Dire consequences or empty threats? Western pressure for peace, justice and democracy in Kenya

Abstract

This paper examines Western countries' pressure – or lack thereof – for peace, justice and democracy in Kenya. It analyzes the period since the 2008 National Accord, which defused the 2007–08 post-election crisis, focusing on the lead-up to and immediate aftermath of the 2013 elections. The paper draws extensively on interviews conducted in 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2013 with Western officials based in Nairobi, as well as informed Kenyans. It argues, first, that recent Western pressure is the latest iteration of a consistent pattern of donors not enforcing stated conditions for future support, causing diminishing returns. Second, donors not only have been reluctant to use potential leverage over the Kenyan government, but also have consistently underestimated it and erred by publicly threatening to use it only at the least strategic moment and not when it could have been most effective. Third, Western officials have continued to make short-term decisions favoring stability or peace that actually undermine basic principles of democracy and justice.

Keywords:

• Kenya
• foreign aid
• donors
• democracy
• peace
• justice
• accountability
• International Criminal Court (ICC)

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Erratum

Introduction

For decades, international actors have intermittently made efforts to change the course of Kenyan politics. Since at least 1990, Western diplomatic and aid officials, along with the governments they represent – collectively known as “the donors” – have individually and collectively applied pressure on the Kenyan government to undertake certain actions and refrain from others in the name of peace, justice, and democracy. The zenith of donor involvement usually coincides with Kenya's general elections, held every five years. Elections constitute concrete tests of democracy and critical junctures for determining the future direction of a country, as well as flashpoints of political protest and violence that threaten stability and security and pose important challenges for accountability.

In this paper, we examine Western countries' pressure – or lack thereof – for peace, justice, and democracy in Kenya, concentrating on the period from 2008 to 2013, with a particular focus on the lead-up to and immediate aftermath of the March 2013 elections. The paper draws extensively on interviews conducted in 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2013 with Western officials based in Nairobi, as well as informed Kenyans.¹ It argues, first, that recent Western pressure is the latest iteration of a consistent pattern of donors not enforcing stated conditions for future support, causing diminishing returns and sometimes even becoming counterproductive. Second, donors have not only been reluctant to use their leverage over the Kenyan government, but also they have underestimated it and erred by publicly threatening to use it only at the least strategic moment and not when it could have been most effective. Third, Western officials have continued to make short-term decisions favoring stability or peace that actually undermine basic principles of democracy and justice.

Two caveats must be noted. First, we do not mean to imply that donors would necessarily have achieved their goals had they wielded their influence more forcefully and more strategically. The counterfactual is impossible to prove and our focus here is the donors' half-hearted and ill-timed attempts. If donors sincerely believed that, unlike in the 1990s, they did not have any influence, they should not have taken those actions. Second, we recognize that these arguments do not apply equally to all donor countries at all times. Nonetheless, they are a fair characterization of the behavior over time of the most significant ones, including France, Germany, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom.²

There is a vast literature on the role and often limited effectiveness of international actors at the time of national elections in Africa and other regions of the world, focusing mainly on election monitoring.³ Rather than focus on an election in isolation, this paper expands the timeframe to examine the most recent full electoral cycle, covering the five-year period from the resolution of the crisis that followed Kenya's 2007 elections to the immediate aftermath of the 2013 polls. Moreover, it positions analysis within the context of a series of such cycles dating back to Kenya's return to a multiparty system in the early 1990s. Such a historically grounded approach reveals patterns that would not otherwise be apparent to academics and the policy community, including donor officials.

The paper is structured as follows. It begins with an examination of the literature on the relative influence that donors have on aid recipient states, focusing on Kenya and other African countries. It then analyzes the Kenyan case over three time periods. First, it provides an overview of donor pressure from the early 1990s to February 2008, when both sides of the 2007 election dispute signed a National Accord that defused the crisis. Next, it examines the evolution of donor political involvement from the signature of the National Accord to late 2012, when the next election campaign began in earnest. The subsequent section analyzes the role of donors during the election campaign and their responses to the controversial outcome of the 2013 presidential ballot. Finally, the conclusion summarizes our findings and addresses the reasons for the weakness and inconsistency of donor pressure, as well as the consequences for Kenya.

Aid and donor influence

Analysts tend to overestimate the ability of Western countries to influence policies in African countries, despite the obvious asymmetry of political, economic, and military power. For well over a decade, bilateral and multilateral aid donors and lenders tried to “encourage” (or “force,” depending on one's perspective) African countries to adopt structural adjustment policies via economic conditionality. Though highly focused, concerted, and sustained, such Western-led efforts were at best only partially successful and at worst a “failure.”⁴ As documented in the work of Gordon Crawford, political conditionality has had very limited success in transforming authoritarian regimes into democracies.⁵ Donor countries have also obtained limited results in other attempts to influence governance practices in recipient countries, including in the realm of justice and specifically accountability, which is particularly relevant in Kenya.

