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Abstract
In the past two decades, Kenya has witnessed the rapid and unprecedented growth of local, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within its borders. This trend reflects similar NGO sector growth throughout the developing world. Scholars have attributed the growth of these key civil society actors to an increasingly neoliberal orientation among international donors, an ideology which favors non-state service providers. Yet less research has been done on the state-level reasons for NGO sector growth. This article asks why the NGO sector has grown so rapidly in Kenya. Drawing on the example of HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs, an historical analysis of the proliferation of these organizations is offered. It is found that donor pressures to democratize helped lead to an environment that prompted NGO growth. It is then argued that the Kenyan government's failure to respond quickly to the HIV/AIDS crisis created the political space necessary for local NGOs to establish and grow. Also, democratic reforms increased civil liberties and reduced state harassment of NGOs. At the same time, the New Policy Agenda (NPA) adopted by major international donors led to increased funding opportunities for NGOs. This article contributes to the understanding of civil society development in Kenya by demonstrating that both international and domestic factors worked together to lay the groundwork for Kenya's active community of HIV/AIDS NGOs.
Notes
1. Civil society encompasses far more than NGOs, but because NGOs have gained such prominence, their growth is affecting the very nature of civil society sectors throughout the developing world. For a discussion on the importance of exploring the breadth of the civil domain, see Obadare, “Revalorizing the Political.”
2. Kanyinga, “Politics of Development Space,” p. 70.
3. Charnovitz, “Two Centuries of Participation.”
4. Strayer, Making of Mission Communities.
5. Maina, “Kenya: State, Donors and the Politics,” p. 133.
6. Maina, “Kenya: State, Donors and the Politics,” p. 146.
7. Maina, “Kenya: State, Donors and the Politics,” pp. 141–2.
8. Mwiria, “Kenya's Harambee Secondary School Movement.”
9. Ngau, “Tensions in Empowerment”; Maina, “Kenya: State, Donors and the Politics”; Kanyinga, “Politics of Development Space,” pp. 73–4.
10. Semboja and Therkildsen, “A New Look at Service Provision in East Africa,” p. 1–34; Service Provision Under Stress, p. 21.
11. Widner, Rise of a Party-State. Widner offers a discussion of civil society under Moi as well as an analysis of the state's move toward entrenched – and increasingly repressive – single-party rule.
12. Lewis, Management of Non-Governmental Development Organizations; Edwards and Fowler, Earthscan Reader on NGO Management. Unfortunately, there is no reliable database of NGOs that has track their emergence or the growth of their ranks over time. This is the case for both international and local NGOs, though international organizations are more likely to have voluntarily submitted their names to the numerous, but incomplete, NGO directories.
13. Kanyinga, “Politics of Development Space,” pp. 78–9.
14. United Nations Economic and Social Affairs (ECOSOC), “Introduction to ECOSOC Consultative Status.”
15. Government of Kenya, “NGO Co-ordination Board”.
16. The numbers do not total to 7284 as some organizations have sites, and operate, in more than one province and many NGOs operate multiple sites within a province.
17. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS), Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic. Kenyan government numbers differ from UNAIDS’ estimates here, putting the highest HIV prevalence at 14% rather than at 11%.
18. USAID, “Private Voluntary Organizations.”
19. Government of Kenya, “NGO Co-ordination Board”.
20. While nearly one-third of Kenya's NGOs engage in HIV/AIDS work, most of these also work in other sectors, such as education, general health or poverty reduction. HIV/AIDS work is often folded into an NGO's initial priorities.
21. Hyden, “Bringing Voluntarism Back In,” p. 42.
22. Chege, “Donors Shift More Aid”; Eade, Development, NGOs and Civil Society.
23. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents.
24. Fowler, “NGOs and the Globalization”, p. 51.
25. Fowler, “NGOs and the Globalization”, p. 26; Maina, “Kenya: State, Donors and the Politics,” 154.
26. Edwards and Hulme, Non-Governmental Organizations; Hearn, “‘NGO-isation’ of Kenyan Society”; Muhumuza, “State–Civil Society Partnership.”
27. Fowler, “NGOs and the Globalization”, p. 67; Fukuyama, State-building; Laird, “Rolling Back the African State”; Hearn, “African NGOs: The New Compradors?,” p. 1098.
28. Mkandawire and Soludo, Our Continent, Our Future, pp. 76–7.
29. Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress; Bratton, “Politics of Government–NGO Relations”; Fowler, “Role of NGOs.”
30. Ayers, “Demystifying Democratization.”
31. World Bank, World Bank–Civil Society Collaboration, pp. 3–4.
32. Bebbington and Riddell, “Direct Funding of Southern NGOs.”
33. Hearn, “‘Invisible’ NGO.”
34. Hearn, “‘Invisible’ NGO.”
35. Kanyinga, “Politics of Development Space”; Laird, “Rolling Back the African State,” p. 470; Muhumuza, “State–Civil Society Partnership.”
36. Maina, “Kenya: State, Donors and the Politics,” 156.
37. Edwards and Hulme, “Scaling Up NGO Impact.”
38. Gideon, “Politics of Social Service Provision”; Klees, “NGOs: Progressive Force”; Pearce, “Development, NGOs and Civil Society”; Mawdsley et al., Knowledge, Power and Development Agendas; Laird, “Rolling Back the African State,” p. 468; Grodsky, “From Neo-Corporatism to Delegative Corporatism?”
