Rebels without borders in the Rwenzori borderland? A biography of the Allied Democratic Forces

Abstract

This article provides a detailed analysis of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel movement that is operating from Congolese soil but so far has attracted very limited scholarly attention. Having its roots in Ugandan Islamic community, it has become part of larger transborder dynamics of rebellion and resistance. It is argued that although its institution is linked to several internal dynamics in Uganda, the movement's character has been largely shaped by the specific characteristics of the Uganda–DRC Rwenzori borderland, where it became a key player of local power struggles and conflicts. The article provides a detailed account of the origins, characteristics and strategies of the ADF, its integration into Congolese society and its impact on local and regional dynamics of conflict.

Keywords:

• Allied Democratic Forces
• militias
• borderlands
• conflict
• DRC
• Uganda

In contrast to other Ugandan rebel groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have received relatively little analysis up to date. Read any attempt to explain the ADF or its strategies, and the word “mystery” will feature prominently. Shinn for example argues how “ever since the ADF launched its first attack in Uganda in 1996, the organization has been shrouded in mystery”.1 The rebel group has been continuously treated as a marginal phenomenon and described as a movement lacking a clear political agenda. Very little is known about its background, ideology, internal organization, military capacity, lines of supply and supporters. Nevertheless, the ADF has been responsible for a very violent military campaign in Uganda's Rwenzori districts during the second half of the 1990s, and since then has been a continuous source of instability at the Congolese side of the Rwenzori Mountains, where it established its bases after its military defeat in Uganda. Reports even suggest that the movement, after having lost much of its power basis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as part of military campaigns by the Congolese army (FARDC), has regained force and has been able to get back control over some of the territories it had lost.2

This article wants to provide a scholarly analysis of the ADF and to offer a biography of the rebel force. It will be argued that although its institution is linked to several internal dynamics in Uganda, the movement's character has been largely shaped by the specific characteristics of the Uganda–DRC Rwenzori borderland. Originally a Ugandan movement, it has been based for most of its existence in the DRC where it became part of local power struggles and conflicts. While this might indicate that the ADF has lost most of its Ugandan character, it is still considered a foreign rebel force or a “rebel group in exile” such as the LRA or the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), which only happen to use the DRC as a safe-haven. Scorgie argues that this perspective on the ADF is misleading and neglects the group's transnational dimension. According to the author, the movement should be understood as a transnational phenomenon and “the seemingly Ugandan intrastate conflict between the ADF and the national government has to be placed within a borderland analytical framework”.3

A second crucial determinant of the rebel group is its integration into Congolese society, leading to a gradual process of “Congolization”. Cunningham et al. point out how 55% of all rebel groups active since 1945 have undertaken extraterritorial operations in countries apart from their target state.4 Because of this, and as Gleditisch emphasizes, civil war cannot only be explained “primarily through country-specific factors or processes that take place within individual states experiencing conflict. Many contemporary civil wars (…) display a transnational character, where actors, resources, and events span national boundaries.”5 However, limited or no, attention has been given to the effect of these “extraterritorial operations” on rebel groups. For rebel groups, being on a foreign territory has a number of particular challenges. As Salehyan highlights:

When mobilizing in other countries, rebel organizations may lose touch with their constituents and reduce their ability to monitor rapidly changing conditions on the ground. Local populations in the host state may not welcome their new ‘guests’, who may be blamed for security problems. (…) Most important, accepting support from foreign patrons often comes with strings attached, as rebel organizations are forced to graft the agendas of their backers onto their own.6

The ADF has been rather successful in dealing with these challenges and has become gradually embedded in its host society. Since its arrival in the DRC, an increasing number of its members have been locally recruited, a certain degree of collaboration with the Congolese population has been realized, contacts with local authorities have been established and the rebel group has become deeply involved in the local economy and informal transborder trade. This has made it possible for the ADF to survive on foreign soil but has also transformed the group from a Ugandan opposition force with an Islamic background to a cross-border phenomenon. The Rwenzori borderland has helped the movement to survive yet at the same time has shaped its constitution, strategies and identity. In return, the movement has had a considerable impact on transborder dynamics in the Rwenzori region and has become part of the local and regional conflict complex.

This article offers a detailed historical examination of the ADF. It will argue that even if it has a background in Ugandan Islamic community, it cannot be disconnected from larger transborder political and socio-economic dynamics. The Rwenzori borderland has a long tradition of armed resistance, of which the ADF became an integral part. This article will illustrate how this borderland has shaped the rebel group but will also evaluate the impact of the destabilizing strategies of the ADF on local dynamics. In a first part, a historical account will be provided of the tradition of rebellion in the Congo–Ugandan borderland, which has been inspired by issues of identity, political participation and (lack of) development. A second part will explain the dynamics behind the institution of the ADF, and will examine how the movement has connected to Rwenzori borderland dynamics. A third part will evaluate the ideology of the rebel force and a fourth part will provide more detail on the position of the ADF within Congolese society. A final part will evaluate the wider consequences of the ADF rebellion.

The proliferation of rebel groups in the Congo–Uganda borderland

Since their institution7 in 1996, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have adopted the Rwenzori Mountains in western Uganda as their theatre of operations. Over the period 1997–2000, it successfully destabilized the western Uganda districts of Kasese Bundibugyo, Kabarole and Kyenjojo, and displaced large parts of the local population (up to 85% of the population in the Bundibugyo district alone). Even if the armed group lacked any serious local support and was not embedded in local society, it was able to attack and loot local urban centres and reduce considerably local economic activities. The rebel movement did not seem to have visible political objectives and never tried to take immediate political advantage of the conditions it had created. Its strategy of calculated and random terror and ruthless abuse, however, attracted a maximum of publicity (particularly in Ugandan media) and put the Ugandan government under serious pressure. Direct confrontation with the Ugandan army was avoided and ADF was able to survive until the Ugandan army increased its efforts to deal with the ADF security threat. By 2000, most of the ADF units were either eliminated or forced to retreat to their camps in the DRC, from where it tried to reorganize.

Even if the ADF leadership did originate from central Uganda and the movement had few direct links with political struggles in western Uganda, it was no coincidence that it had been mainly active in western Uganda. Besides the distinctive characteristics and opportunities of the Rwenzori borderland, here it could also mobilize remnants of the Rwenzururu movement and the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), two armed movements that had their origins in the Ruwenzori Mountains. This last element explains why the dynamics behind the formation of the ADF cannot be understood without a comprehension of the local tradition of armed resistance in western Uganda that has shaped considerably the ADF rebel movement.

In Rwenzori, two different dynamics were behind the institution of armed groups: tensions within the local kingdom and the rejection of the power of the central government. During the colonial period, Kasese (predominantly occupied by the Bakonjo ethnic group) and Bundibugyo (mainly populated by the Baamba ethnic group) were linked to Kabarole (populated by the Batoro). As part of the indirect rule of the British, the Bakonjo and Baamba were arbitrarily made subjects of the Tooro Kingdom, which was led by a Mutoro king.8 The Tooro monarchy supported the colonial occupation, in contrast to the other ethnic communities in this region, and was used by the British to reinforce its territorial control over western Uganda. It was no surprise that in 1919, the British were faced with a first armed rebellion of the Bakonjo, who felt marginalized and whose political and social mobility was restricted by the Tooro Kingdom.9 In the early 1950s, the Bakonjo and Baamba again asked for their own district, which (again) was refused by the British. This refusal provoked the start of a low-intensity guerrilla struggle against the colonial administration, known as the Rwenzururu resistance movement.

