EPRDF's revolutionary democracy and religious plurality: Islam and Christianity in post-Derg Ethiopia

Abstract

In 1991 the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) introduced policies aimed at recognizing the country's long-standing religious diversity, providing a public arena for religious groups, and maintaining a sharp division between religion and the state. This further eroded the traditionally dominant position of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, strengthened Protestant Christian and Muslim communities, and created a more fluid and competitive configuration among the religious communities. Seeking to maintain its political power, the EPRDF has at the same time made efforts to monitor and control the different religious communities. Therefore, the last 20 years have been marked by uneven developments, in which the government's accommodating attitudes have been interlaced with efforts to curtail the influence of the religious communities. This article surveys the intersection and reciprocal influences between EPRDF policies and religious communities over the last 20 years, and discusses how Muslims and Christians (Orthodox and Protestant) have negotiated their roles in relation to politics and public life. These developments have, the article argues, led to the emergence of divergent and competing narratives, reconfiguring self-understanding, political aspirations and views of the religious other. The EPRDF ideology of “revolutionary democracy” has, in this sense, enabled religion to surface as a force for social mobilization and as a point of reference for attempting to define nationhood in Ethiopia.

Keywords:

• Ethiopia
• Islam
• Christianity
• Ethiopian politics

Notes

1. The authors contributed equally to the writing of this article.

2. Cf. Haustein, “Navigating Political Revolutions”; for more details on the situation of the shari'a courts, see “Proclamation to Establish Kadi Courts,” Negarit Gazeta 1, no. 12 (1942); “Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of Naiba and Kadis Councils,” Negarit Gazeta 3, no. 62 (1944); Ibrahim, “Freedom of Religion”; Abdul, “Sharia Courts in Ethiopia.”

3. See Clapham, Transformation and Continuity, 156; Teferra, The Ethiopian Revolution, 274–84.

4. Meles Zenawi renounced Marxism-Leninism at about the same time as Mengistu Hailemariam, see Andargachew, The Ethiopian Revolution, 362.

5. See Young, Peasant Revolution, 177.

6. Hussein, “Islam and Islamic Discourse.”

7. See Penal Code, §476; Criminal Code §482. Participation is fined with 500 or 1000 Birr, respectively, leaders can be put into prison for up to six months or up to 12 months.

8. “Legal Notice No. 321 of 1966: Regulations Issued Pursuant to the Control of Associations Provision of the Civil Code of 1960,” Negarit Gazeta 26, no.1 (1966): 1–10, here §8(1).

9. Traditional religions (2.7%), Catholicism (0.7%) and others (0.6%) form a small minority. These numbers have been criticized, most of all by the Muslim community. See e.g. “Ethiopia: Muslim Critics Reject National Census for ‘Missing Millions’,” Jimma Times, December 27, 2007. http://jimmatimes.com/article.cfm?articleID=31653 (accessed September 23, 2010)

10. Central Statistical Authority, The 1984 Population, 60.

11. Central Statistical Authority, The 1994 Population, 129.

12. See Haustein, Writing Religious Historyfor a comprehensive treatment.

13. See ibid., 19–22.

14. See Donham, Marxist Modern, 144.

15. Cf. Eide, Revolution and Religion, 243–5; Gemechu, “A Church Under Challenge,” 128.

16. See Tsega, “Protestant Mission Activities”; U.S. Department of State, “Ethiopia International Religious Freedom,” for such occurrences in Bahir Dar (1994) and Mekele (2003).

17. Cf. Haustein, “Navigating Political Revolutions,” 124–30.

18. See Gemechu, “A Church Under Challenge,” 137–42; Mitiku, “The Challenge of Language,” 27–38. The breakaway faction initially was led by the former president of the EECMY, Francis Stephanos.

19. “Separated Mekane Yesus Churches Declare their Unification.” http://www.eecmy.org/?page=!news&article=32 (accessed October 20, 2010).

20. Cf. ibid.

21. Cook, “Observer's Report.”

22. See Abuna, The Ethiopian Tewahedo Church, 89–92.

23. The Coptic Church had never recognized the Derg-appointed patriarchs, arguing that unless Abuna Theophilos’ death was confirmed, a new appointment would be uncanonical. The selection of a disciple of Theophilos and the ecclesial burial of Theophilos’ remains one day before Paulos was installed also signify the attempt to restore canonicity and the recognition of the Coptic Church.

24. See Ethiopian Orthodox Church, “Resolutions”; Legitimate Holy Synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, “Letter of Excommunication.”

25. See http://www.ethiopianreview.com.

26. Cf. “The 2005 Ethiopian Election Timeline.” http://www.abbaymedia.com/2005_Ethiopian_Election_Timline.htm (accessed October 22, 2010).

