda between 1994 and 2005 – two donors with very contrasting historical experiences in the country. These examples demonstrate how the policies donor agencies pursue can be traced to their historical relationships with the recipient country, their domestic political contexts, and their approaches to aid. The article warns against a simplistic divide into “new” and “old” donors, a divide often used in the literature on Rwanda, as this masks more complex factors. The positions of individual donor agencies are constantly shifting, which raises broader questions regarding the current trend towards greater harmonisation in donor strategies with regard to developing countries.

Keywords:

• Rwanda
• Belgium
• United Kingdom
• foreign aid
• development

Acknowledgements

The research upon which this article is based was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) under grants PTA-030-2002-00409 (PhD) and PTA-026-27-1383 (post-doctoral research fellowship). I am grateful to Jude Murison, Isabella Soi, and anonymous reviewers for their comments.

Notes

1. Uvin, Aiding Violence, 179. This builds on an earlier report co-written by Uvin – Baaré, Shearer, and Uvin, The Limits and Scope.

2. See, for example, van Hoyweghen, “From Human(itarian) Disaster”; Reyntjens, “Again at the Crossroads”; Unsworth and Uvin, “A New Look at Civil Society Support”; Pottier, Reimagining Rwanda; Storey, “Storylines, Scapegoats and State Power.”

3. Hayman, “From Rome to Accra via Kigali.”

4. The empirical evidence presented in this article comes from interviews and observations in Rwanda, the UK and Belgium between 2002 and 2005. The article does not engage with more recent developments in Belgian and British relations with Rwanda.

5. For good general overviews of the geopolitical and strategic rationales behind the allocation of aid resources, see Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? and Lancaster, Foreign Aid.

6. See IRDP, Building Lasting Peace in Rwanda for an insight into popular perspectives on history in Rwanda.

7. Belgian aid to Rwanda rose dramatically towards the end of the 1980s and into the early 1990s – a time when Rwanda was in the grip of an economic and political crisis. Aid overall increased in the early 1990s to support economic reform and promote an end to the civil war which had begun in 1990 when the RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda. Belgian aid rose from US$ 20.2 million in 1985 to US$ 55.8 million in 1991: OECD, “International Development Statistics.”

8. Several informants within the Belgian administration used this term to describe the Belgian approach; see also Reyntjens and Parqué, “La diplomatie belge”.

9. Debar, Renard and Reyntjens, “Coherent Approaches to Complex Political Emergencies” 1999; Verwimp and Vanheusden, “The Foreign Police of Belgium.” Note that Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997.

10. UNDP, Round Table Conference for Rwanda, July 1995; UNDP, Round Table Conference for Rwanda, January 1995; UNDP, Round Table Conference for Rwanda, June 1996.

11. See, for example, La Nouvelle Relève, no. 345, July 16–31,1997 and no. 370, October 30, 1998.

12. Renard and Reyntjens, “Aid and Conditionality.”

13. de Lame, “Deuil, commémoration, justice.” The depths of this introspection appear disputed, however. An anonymous reviewer considers Belgian attitudes to be rather characterised by “collective amnesia” with the focus tending to be on the deaths of Belgian paratroopers, rather than a deep reflection on Belgium's role both historically and during the genocide.

14. Belgian Senate, “Commission d'enquête parlementaire,” 1998. The enquiry was widely reported in the Rwandan newspaper La Nouvelle Relève in early 1998, with Belgium praised for undertaking such a public and in-depth analysis (in contrast to France). It was not without criticism, however. Sevilien Sebasoni (an academic and RPF activist) considered the enquiry to have avoided the difficult questions about ethnicity and anti-Tutsi sentiments prevalent in Belgium: La Nouvelle Relève, March 31, 1998.

15. Willame, Les Belges au Rwanda; Lanotte “La Belgique et le génocide rwandais”; Willame, “Le génocide rwandais.”

16. Rosoux, “La ‘diplomatie morale’”; de Lame, “Deuil, commémoration, justice.”

17. See Hayman, “The Complexity of Aid,” 156–7.

18. In The Rwanda Crisis, Prunier considers the Belgian struggle for its national identity to have been transferred to Rwandan soil. Flemish missionaries took the side of the repressed Hutu during the colonial period, helping to develop the Hutu ideological position vis-à-vis the Tutsi, associated with the ruling Francophone elite in Belgium, as independence approached.