After independence, this Rwenzururu group further radicalized and turned from an anti-colonial force to a peasant guerrilla movement that continued fighting for political autonomy. In 1962, the Bakonjo and Baamba declared Ruwenzururu an independent kingdom under the leadership of Isaïah Mukiranya. Royal symbols and a Rwenzururu god were created,10 and an appeal was made to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be recognized as a separate state called the Rwenzururu United Kingdom. This Kingdom would include the Bakonzo of Uganda and the Banande of Congo (prior to the arrival of colonialism, the Bakonzo and Banande were part of the same ethnic community). As Doornbos states, the Rwenzururu Kingdom “represents a virtually complete rupture from the state of Uganda”.11 This demand for sub-regional autonomy led to the arrest of Bakonjo leaders, who had instigated the start of a low-scale peasant guerrilla campaign. The headquarters of the Rwenzururu movement was in the forest areas across the Zairian border where its members made contact with Congolese rebels who supported the political dissident Mulele. In western Uganda it succeeded in reducing the authority of the Ugandan state and turned local peasant communities into popular assemblies, which had the right to appoint, censure or acclaim village chiefs without state interference. Even if during the Idi Amin period (1972–79) attempts were made to end local strife for local power between the Batoro and the Bakonjo through the creation of the Kasese district, it was only in August 1982 that the Rwenzururu movement's leadership agreed to hand over their army and administration to the Obote II government12. A political settlement between the Ugandan government and the leadership of the armed group led to the final withdrawal of the separatist movement from armed struggle. In return, the movement's King Omusinga Mumbere was recognized as local cultural leader and was given a post in the District Council. Isaïah Mukiranya, the founder of the movement, left for Zaire in political exile.

The Rwenzururu struggle and local sentiments for an independent Kingdom, however, remained for two reasons. Firstly, resentments were rising towards the Museveni regime for neglect and lack of development of the region. Also, Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) cancelled Mumbere's scholarship upon coming to power. The NRM had to accommodate pressures from Buganda for a restoration of the kingship. In 1993, the kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro were restored, but not the Obusinga – despite being a rather new institution – which led to widespread discontent. The struggle for the recognition of the Kingdom or “Obusinga” has continued ever since.13 Secondly, not all secessionist Rwenzururians had accepted the idea of reconciliation and took up arms again, tempted by financial and material incentives of rebellion. A regiment of disgruntled former Rwenzururu fighters, who had remained in the bush (the “Rwenzururu Freedom Movement” led by former Rwenzururu chief of staff Richard Kinyamusithu) joined the National Resistance Army (NRA) in its guerrilla war.14 When the NRA had taken over Kampala, the Rwenzururu movement therefore felt it had a major stake in Museveni's victory, and expected to benefit from this. Although their leader, Kinyamusithu, received some material benefits (including land and a minibus), the Rwenzururu still felt disgruntled.

Tensions between Kinyamusithu and the government heightened, and Kiynyamusithu fled to the DRC. In the DRC, he was joined by Amon Bazira, who was part of the old Rwenzururu leadership.15 Together they formed a new rebel movement, the National Movement for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), led by Bazira. This new movement was able to revive old sentiments of local autonomy (NALU propagated an independent state and the official recognition of the Bakonjo cultural institutions)16 and attracted Bakonjo youngsters, but could never grant the same popular support as the Ruwenzururu movement. On the contrary, the local population increasingly felt a victim of NALU's actions. Bazira, however, succeeded in attracting support from the Kenyan and Zairian regimes. The Zairian support for Ugandan rebels angered Museveni, who in return started looking for allies in Zaire that could help him to destabilize the Mobutu regime. In Kasindi (the Zairian border town across Kasese), the Ugandan regime mobilized local youngsters who started a low intensity armed campaign against President Mobutu. This movement, the Parti de la Libération Congolais (PLC), however, was never able to pose any serious threat and was even forced to withdraw into the forests after being attacked by the Zairian army.

The Ugandan strategy to overthrow Mobutu through Zairian opponents would only be resumed in 1994 when attempts were made to transform the PLC from a small-scale guerrilla force into a serious military movement. Meanwhile, the Ugandan regime tried to deal with the NALU threat. In 1992, NALU attacked Kasese (western Uganda), but was defeated and the remnants of the movement were pushed back by the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) into Congo. The same year, its leader Amon Bazira was killed in mysterious circumstances in Nairobi. Several sources claim that Ugandan secret services are responsible for his assassination.

In 1995, NALU-remnants in Congo attracted the attention of the Uganda Freedom Fighters Movement, an armed group that in 1994 was instituted by the Islamic Salaf Foundation and was mainly composed of members of the Tabliq sect. The origins of this sect go back to the overthrow of the Amin regime (1979), which was followed by the persecutions of Muslims in south-western Uganda. Its successful recruitment of militants through its large network among Islamic youth in the 1980s turned the Tabliq into an important political pressure group. It was provided with resources through the Sudanese Embassy in Kampala and focused its campaigns on the marginalized position of the younger generations and the exclusion of Muslims to key political positions. When in 1989 the Ugandan Supreme Court ruled in favour of a rival Muslim group (the Ugandan Muslim Supreme Council), the Tabliq interpreted this decision as state interference in Muslim affairs and adopted a more radical agenda. From then on, the institution of an Islamic state became the main objective.

When a struggle between the Ugandan Muslim Supreme Council and the Tabliq over the leadership of a mosque in Kampala turned into violent attacks, Museveni put an important number of Tabliq members in prison. Upon their release in 1993, these prisoners fled to western Uganda where, under the leadership of Jamilu Mukulu and the presumed support of the Sudanese government, they instituted a camp and started attacking the Ugandan regime. In 1995, a military training camp based in Hoima was overrun by the UPDF. The Tabliq survivors of this attack fled to the area around Bunia in eastern Congo, where they for the first time met with the Sudanese Army Security Services that were using the Bunia airstrip to supply another Ugandan rebel movement, the West Nile Bank Liberation Front.

The creation of the ADF

It was only after they were ousted from western Uganda, that the Tabliq members formally constituted the ADF. In September 1995, several of these members met with NALU remnants in eastern Congo. The two delegations were headed by Yusuf Kabanda and NALU-Commander Ngaimoko. During this meeting, it was decided to form an alliance against the Ugandan regime.17 Training camps were instituted as well as supply lines of military resources. The Sudanese regime offered intelligence support, weapons and coordination services, and training facilities in Juba (Southern Sudan).18 The Mobutu regime also offered assistance. For Mobutu, this new rebel movement represented a counter-force to the growing Ugandan–Rwandan collaboration against Hutu militias in eastern Congo.

The first ADF/NALU attack on Ugandan territory was launched on 13 November 1996. From their bases in eastern DRC, ADF forces attacked the Mpondwe border post. This attack was easily repulsed by the UPDF but was soon followed by similar small-scale incursions in the Kabarole, Bundibugiyo and Kasese districts and by bomb attacks in the Ugandan capital Kampala. ADF not only targeted police posts, UPDF encampments and civilian administration, but increasingly attacked civilians as well. This rebel group would soon be feared for its raids and ambushes on unprotected civilian homes, mutilations, abductions (to carry looted goods or to recruit combatants) and random killings. Also land mines were planted in the Ugandan Rwenzori mountain region, which destabilized local economic activities and prevented farmers from harvesting.

