Decentralization to the household: expansion and limits of state power in rural Oromiya

Abstract

This article sheds light on the impacts and dynamics of the latest decentralization phase in Ethiopia, which seeks to professionalize and democratize local government. Based on recent field research in Oromiya Region, we draw attention to the paradoxes inherent in the top-down decentralization of public administration within an authoritarian one-party state. On the one hand, decentralization in Oromiya has empowered kebele administrations and facilitated the expansion of service delivery into rural hinterlands. In particular the sub-kebele state and party structure is instrumentalized by local governments to mobilize and control households. On the other hand, state authority remains limited as peasants resist and subvert state-led development works and kebele officials must rely on clientelistic networks to implement policies. Consequently, decentralization and kebele reform in post-1991 Ethiopia have so far neither altered the tradition of hierarchical state–society relations nor improved the lack of genuine representative democracy at kebele level.

Keywords:

• decentralization
• state–peasant relations
• local government reform
• party-state
• Ethiopia

Acknowledgements

This article is dedicated to the loving memory of our friend and co-author Sibilo Keno, who died in June 2010 before completing his doctoral research project on political practices of decentralization at local level in Oromiya. We thank Jon Abbink, Johan Helland and Siegfried Pausewang for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The authors acknowledge the support of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research North-South (NCCR North-South).

Notes

1. Also called killil, zone, woreda and kebele in Amharic respectively.

2. Dessalegn, Peasant and the State, 244; Tegegne and Kassahun, “A Literature Review,” 10.

3. Rondinelli, “Government Decentralization,” 138. According to Rondinelli's classic distinction, decentralization in Ethiopia does not correspond to devolution, which entails “that local government be given autonomy and independence and be clearly perceived of a separate level over which central authorities exercise little or no direct control.” For different typologies of decentralization in Ethiopia see Meheret, “Decentralization in Ethiopia”; Tegegne and Kassahun, “A Literature Review.”

4. The DLDP transferred planning, fiscal and administrative autonomy from the regions to the district (see Dessalegn, Peasant and the State, 244–6; Meheret, “Decentralization in Ethiopia”; Meheret, “A Rapid Assessment of Wereda Decentralization”; Tegegne and Kassahun, “A Literature Review,” 10, 26) and was a major component of the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) (2002–2005). A more comprehensive decentralization package that included civil service and tax revenues reform as well as urban management capacity-building was implemented under the Public Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCAP), which was part of the subsequent Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (2005–2010). After 2005 the Protection of Basic Services Program supported district and kebele service delivery (see Spielman et al., “Local Governance Systems”; Taye, Digest of Ethiopia). These and other programs were significantly funded by (Western) donor countries and the World Bank.

5. Aalen, “Ethnic Federalism”; Abbink, “The Ethiopian Second Republic”; ICG, “Ethiopia”; Keller, “Making and Remaking State and Nation”; Paulos, “Clientelism”; Vaughan and Tronvoll, Culture of Power.

6. HRW, “Development without Freedom,” 67.

7. Aalen and Tronvoll, “End of Democracy?”; HRW, “Development without Freedom”; HRW, “One Hundred Ways”; only two seats in parliament did not go to the EPRDF – one to the opposition and one to an EPRDF-friendly independent candidate, see Tronvoll, “The Ethiopian 2010.”

8. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia.

9. Before the April 2008 local elections kebele councils consisted of a maximum of 15 members including the chairman, vice-chairman and secretary, see Aalen and Tronvoll, “The 2008 Ethiopian Local Elections,” 116.

10. Bevan, “The MDG-ing of Ethiopian's Rural Communities”; HRW, “Development without Freedom”; HRW, “Suppressing Dissent”; HRW, “One Hundred Ways”; Lefort, “Power – Mengist – and Peasants …: Post-2005 Interlude”; Segers et al., “Be Like Bees.”