19. Several informants referred to this enduring stereotype, a perspective reiterated by the Rwandan Ambassador to Belgium (interview, Brussels, November 2, 2004). See also Reyntjens, “A Dubious Discourse.” The Rwandan government, for its part, has often been hostile towards Belgian academics and NGOs which have criticised it.

20. See 11.11.11, “Lettre ouverte”; Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On”.

21. Interviews, Belgian NGO 11.11.11, Brussels, June 19, 2003 and January 22, 2004.

22. ICG, Fin de Transition; Rafti, “The Rwandan Political Opposition.” However, a revisionist movement has been gaining strength in Belgium in recent years, preferring to interpret the genocide as a civil war that got out of hand and “overlooking” the reaction of the Belgian Prime Minister and other key cabinet members at the time to the outbreak of the genocide. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

23. Belgian Senate, “Commission d'enquête parlementaire,” 2003. See also Braeckman, Les nouveaux prédateurs.

24. See, for example, “Tension entre Bruxelles et Kigali,” Le Soir on-line, Brussels, 2002.

25. Interview, Rwandan Ambassador to Belgium, Brussels, November 2, 2004.

26. Interview, Development Cooperation official, Brussels, January 20, 2004.

27. Interviews, Development Cooperation desk officer for Rwanda, Brussels, June 3, 2003 and January 22, 2004.

28. In April 1995 the Rwandan army emptied by force the last internally displaced peoples camp in south-west Rwanda at Kibeho, resulting in the massacre of thousands of people, civilian and military alike. Disputes over the incident, the role of the Rwandan army and the casualties, led several donors, including Belgium and the European Commission, to suspend aid temporarily. This incident raised doubts for many donors about the nature of the RPF-led regime: see Pottier, Reimagining Rwanda.

29. Government of Belgium, Construction de la paix.

30. OECD, “International Development Statistics.”

31. Ministry of Finance, “2007 Government of Rwanda and Development Partners Retreat,” 9.

32. Government of Belgium, “Note de politique générale,” 14.

33. La Nouvelle Relève, August 31, 1999.

34. Belgian ministers have tended to stress how limited Belgium's influence in world affairs is; however, through its colonisation of the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, Belgium was a powerful force in shaping modern Central Africa: Clément and Roosens, “La Belgique et le Congo.”

35. Government of Belgium, Construction de la paix; DGCD Note stratégique Rwanda.

36. Renard and Reyntjens, “Aid and Conditionality”; Verwimp and Vanheusden, “The Foreign Policy of Belgium.”

37. Debar, Renard, and Reyntjens, “Coherent Approaches.”

38. Renard and Reyntjens, “Aid and Conditonality”.

39. Pottier, Reimagining Rwanda, 165.

40. Renard and Reyntjens, “Aid and Conditonality”.

41. Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder; Melvern and Williams, “Britannia Waived the Rules.”

42. Telephone interview with Lynda Chalker (former UK Minister for Development Cooperation), September 8, 2004. See also DFID, Country Strategy Paper, 5. This “innocence” is questionable, however, reflecting rather an attitude of “total indifference” given that Rwanda lay beyond Britain's sphere of influence or interest, and Britain's lack of vision vis-à-vis Africa more broadly at a time when it was focusing upon the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and strategic middle income countries: Williams, “Britain and Africa”; Porteous, “British Government Policy”; Healey, “UK Aid Management.”

43. Interviews: former UK Minister of Overseas Aid, 8 September 2004 (telephone); former Ambassador to Rwanda 1995–98, August 23, 2004 (telephone); FCO official, June 4, 2004; former ODA/DFID official, June 2, 2004. This is also reflected in the Rwandan press which is very enthusiastic about British aid: see La Nouvelle Relève, April 30, 1999, May 15, 2000; New Times, November 24–26, 2003.