These attacks only increased after the defeat of Mobutu in May 1997. Even if the Kabila-led Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) military campaign cut the supply lines and support of the DRC regime, ADF/NALU continued to receive supplies from the Sudanese regime.19 Therefore, besides the ADF/NALU camps, local airstrips that were used by the Sudanese regime to provide ADF/NALU with weapons and ammunition became one of the main targets of the UPDF in its support for the AFDL campaign. ADF, however, only increased its attacks against civilians in western Uganda. Between 1996 and 2001, more than 1000 people were killed and more than 150,000 people displaced.20 The socio-economic impact of the ADF/NALU rebellion on the Rwenzori mountain region was disastrous. Economic activities came to a standstill. According to officials, in the Kasese district in the period of ADF action, tax revenues dropped by 75%.21 Local farmers were faced with continuous insecurity and the threat of being hit by landmines or being abducted or killed by ADF rebels. In addition to small-scale raids on individual farmers or small groups of civilians, schools were also targeted. In February 1998, 30 students were abducted from the Mitandi Seventh Day Adventist College in Kasese. In June 1998, between 50 and 80 students were burned to death and more than 60 others abducted when ADF/NALU attacked the Kichwamba Technical College in Kabarole district. The same month, 100 school children were abducted from a school in Hoima district.

Besides their operations against the camps based in the DRC, the UPDF also tried to track down ADF rebels during their actions in the Ruwenzori mountain region. In 1999 the UPDF initiated its “Operation Mountain Sweep”, which seriously destabilized the rebel movement. Even though ADF began a renewed offensive in Kabarole en Bundibugyo districts at the end of 1999, between 1500 and 2000 ADF rebels were killed in 1999. In May 2000, UPDF forces in the DRC also captured the secretary-general of the movement, Ali Bwambale Mulima. One month later, the UPDF killed rebels during clashes along the Congolese border. Several rebel leaders were arrested or captured, while former ADF rebels voluntarily surrendered. Arm deposits were seized and abducted children were rescued. Even if the remnants of the movement continued to target civilians in the Ruwenzori mountain region (killings were reported at the end of 2000 in Kibonga district and Kibale22), by 2001 the ADF was seriously weakened and its number of fighters reduced to a few hundred. It lost most of its operational capacity and could only take advantage of the remote terrain of the Rwenzori mountains to harass civilians. An Amnesty Law offered blanket amnesty to its members which further damaged the rebel movement. By 2001, the ADF/NALU no longer posed any serious threat as an organized force to the Ugandan government. The remaining parts of the rebel group retreated to their camps in DRC from where, after the withdrawal of the UPDF in 2003, they tried to reorganize through the mobilization of Congolese recruits.

In November 2005, the Ugandan government opened an office of its Amnesty Commission in the Congolese city of Beni in an attempt to convince the ADF fighters to leave their camps and return to Uganda. While Congolese militia members would be handled by the Congolese Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme, those Ugandan combatants who presented themselves before the Commission would be neither prosecuted nor arrested and would also receive a civil starter kit and a small amount of cash. Some ADF fighters would also be offered a position within the UPDF. This demobilization campaign, which was planned to be operational for one month, proved to be a failure. The number of demobilized rebels was extremely low (about 50), and most of them turned to be of Congolese origin. For the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC), this failure was the final argument to step up its military activities against the ADF forces. At the end of December 2005, a massive joint FARDC–MONUC military offensive destroyed most of the ADF camps and killed more than 90 rebels, several Congolese soldiers and one Indian UN peace-keeper.

It has to be doubted, however, if this military campaign could achieve its objectives. Even if most ADF camps were destroyed, the rebel movement(s) could not be dismantled. Many ADF cadres had left their camps weeks before the operation. The FARDC–MONUC offensive, however, forced most rebels to move deeper in the bush around the Rwenzori mountains. With most of their camps being destroyed and the rebels being dispersed, the movement also lost its cohesion and military capacities. Nevertheless, in spring 2006, new skirmishes between the rebels and the UPDF were reported in western Uganda. According to the Ugandan Army Spokesman, Major Kulayigye, in May 2006 70 ADF rebels crossed into Uganda in an attempt to establish bases in Uganda but were intercepted by the UPDF in Bundibugyo district. Similar incursions were made in 2007 during which heavy fighting with the UPDF took place in which several high-level commanders were killed, including the second-in-command Balao Isiko.23 In September 2007, Uganda and the DRC signed the Arusha pact, in which the two countries agreed to undertake joint efforts to combat:

negative forces operating from the two countries, particularly for Uganda, (…) the Allied Democratic Forces, (…) and the National Liberation Army for Uganda (NALU). (…) To this end, the Parties agree that: (…) The Government of the DRC shall formulate an action plan to neutralize the negative forces, particularly the LRA and ADF, which shall become effective by January 2008.24

This pact had little result. In November 2008, the ADF agreed to go into formal peace negotiations with the Ugandan government but until today these have never fully materialized, something which has seemed to particularly frustrate the ADF which, for example, wanted its families to be repatriated to Uganda.25 In June–July 2010 the Congolese army launched another offensive against the ADF which succeeded in dislodging the rebel force from several of its camps. This provoked strong reactions from the ADF: as a reprisal, it started attacking the local population. Two weeks later, further attacks took place.26 The ADF also started attacking FARDC posts (as part of a strategy to prevent further FARDC operations), rescue captured ADF combatants and recover ammunition.27 It did so continuously through 2010 and 2011.28 In December 2011 it even attacked the FARDC in the town of Beni.29 Whereas the initial FARDC offensive had pushed the ADF out of many of its long-standing camps, the consequent ADF military actions helped to regain control over its former zones of operation.30 Moreover, there are also reports of renewed recruitments in the DRC, Uganda,31 Kenya, Burundi and Tanzania32 and of targeted assassinations of FARDC collaborators or its own collaborators who were believed to have betrayed the movement.33 In early 2012, the ADF is estimated to remain with between 100034 and 1200 combatants.35 Recent reform operations within the FARDC (the so-called regimentation process), which in many areas in eastern DRC has left military voids, has also given more space to the ADF to operate.

Rebels without a cause?

The ADF rebellion is often described as a “rebellion without a cause”.36 Besides the main objective of the movement to overthrow the Ugandan regime, not much is known about its political goals. ADF has no clear-cut political programme, even if in the past it used to have its own website. Today, however, it has become extremely difficult to trace any political statements or documents.

In 1997, the ADF leadership issued a manifesto in which it explained that the movement was instituted to overthrow the Ugandan government. Ugandan President Museveni was also sent an invitation to meet the movement leadership. On several occasions, ADF has threatened to target Ugandans and citizens of western countries that support President Museveni. Using leaflets and a mobile radio (now dismantled) also in the DRC the ADF, in coalition with NALU, tried to turn the population against the Ugandan government by propaganda attacks against its policies. One such statement, issued in 1998 and signed by the ADF chairman Frank Kithasamba, warned that the group would “crack down” on those responsible for the deaths of its members and urged local people “to be on the lookout for politicians who kill and intimidate opponents and voters for their own interests”. Also foreigners were threatened. In 1999, ADF claimed responsibility for the killing of eight western tourists during a gorilla-watch trek in the Bwindi National Park. Many doubts exist about the validity of this claim though, as it is generally accepted that Rwandan Interahamwe combatants have been responsible for these killings.

