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Abstract
Water governance in Tanzania's small-scale irrigation schemes has become ever more challenging because of increasing market penetration, declining predictability of water availability and widening institutional pluralism. Despite these trends, resource conflicts at the local level have generally been avoided. Instead, one observes processes in which actors involved in conflicts make and remake institutions. This renders these irrigation schemes interesting for studying water governance institutions under construction. By documenting how conflicts over water are solved in small-scale irrigation schemes in rural Tanzania, we show that resource conflicts do not necessarily lead to violence, but motivate actors to pragmatically search for solutions. Institutional pluralism is turned into an asset because it increases the potential for creativity. As such, pragmatic conflict resolution and institutional pluralism contribute to the development of more sophisticated and locally adapted resource governance institutions. However, despite its potential, actor-driven development of resource governance institutions can also reproduce deeply entrenched power imbalances and gender roles. As such, it can hinder inclusion of less powerful resource users because the latter do not always have the capability to engage in creative conflict resolution.
Acknowledgements
I acknowledge financial support from Ghent University and MICROCON. This research received research clearance from the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) and the Mufindi District Council. I am grateful for input and support from Björn Van Campenhout, Ben D'Exelle, Charles Kyando, Betty Mntambo and Incomet 2001. I wish to thank Björn Van Campenhout, Koen Vlassenroot, Jeroen Adam, Anne Walraet and anonymous reviewers for commenting on earlier drafts.
Notes
1. Starr, “Water Wars”; Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict.”
2. Le Billon, “Political Ecology of War.”
3. Ostrom, Governing the Commons.
4. Bogale and Korf, “To Share or Not to Share?”; Singleton, “Managing Pacific Salmon.”
5. Kaswamila and Masuruli, “Traditional Irrigation Systems.”
6. Shao et al., Horticulture Development in Tanzania.
7. Dixon et al., “Life on the Edge”; Sokoni and Shechambo, “Changes in Upland Irrigation Systems.”
8. Maganga, “Interplay Between Formal and Informal Systems.”
9. United Republic of Tanzania, National Water Policy; United Republic of Tanzania, National Water Sector Development Strategy.
10. Chaligha et al., “Local Governance in Tanzania.”
11. Justino, “Violent Conflict and Household Poverty.” Recourse conflicts are defined here as conflicts between individuals or between groups resulting from competing claims on resources and disputes over access to and management of resources. These conflicts may imply violent encounters, but they are not instances of violent mass conflicts, defined as systematic breakdowns of the social contract which involve mass violence instigated through collective action.
12. Leach et al., “Environmental Entitlements”; Cleaver, “Reinventing Institutions.”
13. Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, “Dynamic Property Rights”; Maganga, “Interplay Between Formal and Informal Systems.”
14. Cleaver, “Reinventing Institutions,” 16.
15. Cleaver, “Reinventing Institutions,” 20.
16. Cleaver, “Reinventing Institutions,”; Maganga, “Interplay Between Formal and Informal Systems.”
17. Galvan, “Syncretism and Local-level Democracy”; Galvan and Sil, “Institutional Adaptation and the Role of Syncretism.”
18. von Benda-Beckmann, “Forum Shopping”; Lund, “Twilight Institutions,” 676.
19. Aldashev et al., “Using the Law to Change the Custom.”
20. Sikor and Lund, “Access and Property.”
21. von Benda-Beckmann, “Forum Shopping.” Legitimizing practices are closely related to “shopping forums.”
22. Fjeldstad et al., “Local Government Reform.”
23. Ribot et al., “Democratic Decentralization.”
24. Ribot et al., “Democratic Decentralization.”
25. Fjeldstad et al., “Local Government Reform.”
26. Brockington, “Corruption, Taxation, and Natural Resource Management”; Afrobarometer, Summary of Results. Brockington based his conclusion on data gathered before the LGRP. The Afrobarometer survey, conducted in Tanzania in 2008, however, does not give the impression that the LGRP led to a drastic improvement of local government's performance or their reputation.
27. Ribot et al., “Democratic Decentralization”; Brockington, “Corruption, Taxation, and Natural Resource Management.”
28. Ribot et al., “Democratic Decentralization”; Persha and Blomley, “Management Decentralization.”
29. Ribot, “Authority over Forests”; Sikor and Lund, “Access and Property.”
30. Ribot, “Authority over Forests.”
31. Wardell and Lund, “Governing Access to Forests.”
32. Vihemäki, “Participatory Forest Conservation.”
33. Ribot et al., “Democratic Decentralization.”
34. Vihemäki, “Participatory Forest Conservation.”
35. Cleaver and Toner, “Evolution of Community Water Governance.”
36. Mehta, “Water, Difference and Power.”
37. Ribot et al., “Democratic Decentralization.”
38. Vihemäki, “Participatory Forest Conservation.”
39. Cleaver and Toner, “Evolution of Community Water Governance.”
40. Examples of institutional bricolage include Cleaver, “Reinventing Institutions”; and Sehring, “Path Dependencies and Institutional Bricolage.” Examples of legitimizing practices include Nuijten and Lorenzo, “Ruling by Record”; and Roth, “Property and Authority.”