Why have extremely powerful donors, acting in concert, been so unsuccessful at influencing the domestic policies of developing countries, especially African ones, that tend to be weaker and more dependent on Western assistance? Some scholars emphasize African countries' ability to influence to varying degrees their relations with the West and the multilateral system. For example, recent edited volumes by Lindsay Whitfield, and by William Brown and Sophie Harman, have brought much need attention to “African strategies for dealing with donors” and “African agency.”⁶ In many instances, African countries are able to influence donors and evade their pressures. Using the example of Ethiopia, Dereje Feyissa demonstrates how recipient countries can sometimes retain high levels of aid in spite of policies that diverge from donor prescriptions, because of the recipient government's ability to play a series of “cards” in its negotiations with donors, including geo-political and humanitarian considerations.⁷ Jonathan Fisher emphasizes recipient country agency in his analysis of differing donor perceptions of Kenya and Uganda's “reliability” in the “War on Terror.” He argues that donors' views have been influenced by the Ugandan government's effective use of “image management strategies,” while the Kenyan government has been reluctant to promote itself as a key donor ally.⁸ Likewise, Beth Whitaker shows how some “weak” African states, including Kenya, make policy choices that defy American “hegemony” on issues related to security and international criminal justice, propelled mainly by domestic and regional political considerations, and remain protected from retaliation by their “friendly” relations with the United States.⁹ Sometimes, recipient governments deploy principles such a local ownership (a key component of the international “aid effectiveness agenda”) and national sovereignty to resist donors' priorities.¹⁰

Though the actions of recipient countries are sometimes central to their ability to evade donor pressure, one must not overestimate or over-generalize their capacity to do so. Their margin of maneuver is highly context-dependent and can vary over time. The role of donors can also be a central factor in explaining outcomes. Scholars sometimes attribute the primary responsibility for donors' lack of success to the donors' own failure to apply sufficient political pressure or follow through on it. According to Crawford's analysis of 29 cases of political conditionality in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, donors' lack of commitment to political conditionality reflects the greater priority they place on other foreign policy objectives, particularly economic self-interest.¹¹ Stephen Brown makes a similar argument in his study of aid sanctions against Kenya and Malawi, emphasizing donors' commercial and strategic interests.¹² Fisher's analysis of donors' failure to take a stronger stand on the partiality of the Ugandan electoral commission prior to the 2011 elections also highlights donors' prioritization of their security and commercial interests, as well as their internal divisions and their belief, at times overstated, that they lacked influence.¹³ Drawing on the cases of Kenya, Malawi, and Rwanda, Brown argues that donor officials often become apologists for authoritarian practices, making them reluctant to exert additional pressure for political reform.¹⁴ Christoph Zürcher documents how even in heavily aid-dependent, fragile states such as Afghanistan, “donors will rarely if ever pull out” – and local officials know and capitalize on that fact.¹⁵

Few authors have attempted to analyze systematically the conditions under which international actors can influence domestic political decisions, with two notable exceptions. First, Caryn Peiffer and Pierre Englebert use large-N, statistical evidence to argue that African countries' “extraversion” makes them more vulnerable to Western pressure to liberalize. Though they never explicitly define the term, the authors name “alignment with an international patron, reliance on foreign aid in exchange for the adoption of policies recommended by donors, and participation in world trade as a primary commodity producer” as the “most easily identifiable dimensions of extraversion.”¹⁶ Second, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way similarly argue that high levels of leverage (“the degree to which governments are vulnerable to external democratizing pressure”) and linkage (“the density of ties … and cross-border flows … between particular countries and the United States, the European Union (EU) and western-led multilateral institutions”) help explain international actors' success in influencing a country's democratization process.¹⁷ According to their framework, “Where linkage is low but leverage is high, as in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, international pressure is intermittent and only partially effective. It may weaken authoritarianism, but it is rarely sufficient to produce democratization.”¹⁸ In Kenya, however, the relatively high level of extraversion and higher-than-average intensity of linkages for an African country – Western investment, trade, military cooperation, aid flows, tourism and civil society ties – would suggest that Western countries would be more likely to use their leverage.

Both these approaches are primarily structural and focused on the West, paying scant attention to the agency of African countries and their ability to use components of their extraversion, what one might call “counter-leverage,” to resist Western leverage. In fact, many of the types of linkages that both Levitsky and Way and Peiffer and Englebert see as reinforcing Western influence actually allow African governments to evade it. As illustrated below, since the 1990s, if not earlier, Kenyan politicians have been very adept at using Western officials' fear of violence and disorder and their reliance on cooperation in the realm of security, among other factors, to resist to a significant extent Western pressure for democratization and accountability for large-scale political violence. To a lesser extent, in the past decade, Kenyan leaders have also invoked the availability of support from China – a factor also underplayed by Levitsky and Way – to attempt dissuade Western donors from using political conditionality.

