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Abstract
What accounts for the difference between peaceful and violent elections in semi-authoritarian countries? This article analyses the influence of electoral management bodies (EMBs) on the likelihood of widespread violence triggered by opposition protest during election times. It is argued that by establishing inclusive and collaborative relationships through which political actors can jointly negotiate important electoral issues, EMBs influence the incentive structure of the major stakeholders in favour of non-violent strategies. The relationship is explored by comparing elections in Malawi (2004), Ethiopia (2005) and Zanzibar (2005). The analysis supports the idea that inclusive EMBs, rather than legal independence, are critical to guarantee the influence of the opposition in order to address both their interests and their mistrust of electoral politics.
Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge funding from the Swedish Research Council.
Notes
1. CitationDahl, Polyarch: Participation and Opposition.
2. Electoral violence can be defined as ‘physical violence and coercive intimidation directly tied to an impending electoral contest or an announced electoral result’; CitationStraus and Taylor, “Democratization and Electoral Violence,” p. 19. The manifestations of electoral violence are multifaceted; CitationHöglund, “Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies.” Pre-election violence might involve coercive intimidation against individual citizens or party supporters to suppress voter turnout or influence voting behaviour; CitationBratton, “Vote Buying and Violence.” Electoral violence may also take the form of violent grabbing of resources when political actors use patronage to mobilize electoral support; CitationBoone, “Politically Allocated Land Rights.” It can occur in the post-election phase: as riots to protest results, or as violent government repression to overturn results; CitationBekoe, “Postelection Political Agreements.” Violence may also be unrelated to the electoral outcome and be a means through which intra-party cohesion is reinforced; CitationLeBas, From Protest to Parties.
3. The terms ‘electoral management body’ and ‘electoral commission’ are used interchangeably in this study.
4. CitationBirch, “Electoral Institutions and Popular Confidence”; CitationReilly, “Post-Conflict Elections.”
5. CitationLòpez-Pintor, Electoral Management Bodies; CitationLevitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 12.
6. For example, CitationRapoport and Weinberg, “Elections and Violence”; CitationReilly, “Post-Conflict Elections”; CitationStraus and Taylor, “Democratization and Electoral Violence”; and CitationBoone, “Politically Allocated Land Rights.”
7. CitationDahl, Polyarch: Participation and Opposition; CitationPrzeworski, Democracy and the Market.
8. CitationLindberg, Democracy and Elections.
9. CitationSchedler, “Menu of Manipulation”; CitationDiamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”; CitationLevitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.
10. CitationStraus and Taylor, “Democratization and Electoral Violence,” p. 33.
11. CitationHartly et al ., “Electoral Governance Matters”; CitationElklit and Reynolds, “Impact of Election Administration”; CitationLòpez-Pintor, Electoral Management Bodies.
12. CitationPrzeworski, Democracy and the Market, p. 13.
13. CitationMozaffar, “Patterns of Electoral Governance.”
14. CitationPastor, “Role of Electoral Administration,” p. 10.
15. CitationSchedler, “Menu of Manipulation”; CitationMozaffar, “Patterns of Electoral Governance.”
16. CitationBirch, “Electoral Institutions and Popular Confidence,” p. 306; CitationLehoucq. “Can Parties Police Themselves?”
17. CitationGazibo, “Forging of Institutional Autonomy.”
18. CitationElklit and Reynolds, “Judging Elections and Election Management Quality,” p. 204.
19. CitationSchedler, “Menu of Manipulation,” p. 13.
20. CitationMozaffar and Schedler, “Comparative Study of Electoral Governance.”
21. CitationSchaffer, “Might Cleaning Up Elections”; CitationLòpez-Pintor, Electoral Management Bodies.
22. CitationSchedler, “Menu of Manipulation,” p. 10.
23. CitationBirch, “Electoral Management Bodies”; Rosas, “Trust in Elections.”
24. CitationElklit and Reynolds, “Impact of Election Administration”; CitationLyons, “Post-Conflict Elections.”
25. CitationMoepya, “Role of Multiparty Liaison Committees”; CitationUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Elections and Conflict Prevention.
26. The analysis focuses on Zanzibar. Zanzibar is formally a part of Tanzania, but culturally distinct and it enjoys far-reaching degree autonomy.
27. CitationStraus and Taylor, “Democratization and Electoral Violence,” pp. 25–6.
28. CitationReilly, “Post-Conflict Elections”; CitationReilly and Reynolds, “Electoral Systems and Conflict.”
29. CitationStraus and Taylor, “Democratization and Electoral Violence,” p. 19.
30. CitationEnglund, Democracy of Chameleons.
31. CitationKadzamira, “Management of the Electoral Process.”
32. CitationPatel, “1999 Elections in Malawi.”
33. CitationKhembo, “Anatomy of Electoral Democracy in Malawi,” p. 63.
34. CitationRakner and Svåsand, Maybe Free But Not Fair, p. 11.
35. CitationHussein, “Opposition Politics in Malawi.”
36. CitationAfrican Union (AU), “Report of the African Union Observer Team”; CitationCommonwealth, “Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group: Malawi”; CitationKhembo, “Anatomy of Electoral Democracy in Malawi”; CitationEuropean Union Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM), “Republic of Malawi.”
