![Sample our Area Studies journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5922/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Area-Studies.jpg"})
Abstract
Decades of cyclic violence have been met with a near total absence of meaningful redress in Burundi leading to a festering culture of impunity and entrenched divisions. Transitional justice has traditionally been a non-starter. A proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) slated to commence work in 2012 will thus constitute the country's first systematic attempt to deal with its past. Attempting to contextualize this development at the grassroots level, this article seeks to understand whether the objectives and the truth likely to emerge will be meaningful and relevant to ordinary people affected by violence. Using evidence from interviews conducted in Burundi, together with an analysis of the truth commissions in Sierra Leone and South Africa, key themes are introduced to offer a sobering and critical assessment of the likelihood that truth, reconciliation and the restoration of the dignity of victims will be realizable through the TRC. By questioning the truth likely to emerge, the analysis suggests that at present there is an acute risk that the TRC will repeat many shortcomings of the past and become disconnected from the communities it purports to serve.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Professor Hans Nelen and Professor Fred Grünfeld from Maastricht University for their support in writing this article; the two anonymous reviewers who provided valuable comments; Aloys Batungwanayo for providing the Kirundi translation used in the title for the fourth section; and Klaas de Jonge for introducing me to Kivyuka. Most of all, I am deeply grateful to the people in Kivyuka who took the time to tell me their stories.
Notes
1. ‘Meaning’ will be used to interrogate whether the proposed objectives of the TRC align with local perceptions, whereas ‘relevance’ will examine whether they resonate and are compelling in the particular post-conflict context faced by ordinary Burundians.
2. For example, Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding”; and Snyder and Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors.”
3. For a more comprehensive overview of Burundi's history, see Vandeginste, Stones Left Unturned; Lemarchand, Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa; Watt, Burundi; Daly, Gender and Genocide in Burundi; and Lemarchand, Burundi.
4. Lemarchand, Burundi, 97
5. Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 2000, Protocol II (Democracy and Good Governance), ch. II (Transitional Arrangements), Article 18.
6. The ‘Kalomoh Report’. UN Security Council, Letter Dated 26 January 2004 from the President of the Security Council Addressed to the Secretary-General, 2004, UN Doc. S/2004/72.
7. For a thorough explanation, see Vandeginste, “Bypassing the Prohibition of Amnesty”.
8. Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 2000, Protocol I (Nature of the Burundi Conflict, Problems of Genocide and Exclusion and Their Solutions), ch. II (Solutions), Article 18 (1) (a) (b) (c).
9. République du Burundi, Rapport des consultations nationales.
10. Décret No. 100/152 du 13 juin 2011.
11. République du Burundi, Rapport du comité technique.
12. Since the article was written, an amended draft of the law was submitted to the Burundian National Assembly in December 2012. The most important amendments in the new draft concern the removal of any reference to criminal prosecutions that could follow the TRC, including the removal of the provision stating that temporary immunities from prosecution would cease upon publication of the commission's report (temporary immunities were granted for politically-motivated crimes under various peace deals in order to aid the transition from violence).
13. République du Burundi, Avant project du loi portant creation; unofficial translation by the author.
14. République du Burundi, Avant project du loi portant creation; Article 6.
15. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 (No. 4 of 2000), Article 6.
16. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (Act 95-34, July 26, 1995), Article 3 (1).
17. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 14.
18. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (2003), Vol. 1, ch. 4, para. 21.
19. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (2003), Vol. 1, ch. 5, para. 30.
20. Jean-Claude, interview with the author, April 2011. To ensure anonymity, pseudonyms are used throughout.
21. UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 1996, UN Doc. S/PRST/1996/24.
22. Van Eck, Challenges Facing a Post-Election Burundi, 7.
23. Van Eck, Challenges Facing a Post-Election Burundi, 7.
24. République du Burundi, Rapport des consultations nationales.
25. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (2003), Vol. 1, ch. 5, paras 29–45. The Commission conceptualized ‘factual or forensic truth’, ‘personal or narrative truth’, ‘social or “dialogue” truth’, and ‘healing and restorative truth’.
26. A good example of this point is the Bugendana massacre in which around 300 Tutsi civilians were massacred in July 1996, just two months after the massacre of Hutu at Kivyuka. Truth for these two communities would likely be contested as it necessarily relates to the wider socio-political factors that precipitated the violence.
27. Clark, “Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation,” 249.
28. Christophe, interview with the author, April 2011.
29. Emmanuel, interview with the author, April 2011.
30. Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions,” 607.