On an individual level, politics seem to have played a role too. For example, many ex-combatants joined the ADF in the 1990s out of political frustration, as they felt they could not address certain issues under the Ugandan political system.37 This political engagement was also visible in their activities: during the 1996 elections, and to a lesser extent during the 2001 elections, the ADF was mobilizing against the Museveni government on a local scale. It was telling communities not to vote for Museveni and was threatening violence if they did so.38 Similarly, some ex-combatants argued that even if its Islamic identity was something that is used instrumentally by the movement, its political agenda was the movement's main motive. Hovil and Worker for example quote an ex-combatant who argues that:

The agenda of the ADF was purely political. The religious aspect came later as a way to get support and recruits … the ADF adapted the grievances of Islam in order to appeal to these people. Many of the young recruits also happened to be Muslim so the number of Muslims in ADF grew. Islam was a ticket, so the leaders disguised their political motives in religion.39

We would not go as far as reducing the Islamic factor to a purely instrumentalized factor; however, it is useful to highlight how the religious reference co-existed next to other registers, such as a political agenda (on a collective level) or political frustration (on an individual level). Throughout their stay in the DRC, and their disconnection from Uganda, this political agenda became less and less important – and today even seems to have largely evaporated. This could, for example, be concluded from recent attempts at peace negotiations, during which the ADF demands expressed were related to concrete socio-economic challenges such as the social acceptance of demobilized combatants, education and livelihoods upon return to Uganda.40

Integration in Congolese society

Even if the ADF is often portrayed as a Ugandan movement, it would be misleading to consider it as a purely internal Ugandan problem and to neglect its transnational character.41 The rebel group produced a number of spill-over effects in the DRC where its integration into local society was facilitated by the local embeddedness of the NALU. As Scorgie argues, it is important to note that the limited presence of the Ugandan or Congolese state in the Rwenzori borderland not only facilitated the survival of the different Ugandan rebel groups, but also shaped their character, constitution and strategies. Rebel groups could take advantage of a vibrant cross-border informal trade that connected Ugandan and Congolese communities.42 In the case of the ADF, additional opportunities were created during the Congolese wars which led to a strong proliferation of Congolese and Rwandan rebel forces that became potential partners.

Its reliance on the local structures of the NALU offered a number of strategic, economic and social advantages. The strong cultural links between the Bakonjo and the Congolese Banande facilitated the NALU rebel movement to construct a power base within local society and to develop economic activities such as the cultivation of coffee and the smuggling of agricultural products into Uganda. From their bases, combatants descended to village markets in order to provide itself with food and other necessities. According to local sources, these extensive contacts between the rebels and the Zairian population facilitated the recruitment of Congolese youngsters into the rebel forces which started soon after its arrival in Zaire.43 After the killing of their leader Bazira in Nairobi in 1992, however, NALU rebels increasingly turned against the local population. As Bazira played a crucial role in the mobilization of external support, after 1992 NALU was faced with a serious lack of resources which forced its recruits to pillage the villages in the immediate neighbourhoods of their camps. Local sources also mention that the new leadership was no longer able to discipline the NALU rebels, turning the movement into a gang of bandits.

A similar path was followed by the ADF. According to all actors involved, ADF combatants became “naturalized” and part of Congolese society. As Commissaire Kaniki, president of 1431 families in ADF-controlled villages in the northeast of North Kivu argued, “we lived side-by-side with the Ugandans with no problems”.44 Also a large number of inter-marriages has been reported. This was facilitated by the strong presence of Congolese recruits within the movement. Another reason was that when the ADF fled to the DRC, they often had with them their (Ugandan) children who are now adults and have often married Congolese citizens. All of this provided ADF combatants some freedom of movement and facilitated access to food, medical assistance, arable land, and so on. A final element that reinforced the integration into local society was the local Muslim population, especially along the Erengeti–Beni axis. In Erengeti, the local mosque was frequently visited by rebel forces and, from this mosque, local businesses generated some resources for the movement.45 This suggests that there is a clear link between the ADF and Congolese Muslim communities in their areas of operation.

As will be explained below, external support for the ADF has reduced strongly over the years and has become largely unpredictable. Moreover, sources close to the ADF claim that the external financial and material support mainly seems to have benefited the commanders who were able to live a relatively good lifestyle. This was not the case for the majority of the fighters (and their families), who had to live in rather difficult circumstances46 and had to rely on local sources of income. In their areas of control, land was cultivated to guarantee the long-term food security of the recruits and to generate local income. In addition other economic activities were also developed. ADF elements were engaged in the harvesting and commercialization of timber and coffee, which were often illegally exported to Uganda through local commercial networks.47 Local sources have also mentioned the cultivation in the Rwenzori Mountains of “chanvre” (a local brand of marihuana) which was sold at a local market (Watalinga). In addition, the rebel movement generated revenues from their involvement in local businesses and stores in Butembo and Beni; the ADF established a number of businesses in which they could sell a variety of retail goods, such as car spare parts, foodstuffs or pharmaceutical products. Other businesses were approached to work for them – part of the goods was to be supplied by the ADF, and the profits could be shared between the ADF and the traders. In this way, these businesses became integrated in the network of the ADF; something which the United Nations Group of Experts in 2011 summarized as a “widespread business operated by Congolese collaborates who provide the monthly shared revenue to their ADF sponsors”.48

According to local actors, a wide variety of goods was also traded across the border by the ADF; apart from coffee and timber, it was engaged in the trade of motorcycles, fuel, fish, and so on. Ethnic links between the Banande and the Bakonjo were crucial in organizing this local, and cross-border trade.49 Also medical assistance was offered by Congolese supporters who worked in local health centres, while taxes on traders were levied with the help of Congolese chiefs. Lastly, reports of the United Nations Group of Experts claimed how the ADF has been controlling small gold mines in the area for over a decade; in these mines, diggers are periodically forced to provide labour and exploit resources for the rebel movement.50 In other mines, gold production is simply taxed.

This socio-economic embeddedness made it possible to exploit a number of opportunities offered by the lack of state control and the existing conflict environment. As Scorgie argues, “it was the group's socio-political grounding in the borderland milieu that accorded it the opportunity to take advantage of the possibilities opened up by conflict in the DRC”.51 This conflict environment provided the ADF with a number of potential partners and forged alliances with local and foreign armed groups. Already, from 1997, (unconfirmed) collaboration was reported between the ADF and the Hutu Interahamwe and ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR);52 some military operations were also coordinated with a number of Mayi-Mayi militias. These coalitions were not only for reasons of practical support but were inspired by ideological motives. Most groups either resisted the presence of Ugandan or Rwandan troops on Congolese soil or targeted the Museveni and Kagame regimes.53 After the conclusion of the Congolese conflict, ADF also continued to collaborate with remnants of local and foreign militias. Meeting(s) have also taken place with the LRA, but these did not result in an agreement.54 There are also strong indications that former Mayi-Mayi rebels,55 as well as claims that deserted Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) rebels, have joined ADF, and that the rebel group has been establishing linkages with Lendu armed groups in Ituri.56 A manifestation of this collaboration is that the ADF in December 2011 conducted attacks together with Mayi-Mayi groups on Beni town. 57 Local political support from Nande leaderships for the ADF has also increased after the deployment of ex-CNDP forces in Beni, which should be read as part of a strategy aimed at reducing the influence of Hutu and Tutsi in the area.

