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Abstract
For a long time Kenya was the African exception – a country that embraced a capitalist path to development in the midst of widespread state-led development. More recently it has been used as one of many examples of neopatrimonial rule in Africa, following its reputation for endemic corruption and its failure to successfully embrace economic and political reforms. Most interpretations of Kenya's economic development record rest heavily on the evidence of growth. This article revisits that evidence, and the associated causal claims, and finds little support for the consensus view. In the 1960s and 1970s there was nothing exceptional about economic growth in Kenya, while in the 1980s and 1990s Kenya performed relatively well if external conditions are taken into consideration. Finally, the article questions whether this finding should compel scholars to re-evaluate the relative merits of the Kenyatta and Moi regimes.
Notes
1. Leys, Rise and Fall, 143–63. The debate was initiated by Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, continued in an edited volume by Fransman, Industry and Accumulation, complemented by Swainson, Corporate Capitalism, and revised by Kitching, “Kenya Debate.”
2. For a review and critique of “neopatrimonialism” and how this term has been used to explain Kenya's (and other countries such as Cote d'Ivoire) failure to successfully embrace economic and political reform see deGrassi, “Neopatrimonialism,” and Pitcher, Moran and Johnston, “Rethinking Patrimonialism.”
3. Ndulu et al., Growth in Africa: Case Studies, and Growth in Africa: Analytic Surveys.
4. Illiffe, Emergence of African Capitalism, 78, 82. Tanzania is referred to as the “model of African socialism” after Nkrumah's fall in Ghana, while Kenya is labelled the typical example of “nurture capitalism” in East and South Africa.
5. According to Chege, “Introducing Race,” 210, the “Kenya Debate” “rebounded with vengeance” with a renewed interest in discussions on African capitalists and new publications, of which the most important are: Berman and Leys, African Capitalists in African Development; Kennedy, Struggle for Ascendancy; and King, Jua Kali Kenya, all with different perspectives on the debate.
6. Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor.
7. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa.
8. Bates, “Agricultural Policy,” 119.
9. Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market, 148.
10. For several criticisms of Bates’ arguments, see Leys, Rise and Fall, 89; and for a critique of a price-based approach to the production problem, see Platteau, “Food Crisis in Africa,” 463–9.
11. Bates, “Agricultural Policy,” 123.
12. Barkan, Politics and Public Policy, vii.
13. Barkan, Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism, 23.
14. Ndulu and Mutalemwa, Tanzania at the Turn of the Century, 49.
15. Collier and Gunning, “Explaining African Economic Performance,” 68. Meanwhile, Bigsten and Durevall, “Factor Proportions,” 289, note that, for the period 1965–2000, Kenya “can be viewed as a representative sub-Saharan country.”
16. Jerven, “African Dummy.”
17. Ndulu et al., Growth in Africa: Case Studies, and Growth in Africa: Analytic Surveys.
18. Mwega and Ndung'u, “Explaining Economic Growth Performance,” 327.
19. Blades, “Levels and Growth of Output in Developing Countries,” 76.
20. Bigsten, “Welfare and Economic Growth.”
21. Jerven, “The Relativity of Poverty and Income” and “Random Growth.”
22. Moradi finds that data on Kenya are either lacking or unreliable. He uses height data from African army recruits to gauge economic change in pre-colonial Kenya. Moradi, “Towards an Objective Account.”
23. Interview, Collins M. Omondi (Statistician, Central Bureau of Statistics, Kenya), April 2007, Nairobi.
24. Republic of Kenya, National Accounts Companion Volume, 130.
25. East African Statistical Department, Domestic Income and Product in Kenya (A Description of Sources and Methods with Revised Calculations from 1954 to 1958).
26. Republic of Kenya, National Accounts Companion Volume, 132.
27. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1967, 3.
28. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1967, 3.
29. Republic of Kenya, National Accounts Companion Volume, 3.
30. Republic of Kenya, National Accounts Companion Volume, 192.
31. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1982, 4.
32. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1982, 6.
33. Ndulu et al., Growth in Africa: Case Studies, and Growth in Africa: Analytic Surveys.
34. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1967, 3.
35. We have in two sets of data for 1983 too. For 1983 the difference between the two Abstracts is 29.53 million K£. The statistical growth is approximately 3% in this sector.
36. Mwega and Ndung'u, “Explaining Economic Growth Performance;” and Ndulu et al., Growth in Africa: Case Studies, and Growth in Africa: Analytic Surveys.
37. Mwega and Ndung'u, “Explaining Economic Growth Performance,” 326.
38. Mwega and Ndung'u, “Explaining Economic Growth Performance,” 327.
39. Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market, 149.
40. Bates, “Politics of Food Crisis,” 91–2.
41. Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market, 149.
42. Himbara, “Domestic Capitalists,” 88.
43. Anyang’ Nyong'o, “Limitations of Import-Substitution Industrialization,” 38.
44. World Development Indicators, 2003.
45. Mwega and Ndung'u, “Explaining Economic Growth Performance,” 329.
46. Bryceson, Liberalizing Tanzania's Food Trade, 9.
47. Mwau and Handa, Rational Economic Decisions, 135.
48. Coughlin, “Kenya – Moving to the Next Phase,” 251.
49. Fahnbulleh, “Elusive Quest for Industrialisation.”
50. Mwega and Ndung'u, “Explaining Economic Growth Performance,” 340.
51. Sharpley and Lewis, “Kenya: The Manufacturing Sector,” 239–40.
52. Mwega and Ndung'u, “Explaining Economic Growth Performance,” 359.
53. Vandemoortele, “Causes of Economic Instability,” 95.
54. Mwega and Ndung'u, “Explaining Economic Growth Performance,” 343.
55. Vandemoortele, “Causes of Economic Instability,” 88.