44. Interviews, Rwandan government officials and politicians, Kigali, Rwanda 2003–04.

45. According to Short's biography, her first visit was in 1998: Short, An Honourable Deception, 86; however, her first official visit took place in October 1997: DFID Press Release, October 9, 1997; IRIN Update no. 167, October 10, 1997.

46. OECD, “International Development Statistics.”

47. DFID, Rwanda Country Assistance Plan, 15. Drafts of this document were more explicit about who the “traditional donors” were – namely France and Belgium – although no explanation is advanced for why traditional donors were not engaging and why other donors may not have been so enthusiastic. Rather, the UK recognises Rwanda's need for “wide-ranging, substantial and predictable support,” and “the commitment of the new Government to national reconciliation and poverty reduction for all Rwandans”; idem.

48. Parliamentary questions and debates 1997–2004: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmhansrd.htm

49. Observations, Consultation meeting on the Rwanda Country Assistance Strategy, DFID London, June 30, 2003.

50. Between 1997 and 2008, aid to Nigeria was set to rise from £9.3m to £100m, Ethiopia from £5m to £130m, Sierra Leone from £3.1m to £40m and Rwanda from £6.2m to £47m. Since 2000, the DRC has seen a rapid increase also – from £3m in 2000 to a projected £70m by 2008: DFID, Departmental Report, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007; DFID, Statistics on International Development.

51. DFID, Rwanda Country Assistance Plan, 17.

52. Britain's interest in Africa as a whole expanded in the late 1990s and 2000s. Some authors considered the UK's involvement in Rwanda to reflect a broader attempt by the UK and USA to encroach on previously francophone territory (see, for example, Chossudovsky, Rwanda: Installing a US Protectorate and Huliaris, “The ‘Anglophone Conspiracy’”). While British involvement in Central Africa has taken on a more strategic dimension in more recent years, my research exposed no evidence that the British aid programme in Rwanda began with such issues in mind (see Hayman, “The Complexity of Aid”). Rather, the UK can be accused of favouring Rwanda too highly and in the process, failing to take seriously the broader regional crisis. On this see Marriage, “Defining Morality” and Porteous, “Britain in Africa”).

53. DFID, Poverty Reduction Budget Support.

54. Interviews: former UK ambassadors to Rwanda, Kigali, December 1, 2003, telephone, August 23, 2004; former DFID official, London, June 2, 2004.

55. Interviews: former ODI fellow, July 28, 2003; DFID official, London, July 30, 2003.

56. World Bank 1999, “Rwanda”; DFID Country Strategy Paper, 9.

57. DFID, Country Strategy Paper, 5.

58. Interview, former UK ambassador to Rwanda, Kigali, December 1, 2003.

59. Killick, Katumanga, and Piron, “The Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding.”

60. Press release, UK government, June 10, 2005.

61. DFID, Rwanda Country Assistance Plan, 6.

62. See Dorman, “Post-liberation Politics in Africa.”

63. See Hayman, “Milking the Cow” and Hayman, “Going in the ‘Right’ Direction?”

64. Baaré, Shearer, and Uvin, The Limits and Scope, 18; Pottier, Reimagining Rwanda, 166.

65. Baaré, Shearer, and Uvin, The Limits and Scope, 36; Pottier, Reimagining Rwanda.

66. Pottier, Reimagining Rwanda, 156.

67. Ministry of Finance, “Aid Effectiveness Report.”

68. Hayman, “Milking the Cow.”

69. Hayman, “The Complexity of Aid.”

70. For a full discussion of these issues, see Hayman, “Are the MDGs Enough?,” “Milking the Cow” and “Going in the ‘Right’ Direction?”

71. OECD, “International Development Statistics.”

72. Hayman, “Going in the ‘Right’ Direction?”

73. DFID, Rwanda Country Assistance Plan, 14. See also Hayman, “Milking the Cow.”

74. Oomen, “Donor-Driven Justice”; Uvin, Aiding Violence.