One could argue that in the end, a “Congolization” of the ADF took place. This process was hastened by the fact that the group had lost most of its external support, which forced the movement into a struggle for its own survival and to start commercial activities in DRC, cultivate grounds, and recruit new Congolese members. However, collaboration with the local Congolese population was not always as peaceful. On several occasions, Congolese chiefs have tried to resist the power position of the Ugandan rebels. As one local source states:

les relations avec les chefs locaux n'ont pas été harmonieuse faute de la légitimation de pouvoir. Etant détendeur du pouvoir coutumier au niveau local, les chefs se sont vues dépourvus de leur pouvoir par les leaders du ADF. Les rebelles voulaient également agir comme nouveau seigneur et opérateur économique et ne voulaient plus rendre compte et payer des taxes aux chefs.58

As a consequence, several local chiefs were forced to leave the region under control of the ADF. Other local chiefs believed that collaboration with this rebel movement would create new opportunities to generate taxes and thus supported the rebel leadership.

This situation drastically changed after the joint FARDC–MONUC operation against the rebel bases in December 2005. One of the major effects of this operation was the dispersion of ADF fighters and the loss of their supply lines, which forced them to change their attitude towards the Congolese villagers. Since the end of 2005, an increasing number of pillages, taxes, and acts of violence by ADF recruits have been observed. Several suspected MONUC informants have been killed and Congolese have been recruited by force. The joint FARDC–MONUC military operation also displaced more than 40,000 Congolese civilians who hesitated to return home because of fears of prosecution by FARDC forces. Several reports confirmed FARDC troops forcing Congolese villagers to work for them or attacking the displaced population. Others were accused of collaborating with the Ugandan rebel movement and severely punished. As one local observer stated, “depuis les attaques MONUC-FARDC, la vie est devenue invivable suite aux atrocités commises par les rebelles et les FARDC sur la population”59. A similar dynamic could be observed after the June–July 2010 offensive of the Congolese army against the ADF with reprisal attacks against the local population that caused massive displacement. An attack against a local village in June 2010 that killed eight people displaced 50,000 people. In July 2011, about 15,000 people fled the towns of Eringeti and Kainama after the ADF had previously attacked, and announced it was going to further attack, FARDC camps in the area.60 In other words, the “survival mode” of the movement not only included attacking the FARDC, but also shifted against the local population.

Nevertheless, the FARDC actions in the area remain largely unpopular.61 This does not only have to do with the general functioning or incapacity of the FARDC, but also with the degree of local embeddedness of the ADF. The above described commercial network of the ADF did not only allow for the economic survival of the movement, but also contributed to the support of the local community, which continues to have a shared economic interest with the ADF. Cooperative modus vivendi, in which local farmers for example worked on the ADF-controlled land in return for part of the yield, are no longer possible. This helps to understand the largely cooperative relationships before the FARDC offensive. Also in the current situation, the ADF is not unequivocally rejected or even supported; a recent UN report for example claimed how “nearly half of the population of Beni territory”62 supports the ADF.

From local to regional actor

While the profound interconnections between the Ugandan and Congolese parts of the Rwenzori borderland helped both the NALU and ADF to survive on Congolese soil (with the effect of a gradual “Congolization” of these movements), these armed groups became also part and parcel of a growing regional war complex. The Congolese conflicts (1996–97, 1998–2003) produced a multitude of armed actors with shifting alliances, and caused a military fragmentation of the Congolese–Ugandan–Rwandan–Burundian border region. One of the effects of this military fragmentation was that armed groups increasingly turned into proxy forces. This was also the case for the ADF, which at different times served the interests of the Sudanese or Congolese governments as part of their attempts to destabilize the Ugandan territory.

The Mobutu regime, which was already providing military support to NALU forces and allowed this movement to run a low-key destabilization campaign from its territory against the Ugandan government in western Uganda, also facilitated the settlement of the ADF in Zaire and the institution of this played a key role in the creation of an ADF–NALU alliance. According to Lyavala Ali, who was a founding member of the ADF, the first recruits of the movement in 1995 “established a base in Bunia. All this was under the direct authority of President Mobutu”.63 Later on, camps were also opened up in Buhira (which became a training camp) and in Beni (which became the movement's headquarters), all with the support of the Mobutu regime. According to the same ADF leader, “during Mobutu's regime, it were [sic] Zairian troops that were providing us with security and they were the ones coordinating our operations. They were the ones escorting our commanders to Kinshasa for meetings with Mobutu and Sudanese government officials.”64 Zairian army commanders also regularly visited ADF headquarters in Beni.

Less documented is the support of the Kabila government, from which the ADF regularly received financial and material support. For the Kabila regime, the ADF was an interesting force to mobilize against several militias that were operating in the area. Several sources claim that the ADF has been playing a useful role in holding ground (for the Congolese government/army) against the Nkunda-led CNDP.65 The ADF-controlled territory is not vast, but it is a strategically important part of the Goma–Beni corridor. This holding of territory was largely non-confrontational – the movement was never engaged in large-scale fighting. Sources close to the ADF claim that they have been assisting the Congolese army in specific operations in the area and were a far more reliable actor.66 In the words of one high-level observer: “although they're a rag-tag bunch, they're disciplined and well-trained. Or actually, it's better to say ‘better disciplined and better trained’, compared to the FARDC.”67 This relationship was not very stable; according to other sources, ADF members complained they were only being assisted by Kinshasa whenever they were needed.68 At the end of June 2010 this relationship drastically soared, with the Congolese army even attacking the ADF. Sources close to the ADF argue that both parties simply fell out, as Kinshasa refused to give in to certain demands of the ADF.69 Others argue how this had to be linked to the 2010 anniversary of Congo's independence and the Congolese elections in November 2001 – President Kabila wanted to proove that he was capable of providing security in the East and therefore chose to attack the ADF, which seemed a potentially “easy target”. It is also argued that the FARDC operations in June 2010 has to be understood as part of a strategy of the Kabila regime to prove to Museveni its robustness.

Apart from Congolese support, the Islamic networks continued playing a considerable role in providing the ADF the needed external assistance. Several sources point at the Islamic ideological framework of the Tabliq leadership and the objective of the rebel movement to establish an Islamic state in Uganda. One issue often cited as proof of the Islamic agenda of ADF is the distribution of tape recordings by ADF leader Mukulu, in which he incited members of the rebel movement to attack the government of President Yoweri Museveni. In the same recordings he also criticized ADF members who had surrendered to the Ugandan army. According to the UPDF operations officer in charge of Uganda's joint anti-terrorism unit, Captain Kamusiime, Mukulu also preached that “Muslims should kill non-Muslims, and kill also Muslims who are not fighting for jihad”. In another recording, continued Kamusiime, Mukulu takes aim at the West, saying, “Let curses be to Bush, Blair, the president of France – and more curse goes to Museveni and all those fighting Islam.”70 Accounts of captured ADF units report how these units carry Korans and Islamic literature with them.71 A number of returnees from the ADF confirm this Islamic identity of the movement; abductees have to convert to Islam and Muslim prayers play an important role in structuring the daily activities of the organization.72 Today this no longer seems to be the case even if non-Muslims mainly occupy low rank positions within the rebel structures.73

The actual importance and role of the ADF's Islamic identity is rather contested. The Ugandan government claims that the ADF has kept close links with Islamic networks, and sees the ADF as an agent of Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab74 – something which the addition of the ADF to the United States “Terrorist Exclusion List” on 5 December 2001 seems to confirm. However, as was highlighted above in relation to its political goals, the Islamic factor was only one of the registers at play in the ADF. This did not mean that religious references were a monopolistic factor, but neither did it signify that this link was non-existent.