11. Clapham, “Controlling Space,” 14.

12. Pankhurst, Enhancing Understanding, 25.

13. Mann, “The Autonomous Power.”

14. Initially referred to as gott and garee, see HRW, Suppressing Dissent, 30.

15. A more extensive account of the role of the garee misoma in rural road construction in Meta Robi is found in Emmenegger, “Decentralization to the Household” and Emmenegger, “Roads of Decentralization.”

16. Keller, “The Ethnogenesis.”

17. For a critical engagement with the notion of a homogenous Oromo nation see Haneke, “Multidimensionality of Oromo Identity”; Sorenson, “Learning to be Oromo.” The emergence of a collective Oromo national consciousness is of relatively recent date as Oromos are divided into at least five groups: Wellega Oromos who are mostly Protestant farmers, Oromos in Shoa who are often Amharized, small groups of Oromo pastoralists in the South, conservative Muslim Oromos in Hararghe region and agro-pastoral Borana living in the Ethio-Kenyan borderlands; for details see Tronvoll, Ethiopia, 8.

18. The core of the OPDO was initially constituted by former Oromo prisoners of war whom the TPLF had captured during the conflict with the Derg. The OPDO won all 537 seats in the regional council in the May 2010 elections.

19. Formerly the Oromo National Congress (ONC).

20. Mohammed, “Conquest, Tyranny and Ethnocide.”

21. Pausewang, “Ethiopia: A Political View,” 77.

22. Remnants of the OLF, itself divided by internal power struggles and a recent expulsion from its Kenyan hinterlands, carry out sporadic attacks against government buildings and officials.

23. Arriola, “The Politics of Protest.”

24. Aalen and Tronvoll, “The 2008 Ethiopian Local Elections”; ICG, “Ethiopia.”

25. The same district reform occurred in Amhara, Tigray and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) and later on the remaining regions.

26. Dessalegn, Peasant and the State, 246; Tegegne and Kassahun, “A Literature Review,” 15, 26; Vaughan and Tronvoll, Culture of Power, 92.

27. Yilmaz and Venugopal, “Local Government Discretion,” 6, 12. Bevan, Pankhurst, and Lavers, Ethiopian Village Studies, 63; Oromiya Regional State, “Revised Constitution,” art. 92.

28. Oromiya Regional State, “Revised Constitution,” art. 46, 76, 90 (91 and 95); Tegegne and Kassahun, “A Literature Review,” 13–14. The names and functions of the kebele organs are subject to considerable terminological confusion. Partly reflecting inconsistent translations between Amharic and English, partly echoing the perplex division of labor between the kebele council (formally the highest representative body but de facto playing a rather ceremonial role) and the kebele cabinet (formally executing the development priorities decided by the council but de facto instructed by the woreda). Hence the kebele cabinet is sometimes also referred to as “kebele administration” or “kebele administrative council” and the kebele administrator and chairman are one and the same. The Amharic name for the kebele cabinet is sira asfetsami, while the council is referred to as gubae or mikir bet and the social court is known as mehaberawi fird bet; see Pankhurst, Enhancing Understanding, 11.

29. Dessalegn, Peasant and the State, 247.

30. District council speaker Mamo Kedir in discussion with the second author, Dodolla, March 2008. See also Yilmaz and Venugopal, “Local Government Discretion,” 5–6.

31. Oromiya Regional State, “Revised Constitution,” art. 91 (2–3).

32. Yilmaz and Venugopal, “Local Government Discretion,” 8.

33. Aalen and Tronvoll, “The 2008 Ethiopian Local Elections,” 116.

34. Lefort, “Power – Mengist – and Peasants ….: Post-2005 Interlude,” 443.

35. Kumera, “Decentralized Governance.”

36. Oromiya Regional State, “Revised Constitution,” art. 96 (1a).

37. Oromiya Regional State, “Revised Constitution,” art. 95 (1).

38. Yilmaz and Venugopal, “Local Government Discretion,” 7.

39. Oromiya Regional State, “Revised Constitution,” art. 97 (1).

40. Vaughan and Tronvoll, Culture of Power, 42, point out that, according to capacity and need, the kebele cabinet was occasionally composed of five or nine individuals before 2008, for example in charge of mass mobilization.