31. Wilson, “Anthropological Studies of National Reconciliation Processes,” 370.
32. Jeannine, interview with the author, April 2011.
33. Ross (1999), cited in Brahm, “Judging Truth,” 126.
34. Millar, “Assessing Local Experiences of Truth-Telling”; Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions; Kelsall, “Truth, Lies, Ritual”; and Park, “Community-Based Restorative Transitional Justice.”
35. Ingelaere found in his research that people saw a TRC as a mechanism to facilitate a process of mediation between communities at the local level; Ingelaere, Living Together Again.
36. Stanley, “Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” 527.
37. Kelsall, “Truth, Lies, Ritual,” 380.
38. Kelsall, “Truth, Lies, Ritual,” 363.
39. Nwogu, “When and Why It Started,” 288.
40. Tepperman, “Truth and Consequences”; Laplante, “Transitional Justice and Peace Building.”
41. Nwogu, “When and Why It Started,” 286.
42. Emmanuel, interview with the author, April 2011.
43. The draft law states that the Commission should recommend action including measures for reconciliation, the reform of institutions to guarantee non-repetition, vetting of the security forces and criminal proceedings.
44. This somewhat contrasts with Ingelaere's finding that priority was given to other objectives than those stipulated at Arusha; Ingelaere, Living Together Again.
45. Ignatieff cited in Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 52.
46. Daly, “Truth Skepticism,” 36–38.
47. Daly, “Truth Skepticism,”, 38.
48. Stanley, “Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” 527.
49. Kelsall, “Truth, Lies, Ritual”.
50. Shaw, “Memory Frictions.”
51. UN Security Council, Letter Dated 11 March 2005 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 2005, UN Doc. S/2005/158, para. 13–14; Frère Emmanuel Ntakarutimana, Centre Ubuntu, interview with the author, April 2011.
52. Tutu, No Truth Without Forgiveness, 89.
53. Clark, “Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation,” 249.
54. Christophe, interview with the author, April 2011.
55. Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.
56. In his research, Ingelaere found greater support for the latter proposition; Ingelaere, Living Together Again.
57. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), Survivors’ Perceptions.
58. Grâce, interview with the author, April 2011.
59. Christophe, interview with the author, April 2011.
60. Millar, “Assessing Local Experiences of Truth-Telling”; Wilson, Politics of Truth and Reconciliation; Wilson, “Anthropological Studies of National Reconciliation Processes”; Ross, Bearing Witness.
61. Wilson, “Anthropological Studies of National Reconciliation Processes,” 369. Similarly, Slabbert states that ‘reconciliation was the Trojan horse used to smuggle the discomforting aspect of the past into the new constitutional order’; Slabbert, “Debunking a Meta-Narrative,” 31.
62. Snyder and Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors,” 33.
63. Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions,” 608.
64. Weinstein, “Editorial Note,” 6.
65. Wilson, “Anthropological Studies of National Reconciliation Processes,” 370–371.
66. Tepperman, “Truth and Consequences,” 135.
67. Accord de principes de Dar es Salaam en vue de la réalisation de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité durables au Burundi, Article 1 (3), 22 juin 2006.
68. Vandeginste, “Immunité provisoire.”
69. In the national consultations, support was expressed for prosecuting the upper echelons. Other studies, such as that by Samii, suggest a preference for leaving the past alone; Samii, “Who Wants to Forgive and Forget?”
70. Park, “Community-Based Restorative Transitional Justice,” 103.
71. Yvonne, interview with the author, April 2011.
72. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 71.
73. UN Security Council, Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, 2001, UN Doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574, para. 7.
74. Laplante, “Transitional Justice and Peace Building”, 355.
75. Millar, “Local Evaluations of Justice.”
76. Millar, “Local Evaluations of Justice.” 524–525.
77. Millar, “Local Evaluations of Justice.” 529.
78. Identical findings were made by Kelsall, “Truth, Lies, Ritual”, and Shaw, “Memory Frictions,” in Sierra Leone.
79. In a study conducted by Sawyer and Kelsall, 52% of the people surveyed had poor knowledge and understanding of the TRC in Sierra Leone; Sawyer and Kelsall, “Truth vs. Justice?” Even in South Africa, outreach activities were labelled as ‘flawed and inadequate’; CSVR, Survivors’ Perceptions.
80. Snyder and Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors”; Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions”.