39. Michael, Undermining Development.
40. Gideon, “Politics of Social Service Provision.”
41. Kanyinga, “Politics of Development Space,” p. 71.
42. Hearn, “‘NGO-isation’ of Kenyan Society,” p. 90.
43. Hearn, “African NGOs: The New Compradors?”
44. Abrahamsen, “Power of Partnerships in Global Governance,” p. 1453.
45. Harrison, “Post-Conditionality Politics”.
46. Fowler, in Semboja and Therkildsen, Service Provision Under Stress, p. 18.
47. Maina, “Kenya: State, Donors and the Politics,” 162.
48. For a discussion of the passage of the NGO Co-ordination Act, see Kanyinga, “Politics of Development Space,” pp. 80–4.
49. For more on the historical events that prepared Moi to establish an authoritative rule after Kenyatta's death, see Lynch, “Moi: The Making.”
50. Roessler, “Donor-Induced Democratization.”
51. Barkan, “Kenya after Moi.”
52. Throup, “Elections and Political Legitimacy.”
53. Throup, “Elections and Political Legitimacy.” p. 385.
54. Barkan, “Rise and Fall.”
55. Perlez, “U.S. Legislators Warn Kenya”; Barkan, “Rise and Fall.”
56. World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”
57. Sabar-Friedman, “Church and State in Kenya.”
58. Maina, “Kenya: State, Donors and the Politics,” 154
59. Roessler, “Donor-Induced Democratization.”
60. Throup, “Elections and Political Legitimacy.”
61. Southall, “Moi's Flawed Mandate.”
62. Kameri-Mbote, Operational Environment; Matanga, “Civil Society and Politics.”
63. Government of Kenya, “NGO Co-ordination Board”.
64. Kanyinga, “Politics of Development Space,” pp. 80–3.
65. Rajab, “Will Kenya's Economy Survive”; Murunga and Nasong'o, “Bent on Self-Destruction.”
66. Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU). Country Profile Series (Kenya).
67. Rajab, “Will Kenya's Economy Survive.”
68. Rajab, “Will Kenya's Economy Survive.” p. 3.
69. Brown, “Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections.” Brown argues that donor pressure on Kenya has been exaggerated and that, instead, international donors legitimized rigged elections and otherwise supported Moi's authoritarian rule in the name of security. While a shift to more comprehensive democratic governance may have occurred earlier had the international community been harsher with Moi, aid cuts (and threats of further aid cuts) did play an important role in forcing Moi to continue allowing multi-party elections.
70. Haugerud, Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya.
71. Chabal, “Few Considerations on Democracy.”
72. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), “Kenya: 1997 Presidential Election Results.”
73. Kameri-Mbote, Operational Environment.
74. Kameri-Mbote, Operational Environment.
75. Murunga and Nasong'o, “Bent on Self-Destruction.”
76. Carroll and Carroll, “Rapid Emergence of Civil Society.”
77. Kamaara, Gender, Youth, Sexuality & HIV/AIDS.
78. National AIDS Control Council (NACC), Kenya National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2000–2005.
79. Morisky and Jacob, Overcoming AIDS.
80. Patterson, Politics of AIDS in Africa; Bor, “Political Economy of AIDS Leadership”; Lieberman, Boundaries of Contagion.
81. Bor, “Political Economy of AIDS Leadership.”
82. Lieberman, Boundaries of Contagion.
83. Booth, Local Women, Global Science.
84. Booth, Local Women, Global Science.
85. World Health Organization (WHO), Guidelines for the Development.
86. Booth, Local Women, Global Science; Kamaara, Gender, Youth, Sexuality & HIV/AIDS.
87. The National AIDS Control Program was ultimately replaced by the National HIV/AIDS and STD Control Program (NASCOP) in 1992.
88. Ahlberg, Women, Sexuality, and the Changing Social Order.
89. NACC, Kenya National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2000–2005.
90. The need for HIV/AIDS assistance became especially dire due to increasing poverty and a weakened economy due to SAPs. For a discussion of the effects of SAPs on Kenya, see Kameri-Mbote, Operational Environment.
91. Kenya Network of Women with AIDS (KENWA). “Our Organization.” KENWA did not register with the government as an NGO until 1998. This is an example of an organization that began operating informally, lacking the resources to formalize at its founding.
92. Kenya AIDS NGOs Consortium (KANCO). “Introduction.”
93. NACC, Kenya National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2000–2005.
94. Interview with Moses Owino (name changed), a former NASCOP employee, October 2, 2008.
95. Agence France-Presse (AFP). “AIDS a National Disaster.”
96. NACC, like NASCOP before it, was established largely as a coordinating body to organize countrywide efforts to address HIV/AIDS and, perhaps most importantly, to act as a funnel for HIV/AIDS-related foreign aid that came into the country.
97. East African Standard, “President Moi Concerned.”
98. NACC is located within the Office of the President rather than in the Ministry of Health, a controversial placement that allows more immediate presidential supervision over the large quantities of money for which NACC acts as a clearinghouse.
99. Kamaara, Gender, Youth, Sexuality & HIV/AIDS.
100. NACC, Kenya National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2005/06–2009/10.
101. NACC, Kenya National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2005/06–2009/10.
102. Parkhurst and Lush, “Political Environment of HIV”; Poku and Whiteside, Political Economy of AIDS.
103. Daily Nation, “Kibaki to Launch Ministry Campaign.”
104. Daily Nation, “Government Hospitals to Stock”; Daily Nation, “Pregnant Women to be Tested”; East African Standard, “Kenyan Paper Says.”
105. US State Department, “Kenya – Planned Funding Amount.”
106. Patterson, Politics of AIDS in Africa.
107. McNeil, “Obama is Criticized.”