At the start of the movement there certainly was a strong link with Islamic networks in Pakistan and Kenya. According to International Criminal Court (ICC) sources, the United Arab Emirates were the main arms supplier, while also Iran provided arms to the movement via an Islamic foundation based in South Africa.75 Other sources even mention the existence of a solid link between the movement and Osama Bin Laden, especially when Bin Laden was living in Sudan (between 1988 and 1996). Some argue that the ADF received financial support from Al Qaeda groups as well as from the Salaf Tabliq Sect during this period.76 During the second phase of its existence, when the ADF retreated into eastern DRC, it became more and more a “sleeping” force, with reduced visibility and strategic importance. This was not only reflected in the disappearance of a political agenda, but also in its links with these Islamic elements, which drastically reduced in content as the movement was not living up to the expectations of these Islamic elements. This does not indicate that the link has entirely evaporated; the communication is still there, and on irregular intervals, the ADF still receives financing and visits from these elements. A report by the UN Group of Experts mentions two training sessions by Pakistani trainers in 2009 and two Moroccan trainers in 2010, and several training sessions in urban warfare and terrorist tactics since 2006.77

Nevertheless, this Islamic linkage should be considered sporadic and not too strong: only when the movement's military capacity and readiness to act along an Islamic agenda would be shown, might it attract more substantial funding.78 The relationship with Al Shabaab – which was held responsible for the July 2010 bombings in Kampala – has to be seen in the same light. Even if our sources indicate that there has been some communication with Al Shabaab representatives, the ADF has not taken up any concrete action in support of Al Shabaab because it is not willing to do so. Several sources point at the division within the ADF leadership on this issue: while the current leadership does not want to follow the path of further radicalization, some commanders feel “trapped” and argue that this radicalization is the only way out – a factor which was also used as an explicit threat by the leadership during the peace negotiations.79

In sum, our interviews and field research reveal a more nuanced picture in which the connection with Islamic networks can be seen as one of the registers at play within the movement. This reference has been present throughout the history of the movement but never fully guided its actions.

From local to regional actor: geo-political implications

From the above overview, it is clear that the ADF has geo-political importance beyond its particular area of activity in eastern DRC; although the movement has been local in its impact, it is linked to wider regional and global actors.80 And this perhaps could explain why the movement is still there: its geo-political importance serves particular interests, which might have no direct interest in finishing the movement. In order to elaborate this point, let us first look at a similar discussion which has been held on the continued conflict in Northern Uganda with the LRA. Here, Ugandan government critics have argued how the “conflict in the North” has been politically useful as a tool that is allowing “emergency measures” or punishment against the Acholi people and opposition in Northern Uganda, as well as paving the road to an increase of the military budget. As the International Crisis Group explained, the Northern conflict made it easier to reject calls for reduced defence spending.81 Also, internationally, the LRA and the war in the North have had a number of advantages. After 9/11, the LRA was put on the US's terrorist exclusion list. The fight against the LRA could thus be framed within the war on terror, through which Museveni could establish himself as a key US ally in the region.82 As Branch stated in 2005, “in a context where beneficial effects of the war for various factions of the Ugandan government and military can be identified, but intentionality is extremely difficult to prove, the war might best be thought of as a system”.83 In this “system”, the interests of different powerful national and international actors “have aligned themselves so that the continuation of the war either serves their purposes or at least does them no significant damage”.84

A similar point could be made for the ADF: various interests have aligned themselves in such a way that the movement's continued existence serves different purposes without causing significant damage. Since Museveni's regime is increasingly being criticized because of its undemocratic regime characteristics,85 it needs other ways to identify itself as a key ally of the US. Museveni's “war on terror” allowed him significant American military aid and diplomatic support. Similar to the LRA, the Museveni regime has since 9/11 consistently branded the ADF as a terrorist organization. In 2002, for example, President Museveni noted that Al-Qaeda, via the ADF, had plotted to assassinate him in 1999 and that “Bin Laden … was the one who started arming … the ADF … our fight is directly linked to world terrorism”,86 while in 2005, Uganda's acting chief of military intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel James Mugira, argued of ADF leader Mukulu “we think he'll become the next Bin Laden of Africa”.87

Now that the LRA is less of a direct threat to Ugandan territory, the ADF seems to be taking over this role. Although the ADF was in 2005 removed from the US “Terrorist Exclusion List”,88 the Museveni regime is doing everything to show it is not a “dormant” force, but a direct terrorist threat: the assumed links of the ADF with Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab are therefore geo-politically useful, as it allows Uganda (again) to identify itself again as a key ally for the US; and more importantly, to receive US support for its “war on terror”.89

By emphasizing this link, and portraying the ADF as a considerable threat, Uganda is also provided with an alibi to re-enter the DRC. As a high-level official from the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) argues “After the 7/11 attacks [the Kampala bombings], the UPDF has been pushing us to go back into Congo (…) There was an increased pressure from the Ugandan government.”90 A diplomatic official completed by saying:

we here had the feeling that they lost interest in the LRA – they did not stop chasing it; but relatively, the ADF has become more important: by showing the link with Al Qaeda, they're able to get support from the US; they're able to push to enter Congo; and they are able to create a sphere of insecurity during the elections and deploy because of this.91

As this official points out, this increased security threat was also internally useful: it was one of the reasons which allowed for the presence of a strong military force during the 2011 elections, which was perceived to be strongly intimidating by the opposition.92 Moreover, the continued presence of the ADF constitutes a continued alibi for the Ugandan government to enter the DRC also for other reasons: it “still maintains that it has the right to deploy its forces unilaterally in eastern DRC in order to take on the rebels”.93 The discovery of oil on Lake Albert and the conflicts surrounding this lake have increased the strategic interest of the Ugandan regime in the region.94 In this context, an international policy actor considers the link between the ADF and Al Shabaab “seriously exaggerated and politically used”.95 This context could help to explain the paradox in which the ADF is considered a serious threat, yet at the same time the Ugandan government has not shown willingness to enter into serious peace negotiations with the movement; although this – according to the policy-actors involved – would constitute an “easy win”: “part of the ADF could be repatriated, peace negotiations follow, the ADF is taken from Congolese territory, and another threat is gone. Yet, this has not happened.”96

Similarly, it serves useful functions for a range of other actors, which can use the movement on an ad hoc basis. As explained above, this has been the case for the Congolese government: on the one hand, the movement can be used as a proxy, and on the other hand, by fighting ADF controlled territory, the Congolese army is able to “feed” itself. Monusco did not support the FARDC June–July 2010 offensive because it considered the movement “dormant”97 and because an offensive would constitute a large threat to civilians, which indeed was eventually one of the outcomes. But for the FARDC, these operations serve a number of advantages. In similar FARDC offensives, the population complained that those who stayed or returned to their villages have been forced to work for the soldiers and give them food, while other diplomatic sources mention attacks of Congolese army soldiers on the population, even outside of the area of military operation.98 As argued above, many Congolese communities preferred being under the rule of the ADF rather than being “protected” by the FARDC.99