37. CitationKhembo, “Anatomy of Electoral Democracy in Malawi.”
38. CitationEU-EOM, “Republic of Malawi,” p. 34.
39. CitationPatel, “Troublemakers and Bridge Builders,” p. 233; CitationCommonwealth, “Report of the CitationCommonwealth Observer Group; Malawi,” p. 48.
40. CitationRakner and Svåsand, Maybe Free But Not Fair, p. 13.
41. AU, “Report of the African Union Observer Team,” p. 20; CitationEU-EOM, “Republic of Malawi,” p. 3.
42. CitationRakner and Svåsand, Maybe Free But Not Fair, p. 14.
43. CitationEU-EOM, “Republic of Malawi,” p. 35.
44. CitationRakner and Svåsand, Maybe Free But Not Fair, p. 15.
45. CitationPatel, “Troublemakers and Bridge Builders,” p. 233.
46. CitationKhembo, Elections and Democratisation in Malawi, p. 64.
47. CitationEU-EOM, “Republic of Malawi,” p. 17.
48. CitationPatel, “Troublemakers and Bridge Builders,” pp. 231–4.
49. CitationHussein, “Opposition Politics in Malawi,” p. 355.
50. CitationPatel, “Troublemakers and Bridge Builders,” p. 233.
51. CitationRakner and Svåsand, Maybe Free But Not Fair, p. 10.
52. CitationKhembo, Elections and Democratisation in Malawi, pp. 50–61.
53. CitationRakner and Svåsand, Maybe Free But Not Fair, p. 16.
54. CitationHarbeson, “Ethiopia's Extended Transition,” p. 148.
55. CitationArriola, “Ethnicity, Economic Conditions”; CitationSmith, “Disturbance or Massacre?”
56. CitationTronvoll, “Ambiguous Elections,” p. 451.
57. CitationEuropean Union Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM), “Ethiopia: Legislative Elections 2005,” p. 15.
58. CitationEuropean Union Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM), “Ethiopia: Legislative Elections 2005,” p. 8.
59. CitationCarter Center, “Observing the 2005 Ethiopia National Elections,” p. 20.
60. CitationCarter Center, “Observing the 2005 Ethiopia National Elections,” p. 31; CitationEU-EOM, “Ethiopia: Legislative Elections 2005,” p. 28.
61. CitationLyons, “Ethiopia in 2005,” p. 2.
62. CitationCarter Center, “Observing the 2005 Ethiopia National Elections,” p. 15.
63. CitationCarter Center, “Observing the 2005 Ethiopia National Elections,” pp. 16–17.
64. CitationEU-EOM, “Ethiopia: Legislative Elections 2005,” p. 8.
65. CitationCarter Center, “Observing the 2005 Ethiopia National Elections,” p. 39.
66. CitationTeshome, “Electoral Violence in Africa,” p. 468.
67. CitationCarter Center, “Observing the 2005 Ethiopia National Elections,” pp. 27–8.
68. CitationEU-EOM, “Ethiopia: Legislative Elections 2005,” p. 28.
69. CitationCarter Center, “Observing the 2005 Ethiopia National Elections,” p. 32.
70. CitationEU-EOM, “Ethiopia: Legislative Elections 2005,” p. 28.
71. CitationClapham, “Post-War Ethiopia”; CitationTronvoll, “Ambiguous Elections.”
72. CitationSmith, “Disturbance or Massacre?”
73. CitationKillian, “State and Identity Politics in Zanzibar.”
74. CitationBrown, “Political Tension in Zanzibar.”
75. CitationEISA, EISA Election Observer Mission Report No. 22, p. 5.
76. CitationBekoe, “Postelection Political Agreements.”
77. CitationBekoe, “Postelection Political Agreements.”.
78. CitationCommonwealth, “Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group: Zanzibar,” p. 33.
79. CitationEISA, EISA Election Observer Mission Report No. 22, p. 12.
80. CitationTanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), “Report of the Tanzania Election,” pp. 54–5.
81. CitationEISA, “Election Talk 27,” p. 8.
82. CitationCommonwealth, “Report of the CitationCommonwealth Observer Group: Zanzibar,” p. 52; CitationEISA, EISA Election Observer Mission Report No. 22; CitationNational Democratic Institute (NDI), “International Observation Mission”; CitationTEMCO, “Report of the Tanzania Election.”
83. CitationTEMCO, “Report of the Tanzania Election,” p. 76.
84. CitationTEMCO, “Report of the Tanzania Election,” p. 62.
85. CitationNDI, “International Observation Mission,” p. 23.
86. CitationBekoe, “Postelection Political Agreements,” pp. 134–7.
87. CitationBekoe, “Postelection Political Agreements,” p. 137; CitationForum on Early Warning and Early Response – Africa (FEWER), Electoral Violence and Reconciliation Zanzibar, p. 5.
88. CitationBrown, “Political Tension in Zanzibar”; CitationKarume, Dilemmas of Political Transition, p. 13.
89. CitationMozaffar and Schedler, “Comparative Study of Electoral Governance,” p. 13.
90. CitationBirch, “Electoral Management Bodies.”