41. Dessalegn, Peasant and the State, 247; Tegegne and Kassahun, “A Literature Review,” 13–14.

42. Interview with kebele manager, Meta Robi, August 26, 2009.

43. Sibilo, “The Practice of Decentralization,” 13.

44. Lefort, “Power – Mengist – and Peasants ….: Post-2005 Interlude,” 446–7.

45. Pankhurst, Enhancing Understanding, 11.

46. We are indebted to René Lefort for this observation (email correspondence, January 16, 2011).

47. Yilmaz and Venugopal, “Local Government Discretion,” 12. For Oromiya see also Pausewang, “Ethiopia: A Political View,” 72.

48. Article 45 of the Oromiya constitution grants the regional government the right to establish “other” administrative structures that “may be necessary” (Oromiya Regional State, “Revised Constitution,” art. 45).

49. HRW, “Suppressing Dissent,” 30.

50. Heads of household (usually male) are referred to as abba warra in Oromiffa and pay taxes to local government for the land they “own”. In case a male head of household dies, his widow inherits his garee membership as well as his land and duty to pay taxes.

51. The gott in Oromiya refers to the gott in Amhara or qushet in Tigray, which are also placed between the kebele and the garee. The garee or garee misoma finds its equivalent in the limat budin in Amhara and the gudjle lm'at in Tigray. Despite the similarities, different reports indicate slight difference regarding the constitution of these sub-kebeles in different regions. See also Lefort, “Power – Mengist – and Peasants ….: Post-2005 Interlude,” 448–9; Segers et al., “Be Like Bees,” 8, 13; Yilmaz and Venugopal, “Local Government Discretion,” 4.

52. Bevan and Pankhurst, “Power Structures,” 134; Pankhurst, Enhancing Understanding, 12; Segers et al., “Be Like Bees,” 13. For a description of the mengistawi budin and its recent counterpart, the lema'at budin (development team), see Vaughan and Tronvoll, Culture of Power, 40.

53. Interview with elder, Meta Robi, August 30, 2009.

54. Teferi, “Decentralized There, Centralized Here,” 611.

55. Bevan, “The MDG-ing of Ethiopia's Rural Communities,” 63.

56. Dessalegn, Peasant and the State, 331; HRW, “One Hundred Ways,” 23–4.

57. HRW, “Development without Freedom”; HRW, “Suppressing Dissent”; HRW, “One Hundred Ways.”

58. See for example HRW, “One Hundred Ways,” 23–4; Vaughan and Tronvoll, Culture of Power, 40. Since both party and state structure at household level – the garee and the cell – are coordinated and organized by kebele leaders, we subsume the two as sub-kebele.

59. Bevan, “The MDG-ing of Ethiopia's Rural Communities,” 22.

60. Interview with farmer, Meta Robi, August 30, 2009.

61. HRW, “Suppressing Dissent,” 30, dates the creation of the gott and garee to 2004.

62. The WRRO was created as decentralization entered its second phase with the DLDP. As an executive sector office, it is run by the woreda administration and implements regional government policy.

63. As an example of the national discourse see ERA, “Road Sector Development Programme.”

64. Interview with farmer, Meta Robi, August 24, 2009.

65. The militia consists of kebele dwellers, mainly farmers, who are tasked with security. They receive basic military training, carry a gun and report to the kebele chairman and the head of security. According to local informants, one of the local kebele with about 900 inhabitants had 74 militia, while a neighboring kebele of 1100 inhabitants had 250 militia. It is important to note that many militia are concomitantly garee leaders, which blurs their roles in everyday life.

66. See also HRW, “Suppressing Dissent,” 38.

67. Harrison, “The Problem with the Locals,” 600; Lefort, “Power – Mengist – and Peasants …: The May 2005 Elections,” 254; Pausewang, “No Environmental Protection,” 98.