Conclusion

The history of the ADF shows how rebel movements cannot be seen as isolated units, but rather as part of broader regional and international processes. These different levels should not be considered in isolation from each other, but are closely interlinked, whereby “domestic and international processes overlap, actors span national boundaries, and bargaining takes place at multiple levels”.100 Rebel groups therefore need to be understood as phenomena that exist and operate in close interaction with their wider environment, in which they continuously have to make strategic choices and interactions. In this situation, the presence of a rebel group on foreign territory does not simply mean that a particular conflict – in this case the struggle of the ADF against the Ugandan government – is exported to another territory. It instead means that a particular conflict and the actors involved – both the rebel group and the government – are acting in a new situation: both the ADF and the Ugandan government are acting in an environment in which they are confronted with a variety of pressures and negotiating with a variety of actors on multiple levels, which involve, for example, the Congolese government, Islamic networks or the US. Certainly after the ADF had settled itself in the DRC, the movement had no consistent support and had lost much of its power base, which forced it to adapt itself to its new environment and seek for alternative sources of support. In other words, the movement cannot be understood by narrowly focusing on one of the above linkages, such as Islamic networks or its Ugandan character. With regards to the latter, it is clear that the ADF cannot be seen as a purely Ugandan movement but should be explained as a transnational phenomenon, causing an impact on the DRC (from where it operates), and on Uganda (where its origins are). The rebel force has firmly integrated in the DRC but is still being considered a security threat by the Ugandan regime. Similarly, although being a Ugandan movement, it is playing an important role in the DRC: the local conflict environment has provided the ADF with a range of potential partners with whom the movement has collaborated, and a perfect context to continue its recruitment strategies and consolidate its economic basis through control over local resource exploitation and trading activities. The movement has also served useful purposes for Kinshasa, both during the Mobutu- and Kabila-regimes, who have used the movement as a proxy force in various ways. For Mobutu, the movement was seen as a key ally in his strategy to destabilize the Museveni regime. For the current Kabile regime, various sources have claimed that the ADF is playing an important role in “holding ground” against other rebel movements, such as the CNDP. And finally, the ADF also has a number of wider transnational linkages. As has been discussed, the ADF received assistance from Islamic networks. This assistance declined over the years even if the impact of these links remained strong, as this fact serves particular political interests. In other words, even if often considered as a “mysterious” or marginal phenomenon, the ADF has gained importance both at the local, regional and international level and has become part of different “realities” at the same time. By doing so, it has been able to navigate and survive in difficult circumstances. Because the movement is useful for different actors at different levels (as a proxy force or as a way to serve internal and external political ends) it could at crucial moments mobilize external support. The ADF's current status should be understood in this light: much speculation exists about the future of the ADF. In early 2011, the rebel force tried to re-establish some bases on the slopes of the Rwenzori mountains in eastern DRC and a recent 2011 United Nations report101 confirms news wires of increased operational capacity of the rebel group. The Congolese army continues its operations against the movement but so far has been unsuccessful in fully dislodging the ADF (as the movement succeeded in re-establishing some of its bases). Calls to disarm by MONUSCO have been left unanswered and attempts to put in place again a peace process have remained futile. As argued above, bargaining takes place at multiple levels and the relationship between the ADF and the Ugandan government is not the only factor at play in understanding this rebel group. As long as the movement is not representing a considerable security threat and can serve a number of interests for regional actors, including the Ugandan government, the chances for a lasting solution will remain limited.

Notes

1. Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn,” 68. An article in the New Vision starts with the same phrase: De Temmerman, “ADF Rebellion.”

2. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010).”

3. Scorgie, “Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel?,” 81.

4. Cunningham, Gleditisch, and Salehyan cited in Salehyan, Rebels without Borders, 5.

5. Gleditisch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” 293.

6. Salehyan, Rebels without Borders, 10.

7. Parts of this section are based on the study that one of the authors did on behalf of the World Bank MDRP project. See Vlassenroot, “ADF/NALU.”

8. Doornbos, “Kumanya and Rwenzururu,” 1970.

9. Scorgie, “Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel?”

10. Doornbos, “Kumanya and Rwenzururu.”

11. Doornbos, “Kumanya and Rwenzururu.”, 1110.

12. Prunier, “Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare.”

13. Doornbos, “Understanding the Rwenzururu Movement.”

14. The estimated number of Rwezururu joining the NRA ranges between 100 and 400.

15. Bazira, a former Member of Parliament for the UPC, played a major role in the Rwenzururu struggle, for example in spearheading the scholarship for Mumbere and in the 1982 settlement. See Doornbos, “Kumanya and Rwenzururu.”

16. Scorgie, “Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel?”

17. Interview with Ugandan journalist, December 1997.

18. Prunier, “Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare”; Boas, “Uganda in the Regional War Zone.”

19. Prunier, “Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare.”

20. Lancaster, “The Allied Democratic Front versus the Ugandan People's Defence Force, 1996–2001.”

21. Lancaster, “The Allied Democratic Front versus the Ugandan People's Defence Force, 1996–2001.”

22. International Criminal Court. “Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo – Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda Counter-Memorial Submitted by the Republic of Uganda.”

23. See regular reporting in The New Vision.

24. “The Arusha Pact Between Uganda and Congo on Security, Oil,” The New Vision, September 12, 2007.

25. Interview data 2009–11; Jamilu Mukulu, “Lubumbashi Statement of Commitment to Peace Talks from Jamilu Mukulu – Commander Allied Democratic Forces (ADF),” transcript of voice recording November 14, 2008; Tebajjukira, “ADF Wants Talks with Govt – Kasaija”; Namutebi, “ADF Rebels Want Peace Talks”; Matsiko, “ADF Agrees to Talk with Government.”

26. IRIN, “DRC: When Thousands Take Flight.”

27. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” §51; Radio Okapi, “Beni: 9 rebelles ougandais tués lors d'une attaque contre un camp FARDC.”

28. Radio Okapi, “Beni: attaque de l'ADF/Nalu contre une position FARDC vers Eringeti”; Radio Okapi, “Opérations Rwenzori”; Kasasira, “ADF Rebels Attack Congolese Army Base.”

29. Radio Okapi, “Beni: 3 morts et 3 blessés lors des accrochages entre FARDC et ADF-NALU”; Radio Okapi, “Nord-Kivu: les rebelles ougandais ADF-NALU attaquent les FARDC à Beni.”

30. According to the UN report, the ADF has been doing so because of the important arms caches in these locations. See: United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” §50.

31. Kirunda and Mulondo, “ADF in Fresh Recruitment, Says RDC.”

32. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” §44.

33. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),”, §52; 63.

34. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),”, §44.

35. A figure confirmed by reports (IRIN, “DRC: When Thousands Take Flight”) and Jamilu Mukulu, “Lubumbashi Statement of Commitment to Peace Talks from Jamilu Mukulu – Commander Allied Democratic Forces (ADF),” transcript of voice recording November 14, 2008.

36. African Rights, Avoiding an Impasse, 1.

37. Interview with researcher, Kampala, January 14, 2011.

38. Interview with Kasese civil society actor, Kampala, January 13, 2011.

39. Hovil and Worker, “Portrait of a Failed Rebellion,” 15.

40. Interviews with high-level policy actors Kampala, January–March 2011.

41. Scorgie, “Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel?”

42. Titeca, “The Changing Cross-border Trade Dynamics between North-western Uganda, North-eastern Congo and Southern Sudan”; Titeca and De Herdt, “Regulation, Cross-border Trade and Practical Norms in West Nile, North-western Uganda.”; Titeca, “Access to Resources and Predictability in Armed Rebellion”; Raeymaekers and Jourdan, “Economic Opportunities and Local Governance on the African Frontier”; Raeymaekers, “The Power of Protection.”

