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Abstract
After 1995, southern and central Somalia splintered into a patchwork of weakly institutionalized forms of authority. These localized power-figurations had common characteristics: they were established by clan-based militias, used primary forms of revenue extraction and mobilized followers on the basis of clan affiliation. Their degree of legitimacy varied considerably between the regions, depending on the history of conquest, the organizational structure of domination and the utilized forms of administration. This article will examine the social order established in the south-western regions Bay and Bakool. It was established by the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) and enjoyed a relatively high degree of legitimacy among the local population. However, the RRA faced the same problems as other ruling militias in south–central Somalia. It could not transform its highly personalized power structure into bureaucratic, and hence more stable, forms of authority. Instead, it was challenged by internal competition, which eventually led to fragmentation and decay.
Notes
1. Keen, Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, and Vlassenrot, “State and Non-State Regulation in African Protracted Crises.”
2. Menkhaus, “Somalia: Political Order in a Stateless Society”; Bakonyi and Stuvoy, “Violence and Social Order”; Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia”.
3. The institutionalization of these core functions, hence the establishment of a security apparatus, a legal system and a tax mechanism, were central for the European state-building processes; Tilly, “War Making and State Making”; Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States; Elias, “Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation”; Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States.
4. Von Trotha elaborated in his seminal in-depth study of the German colonial administration how intermediate authority works and highlighted its dilemmas; von Trotha, Koloniale Herrschaft.
5. Sahlins, “Poor Man, Rich Man,” 299.
6. Menkhaus, “Somalia: Political Order in a Stateless Society,” 223.
7. Names of interviewees are kept confidential. Only people holding official positions are cited with full names.
8. Lewis, Pastoral Democracy.
9. Elders therefore relied on their ability to convince their clan mates; see especially Höhne, “Traditional Authorities in Northern Somalia.”
10. Somaliland declared its independence in May 1991 but is not recognized internationally. The developments in Somaliland are analysed by Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland; and Renders, Consider Somaliland.
11. Marchal, “Tentative Assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab”; Marchal, “Rise of a Jihadi Movement.”
12. Parts of the following article are based on the more detailed study of local authorities in Somalia in Bakonyi, Land ohne Staat.
13. Helander, “Rahanweyn Sociability.”
14. Since 2000, after negotiations in Djibouti led to the formation of a Transitional National Parliament, 4.5 became the main formula to ensure clan balance in Somalia's parliaments. Accordingly, parliamentary seats are allocated equally to the four major clan families Darood, Hawiye, Dir and Rahanweyn, while minority groups together are allocated half of the number of seats of a major clan family.
15. On the two regions and the Mirifle clan, see Helander, “Hubeer in the Land of Plenty”; and Helander, Slaughtered Camel. On the political and economic organization in the regions, see Massey, Subsistence and Change.
16. The notation Mirifle/Gelidle refers to the Mirifle as an upper clan segment (be it clan family or clan), while Gelidle is a sub-segment.
17. Group interview with elders in Gurbaan, November 28, 2004.
18. Field notes, 2004; also Helander, “Rahanweyn Sociability”, 199f.
19. Helander, Slaughtered Camel, 61.
20. Group interview with Mirifle elders in Misra, December 8, 2004.
21. The USC split into two factions in 1991 and both factions claimed legitimate leadership over the country.
22. De Waal, Famine Crimes.
23. Helander, Building Peace from Below?; Heinrich, Building the Peace; Putman, “Disarming Somalia,” 519.
24. The following section draws on Bakonyi, Land ohne Staat.
25. Interview with a former RRA combatant, June 3, 2007.
26. Interview with a former RRA Deputy Chairman Sheekh Aden Madoobe in Eldoret, December 12, 2002; United Nation Integrated Regional Information Network, interview with an RRA Chairman Xasan Nuur Maxamad Shatiguduud.
27. Interview with Sheekh Aaden Madoobe in Eldoret, December 12, 2002.
28. Interview with Maxamad Abdow Maxamad Tall in Xudur, August 24, 2005. Moxamad Tall was a founding member of the RRA and for some years also its General Secretary. In 2006 he was nominated as Governor for the Bakool region by the TFG, but fled after Al-Shabaab took over the region.
29. Most clan militias were, at least in their first years, embedded in a moral economy of clan; Bakonyi, “Moral Economy of Mass Violence.”
30. Interview with Maxamad Tall in Xudur, August 24, 2005.
31. Bryden, “No Quick Fixes.” Ethiopia supported several militias in the Somali-Ethiopian border regions, among them the RRA, the USC–PM in Belet Weyne, and one SNF factions in Gedo. It also supported the government of Puntland.
32. Interview with a former RRA combatant and current police officer in Xudur, November 21, 2004.
33. Interview with Maxamad Tall in Xudur, August 24, 2005.
34. In the council of Diinsoor, for example, the 19 councillors represented the five strongest clans living in the town: 10 Digil/Dabarre, four Mirifle/Gelidle, two Mirifle/Ormale, one Mirifle/Luuway, and two Ajuuraan. The number of representatives was chosen according to the (perceived or real) strength and power position of the (sub-)clans in the town.
35. Interview with Ajuuraan elders in Habibiyaal, November 7, 2004.
36. Interview with Cabdi Hafid Sheekh Xuseen (District Commissioner) in Diinsoor, December 11, 2004.
37. Interview with Cabdi Hafid Sheekh Xuseen (District Commissioner) in Diinsoor, December 11, 2004.
38. Group interview with District Councillors in Qansaxdheere town, March 24, 2005.
39. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 389f.
40. Interview with an elder and employee of the District Council in Diinsoor, April 3, 2005.
41. Group interview with elders and other local authorities in Raxoole, December 6, 2004.
42. In the context of state decay elders in all parts of Somalia have taken over executive, legislative and judicial tasks; Le Sage, Stateless Justice in Somalia; Gundel, “Predicament of the ‘Oday.’”
43. During roundtable talks and workshops with elders in both regions, such ‘illegal’ checkpoints were identified as the main reasons for violence, together with conflicts over land, water and grazing rights.
44. Le Sage, “Somalia and the War on Terrorism,” 138f.
45. Interview with a Sufi sheikh, April 5, 2005. The location of the interview has been kept confidential.
46. Interview with a Sufi sheikh, April 5, 2005. The location of the interview has been kept confidential.
47. Al-Shabaab declared Sufi practices illegal and even destroyed historical Sufi shrines.
48. Interview with the representative of a women's organization in Mogadishu, August 6, 2003. See also Sheikh, Legal Status of Women in Somalia; and Sheikh, Haji Ibrahim, and Abdi Study on Somali Women Rights.
49. Interview with an elder and tax collector in Diinsoor, April 3, 2005. It was impossible to verify the statements of the informant. In the highly personalized Somali setting, it can be assumed that the fees or taxes also depended on personal relations of traders with the administration and tax collectors.
50. Economic Intelligence Unit, “EIU Country Report December 2000: Somalia,” 27.
51. Bryden, “New Hope for Somalia?”
52. United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network, “RRA sets up local administration.”
53. Interview with a former RRA combatant in Xudur, November 5, 2005.