68. Pausewang, “No Environmental Protection,” 98.

69. Interview with young farmer, Meta Robi, August 17, 2009.

70. Interview with garee leader, Meta Robi, August 30, 2009.

71. Interview with garee leader, Meta Robi, August 16, 2009.

72. Interview with head of Woreda Rural Road Office, Shino, August 24, 2009.

73. Dessalegn, Peasant and the State, 328.

74. Pankhurst, The Influence of the State, 12.

75. Vaughan and Tronvoll, Culture of Power, 34.

76. Interview with garee leader, Meta Robi, August 30, 2009.

77. Interview with kebele manager, Shino, August 26, 2009.

78. Interview with garee leader, Shino, August 22, 2009.

79. Vaughan and Tronvoll, Culture of Power, 41.

80. Interview with cell leader, Meta Robi, August 31, 2009.

81. Interview with kebele manager, Meta Robi, August 18, 2009.

82. Interview with former gott leader, Meta Robi, August 24, 2009.

83. Interview with farmer, Meta Robi, August 30, 2009; former gott leader, Meta Robi, August 24, 2009.

84. Interview with farmer, Meta Robi, August 16, 2009.

85. Interview with elder, Metta Robi, August 31, 2009.

86. Interview with garee leader, Meta Robi, August 28, 2009.

87. This seems to be one of the results of the “good governance” measures devised by EPRDF after 2005, including the “democratic right” to refuse to participate in meetings, community work or other government interventions, see Bevan, “The MDG-ing of Ethiopia's Rural Communities,” 20.

88. Interview with young farmer, August 22, 2009.

89. Aspen, “Models of Democracy,” 69.

90. Interview with garee leader, Meta Robi, August 31, 2009.

91. Bevan, “The MDG-ing of Ethiopia's Rural Communities,” 13 notes that the “EPRDF structures is a potential route to upward mobility” as well as “a battleground for competing networks.”

92. The following section is drawn from an unpublished manuscript by the second author, which summarizes the main research findings of his nine months of field research in different localities in Oromiya, see Sibilo, “The Practice of Decentralization.” The co-authors have copy-edited this section and inserted the (sub-)titles, but otherwise attempted to stick to the original wording.

93. Informal discussions with farmers, students and teachers, Nansebo district of West Arsi zone, February 2008.

94. Formal and informal discussions with elders, farmers, pastoralists, merchants, civil servants and district officials, see Oromiya, “Revised Constitution.” See also Sibilo, “Practice of Decentralization,” 14.

95. The armed struggle of the OLF is used by the OPDO to justify political repression at local level, see HRW, “Suppressing Dissent”; Pausewang, “Ethiopia: A Political View.”

96. This point was recently confirmed by Human Rights Watch who reported that teachers in Ambo were forced to join the OPDO “or else be suspected of sympathizing with the rebel Oromo Liberation Front,” Development without Freedom, 57.

97. Areqee is a locally made drink, which is cheaper and stronger than beer.

98. Interview with Tadele Nagisho, president of the Oromiya Regional State Supreme Court, Reporter Newspaper, Amharic version, April 5, 2009 (http://www.ethiopianreporter.com), translation by Sibilo Keno.

99. FDRE, Federal Plan on District, 3; Oromiya Regional State, An Overview, 19.

100. See also Pausewang, “Democratic Dialogue,” 187; Vaughan and Tronvoll, Culture of Power, 33; and more recently in Fekadu-Nigussa and Mberengwa, “Challenges of Productive Safety Net Program.”

101. This is not to deny serious human rights violations committed by state security organs in Oromiya upon orders of the EPRDF.

102. Also Lefort, “Power – Mengist – and Peasants ….: Post-2005 Interlude,” 450, reports that in his study area in Amhara Region kebele concil elections “were considered a non-event” and “entirely in the hands of the local officials.”

103. A very similar point is also made by Merera, “Ethnicity, Democratisation and Decentralization.”

104. Oromiya Regional State, “Revised Constitution,” art. 103 (1).

105. Interview with local elder, Oromia, 2008.