27. See Ethiopian Human Rights Council, “Illegal Detention.” The monk had intended to hand a petition to the Patriarch, while Paulos’ guards apparently believed that he wanted to assassinate him.

28. Hussein, “Islam and Islamic Discourse,” 789f.; Nuredin, “The Establishment of the Supreme Council.”

29. Østebø, “Localising Salafism,” 240.

30. Hussein, “Islamic Literature.”

31. Bawer, “The Development of Islamic Propagation,” 79; Nega, “The History of the Awaliyya School.”

32. The incident seems to have been spurred by internal rivalry within the Addis Ababa Islamic Affairs Supreme Council. See Abbink, “An Historical-Anthropological Approach,” 118; Hussein, “Coexistence and/or Confrontation,” 17.

33. This was according to reports in Addis Zemen, June 27 and July 5, 1995 and in Africa Confidential, June 7, 1995.

34. For some examples of the public Ethiopian debate, see Hibret, “Proof of Wahabi”; Alem, “Saudi-Arabia's Wahabism”; Johannes, “The Emergence of Radical Islam.”

35. Barnes and Hassan, “The Rise and Fall,” 4.

36. See Corazza, “State and Religion,” 367.

37. Ministry of Education, Rules and Regulation; Ministry of Education, How to Prevent and Solve Religious Challenge.

38. The order was formally issued by EIASC (letter to the district Islamic Affairs Bureaus, March 25, 2009). The registration form is available at http://blog.ethiopianmuslims.net/negashi/?p=353 (accessed April 29, 2010).

39. “Information on the decrees made by the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council,” letter from EIASC, February 23, 2009.

40. These have been posted on the website http://blog.ethiopianmuslims.net/negashi/saying that the government in February/March 2009 planned to carry out a massive campaign against the Muslims.

41. General Secretariat, Ye’ītyop'ya be¯te kristīyan tinantinana zāre¯ [Ethiopia's Church Yesterday and Today], 7.

42. The Mahibere Kidusan is an Orthodox youth movement that emerged from a number of university student groups looking to preserve their religious tradition during the Derg. It was officially accepted by the EOC Sunday School Department in May 1990. The Mahibere Kidusan supports and promotes various church activities among youths, and by strengthening youth identification with the Orthodox Church it seeks to protect the church from further incursions of Protestantism, and also from a perceived threat of Muslim fundamentalism. See Mahibere, “Who is Mahibere Kidusan,” ch. 3.

43. Cf. Mengistu and Asamenu, Yebe¯te kristīyan tarīk [Church History], 181–95.

44. Cf. Mengistu and Asamenu, Yebe¯te kristīyan tarīk [Church History], 164–9.

45. See also Esubalew, Yegehanem dejoch [Gates of Hell].

46. See Bekele, Rīvayval [Revival], 115–50.

47. See Bekele, Rīvayval [Revival], 139.

48. See http://www.ethiopianmuslims.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141 (accessed October 21, 2010).

49. See http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/8226 (accessed October 21, 2010).

50. See Gemechu, “A Church Under Challenge,” 133–6.

51. The Oromo Salafis have, on the other hand, been clearly supportive of the Oromo ethno-nationalist movement and the OLF, indicating that Salafism as a transnational movement has been unable to surpass ethnic boundaries. However, the internal frictions within OLF in recent years seem to have defused much of the ethno-nationalistic fervor among the Oromo and increased their disillusions.

52. Takfir wal Hijra first arrived in Ethiopia in 1992 from Sudan. It was soon denounced by the Salafi establishment and by Muslim scholars in general, causing its eventual decline. The word Takfir refers to the issue of declaring a fellow Muslim an apostate. The practical consequence in Ethiopia has been that followers of the Takfir wal Hijra refuse to pray with other Muslims in the mosques and organize their own celebrations of Muslim holidays.

53. Interview, Addis Ababa, February 20, 2010.

54. Cf. Memher, Gedil weys gedel? [Saint or Abyss?]; Sereqe, Ts'elot zemutān [Prayer to the Dead].

55. See Data, “Changing Youth Religiosity.”

56. For more details, see Østebø, “Localising Salafism,” 280.

57. Zelalem, “The 2006 Religious Conflict,” 81.

58. Medhane, “Ethiopia: Religion.”

59. Muslims were highly provoked by the extensive celebration of Timket (Epiphany) in 2010. They saw it as an explicit demonstration of Orthodox power, and viewed its semi-official character as a proof of the authorities’ religious biases (interview, Addis Ababa, February 16, 2010).