41. Ribot, “Authority over Forests”; Galvan, “Syncretism and Local-level Democracy”; Juma and Maganga, “Current Reforms and their Implications.”
42. Maganga, “Interplay Between Formal and Informal Systems.”
43. Mkavidanda and Kaswamila, “Traditional Irrigation Systems (Vinyungu).”
44. United Republic of Tanzania, “Agro-ecological Zone.”
45. Reeves and Baden, “Gender and Development.”
46. Eyben et al., “Power for Change”; Leach et al., “Environmental Entitlements.” The focus here is on the enabling nature of power, which relates to Sen's concept of capabilities, or Lukes’ concept of “power to.” See Lukes, Power: A Radical View; Stewart and Deneulin, “Sen's Contribution to Development Thinking.”
47. Laws et al., Research for Development.
48. Cleaver, “Reinventing Institutions.”
49. Weiss and Fershtman, “Social Status.” Social status is a collective judgment of the relative position of an individual in society based on her traits and assets and is an important source of power. Social status was translated in Swahili as “hadhi ya jamii,” which literally means “status in society,” and as “uwezo,” which implies economic ability but also the ability to attain your goals, to influence others and to be respected. The notion of power is present in the term “uwezo.”
50. Participants were not expected to rank themselves nor users they were not well acquainted with. Rungs could be removed (added) if participants distinguished less (more) than four categories.
51. Singh - Manouk et al., “Subjective Social Status.”
52. Mkavidanda and Kaswamila, “Traditional Irrigation Systems (Vinyungu).”
53. Codenames are used to assure anonymity.
54. United Republic of Tanzania, National Water Policy; United Republic of Tanzania, National Water Sector Development Strategy.
55. Juma and Maganga, “Current Reforms and their Implications.”
56. Interview with Mufindi District Agriculture Extension Officer, Mr. Nko, Mafinga, June 20, 2008.
57. Fjeldstad et al., “Local Government Reform.”
58. Based on information gathered through group discussions in 2008.
59. Interview with village chairman, Isanu, May 9, 2009. Case Is2.
60. Interview with village chairman, Isanu, May 9, 2009.
61. United Republic of Tanzania, National Water Policy, 17.
62. Case Is4.
63. Interview with canal initiator, Isanu, May 9, 2009.
64. Case Is7.
65. Case KitZ1.
66. Case Ik3.
67. Case Is2.
68. Cases Mt3 and Mt6.
69. Case Is4.
70. Case KitU5.
71. Hayami, “Social Capital, Human Capital.”
72. Case Is7.
73. Case Ik4.
74. Case KitZ9.
75. Interview with female member of water committee, Kitangzi, May 11, 2009.
76. Case Ik3.
77. Interview with village executive officer, Ika, May 10, 2009.
78. The semi-commercial farmer is the one involved in the alleged illegal land sale; see case KitU5. See also cases KitU4, KitU6 and KitU8.
79. Sikor and Lund, “Access and Property.”
80. Case KitU4.
81. Case Ik2.
82. Case Mt2.
83. Case Mt6.
84. Cases Mt7 and Mt8.
85. Interview with village chairman, Mutua, May 8, 2009.
86. Case Is3.
87. Case Is5.
88. Case Is6.
89. Case Ik1.
90. Case Ik2.
91. Case Ik5.
92. Interview with female irrigator, Ika, May 10, 2009.
93. Case Ik4.
94. Case Mt4.
95. Interview with irrigation user committee member, Mutua, May 8, 2009
96. Interview with female irrigator, Kitangzi, May 11, 2009. See case KitZ10.
97. Case Mt1.
98. Interview with female irrigator, Mutua, May 8, 2009.
99. Case Mt3.
100. Interview with female irrigator, Mutua, May 8, 2009.
101. Cleaver, “Reinventing Institutions”; Galvan, “Syncretism and Local-level Democracy.”
102. Galvan, “Syncretism and Local-level Democracy”; Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, “Dynamic Property Rights”; Roth, “Property and Authority.”
103. Leach et al., “Environmental Entitlements.”
104. Mehta, “Water, Difference and Power.”