43. Fieldnotes, May 1998, May 2003.

44. Cited in IRIN, “DRC: Ugandan Rebels Dislodged, but Civilians not Returning Home.”

45. Interview with local observer, March 2011.

46. Something which the ADF leader Jamilu Mukulu also claimed in his November 2008 Lubumbashi statement “I have 700 people who are dying in camps” – Jamilu Mukulu, “Lubumbashi Statement of Commitment to Peace Talks from Jamilu Mukulu – Commander Allied Democratic Forces (ADF),” transcript of voice recording November 14, 2008.

47. As the ADF controlled vast forests near Mount Rwenzori, it was exploiting and trading timber, as well as taxing chainsaws. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” §58.

48. As the ADF controlled vast forests near Mount Rwenzori, it was exploiting and trading timber, as well as taxing chainsaws. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),”, §63.

49. Raeymakers and Jourdan, “Economic Opportunities and Local Governance on the African Frontier.” Moreover, these ethnic linkages also gave them other advantages, such as communication, allowing them to cross the border undetected, blending into the target populations, scouting, and so on. Scorgie, “Peripheral Pariah of Regional Rebel?”

50. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009),” §241; United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” §59.

51. Scorgie, “Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel?,” 87.

52. African Rights, Avoiding an Impasse, 10.

53. African Rights, Avoiding an Impasse. As the African Rights report argues “The ADF came into being partly through the support of Mobutu, who was intent upon propping the Habyarimana regime in the face of the threat from the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990. Given the links between the RPF and the NRM leadership, it is not surprising that the ADF would subscribe to some of the same arguments, in particular the notion that Museveni is a leading figure in a Tutsi-Hima conspiracy to control the region.”

54. There were newspaper reports about a coalition between ADF and the LRA, but these are of a rather dubious quality. For example: Rwamuhumbu, “Invasion. Suspected ADF, LRA Rebels Raid Masindi.”

55. E.g. Muhanga, “Mai Mai Join ADF in West.”

56. Mugabi, “MONUC Calls for Joint Effort on Rebels.”

57. Radio Okapi, “Nord-Kivu: les rebelles ougandais ADF-NALU attaquent les FARDC à Beni.”

58. Interview with local observer in Butembo, October, 2006.

59. Interview with local observer in Butembo, October, 2006.

60. Radio Okapi, “Beni: menace des ADF/Nalu, 15000 personnes quittent Eringeti et Kainama”; Radio Okapi, “Beni: attaque de l'ADF/Nalu contre une position FARDC vers Eringeti.”

61. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” §65.

62. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),”, §63.

63. International Criminal Court, “Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo – Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda Counter-Memorial Submitted by the Republic of Uganda.”

64. International Criminal Court, “Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo – Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda Counter-Memorial Submitted by the Republic of Uganda.”

65. Interviews with civil society leaders in Beni, January 2011; interviews with policy actors, Kampala, January–March 2011.

66. Interviews with policy actors Kampala, January–March 2011.

67. Interview high-level policy actor, January 20, 2011.

68. Interviews high-level policy actors Kampala, January 20, 2011.

69. Interviews policy actors Kampala, January–March, 2011.

70. Sheikh, “New Danger from Ugandan Rebel Group?”

71. See for example Alli, “Army Kills Most Wanted ADF Rebel”; Refugee Law Project, “Displacement in Bundibugyo District.”

72. See for example De Temmerman, “Inside ADF.”

73. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010).”

74. Mwenda, “Uganda: Terror in Kampala”; “Kampala Blacklists Al-Qaeda Terrorists,” The New Vision, March 20, 2002; “Uganda on Alert over Al-Qaeda Christmas Threat,” Times Live, December 20, 2010; Matsiko, “Terror Suspects Still in Detention”; Mwenda, “Security Finds New Clues on the Terror Attacks.”

75. International Criminal Court, “Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo – Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda Counter-Memorial Submitted by the Republic of Uganda.”

76. Others point to a link with Iraq is to be found in Smucker and Bowers, “Iraq Regime Linked to Terror Group.” These authors quote 2001 letters from the self-declared chief of diplomacy of the ADF to the Iraqi chargé d'affaires based in Nairobi (which were found in the headquarters of Iraq's intelligence agency). In these letters, a detailed agenda of the group's activities were given and statements were made such as “We in the ADF forces are ready to run the African muhahideen headquarters. We have already started and we are on the ground, operational!” and how the group is planning attacks on the “US/British/Israeli sponsored regimes of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.”

77. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010),” §111.

78. Interview with policy actors, Kampala, January–March 2011.

79. It was argued that if the negotiations were not going to be successful, these radical elements might take over. Interview with policy actors, Kampala, January–March 2011.

80. Hovil and Werker, “Portrait of a Failed Rebellion,” 14.

81. International Crisis Group, “Northern Uganda,” 12.

82. Finnstrom, Living With Bad Surroundings, 155.

83. Branch, “Neither Peace nor Justice,” 3.

84. Branch, “Neither Peace nor Justice,” 3.

85. USAID, “Democracy and Governance Assessment.”

86. Fisher, “International Perceptions and African Agency,” 222.

87. Sheikh, “New Danger from Ugandan Rebel Group?”

88. Fisher, “International Perceptions and African Agency,” 168–9.

89. Although the ADF was not added again to the US “Terrorist Exclusion List,” an international warrant was issued for Jamilu Mukulu by Interpol; and in October 2011, the US government has frozen the assets of Mukulu which it may have within its jurisdiction. As the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control said, this happened because of his “role as head of a foreign armed group operating in the DRC that impedes the disarmement, repatriation, or resettlement of combatants.” Batugira, “America Asset Freeze Exposes ADF's Mukulu to UN Sanctions”; Bagala, “Interpol Issues Red Notice for ADF Boss.”

90. Interview with Monusco official, Kampala, January 19, 2011.

91. Interview with diplomatic official, Kampala, January 19, 2011.

92. For example, it is claimed how the Uganda Rwenzori region had not had seen such a military presence since the ADF insurgency; and according to a local opposition candidate the army told the population “to vote NRM or else rebel insurgency would return to Kasese.” Njoroge, “Politicians Accuse the Military of Vote Theft.” The two opposition parties (UPC and FDC) filed a petition at the Constitutional Court which (among other things) contested the massive deployment of armed security personnel throughout the country allegedly to intimidate voters (European Union Election Observation Mission Uganda, “Preliminary Statement. Uganda 2011 Elections”).

93. Cf. also Allio, “Uganda Threatens to Enter DRC”; Mutengesa and Hendrickson, “State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs,” 48.

94. Ballong, “Uganda–DRC: Tensions Mount over Lake Albert Resources”; Nyakairu, “Uganda–Congo into a Border Conflict.”

95. Interview with international policy actor, Kampala, January 20, 2011.

96. Interview with high-level policy actor, Kampala, January 20, 2011.

97. IRIN, “DRC: When Thousands Take Flight.”

98. IRIN, “DRC: Ugandan Rebels Dislodged, but Civilians not Returning Home.”

99. Scorgie, “Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel?”

100. Salehyan, Rebels without Borders, 165.

101. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010)”.