A more complete account of donors' ability to influence domestic policy thus depends on both structure and agency, including the agency of both donor and recipient governments. Though Axel Borchgrevink's analysis of the Ethiopian government's relative policy autonomy takes into account both the government's strategies and the donors' deficiencies, he tends to underplay the structural basis of the government's leverage.¹⁹ Whitfield and Fraser, by way of contrast, recognize that one must look at African leaders' sources of leverage, as well as their strategies, in their negotiations with donors.²⁰ To that, though, one must add factors related to donor agency, which have played a crucial role in Kenya. As we demonstrate below, donors repeatedly make threats that they are unwilling or unable to enforce – or believe, possibly erroneously, that they are unable to enforce – suggesting that it is useless or even unwise to apply pressure in the first place. Donors also make strategic errors in the timing of their pronouncements. These shortcomings not only greatly reduce the effectiveness of donor efforts, they sometimes have counterproductive effects.

Historical record of donor political pressure

In the 1990s, donor pressure on the Kenyan government focused on political and economic liberalization. Donors' most forceful acts were suspending new foreign aid in late 1990 and mid-1997, which combined with strong local democracy movements to cause the government to move to a multiparty system in the first case and enact some electoral reforms in the second. Neither the December 1992 nor the December 1997 elections, however, met international standards of free and fair, as documented even in donors' own observer reports. However, donors were concerned that rejecting the results would cause instability. They therefore endorsed them and renewed aid flows, encouraged by actual or promised economic reforms.²¹

Western actors also ignored the well-known fact that in both instances high-level figures in government and the ruling party of President Daniel arap Moi, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), had organized and financed large-scale electoral violence, killing well over 1000 people believed to support opposition parties, based on their ethnic identity, and displacing hundreds of thousands more. Donors took no significant action to pressure the government to hold accountable those responsible for the atrocities, despite the fact that they were in many ways a by-product of donor pressure for democratization, again prioritizing stability and other foreign interests over accountability.²²

Through their actions and inaction, donors thus undermined basic principles of democracy and justice. Though arguably beneficial in the short term, at least in terms of keeping the peace, these decisions not only helped keep a repressive regime in power until 2003, but also contributed to the entrenchment of impunity and encouraged future large-scale atrocities. Had those responsible for the violence in 1991–93 been held accountable, it would have been a lot less likely to recur in 1997–98 (both because perpetrators would be behind bars and because potential perpetrators would be deterred). The fact that not one prominent official was prosecuted for the “electoral clashes” of the 1990s directly facilitated more than 1000 additional deaths in 2008, alongside hundreds of thousands more displaced people. The names of those allegedly responsible in the 1990s were well known. Many were even listed in two parliamentary reports investigating the “clashes,” but complete impunity prevailed.²³ Some of the individuals identified in the 1990s were later accused of responsibility for the 2007–08 post-election violence. For instance, no effort was made to investigate the acts of William Ruto – elected Deputy President in March 2013 – while a senior official in a group called Youth for KANU '92, believed to have organized violent attacks in the Rift Valley Province in 1992–93.²⁴ In 2012, the International Criminal Court (ICC) charged him with crimes against humanity committed in 2007–08.

The extent and severity of the attacks that followed the December 2007 elections prompted donors to prioritize peace and stability above democratic principles, as they had in the 1990s.²⁵ Western donors and the African Union joined forces to help negotiate a power-sharing agreement that set aside, rather than settled, the question of who had rightfully won the presidential elections. The 2008 National Accord instantaneously ended the large-scale violence; however, it discarded the rules that determine who will form the government. Donors thus facilitated a carve-up of political power between the parties of both main contenders, described as “the politics of collusion,” trading off democracy for peace, while creating a “government of national impunity.”²⁶ The next section examines Western priorities under that coalition government.

Electoral interlude, 2008–12

This section analyzes shifts in donor pressure after the resolution of the crisis that followed the December 2007 elections until the beginning of the 2012–13 election campaign. It illustrates how donors initially applied only modest pressure, when their chances of success would have been highest, and subsequently failed to follow through. In so doing, they abandoned what they initially presented as the sine qua non of donor–Kenya relations, damaging the credibility of any subsequent pressure. Moreover, during this period, donors repeatedly underestimated their potential influence as a justification for inaction.

After the fire, 2008

The National Accord quelled the flames of conflict and contained numerous measures to help prevent them from reigniting. A central provision was the creation of a Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, commonly referred to as the Waki Commission. The commission's report, published in October 2008, detailed the nature and extent of the violence and recommended the creation of a Special Tribunal to prosecute those who bore the greatest responsibility for the atrocities. It gave the government three months to set up the tribunal, failing which the commission would hand over a list of suspects and evidence to the ICC through the intermediary of Kofi Annan, who had led the National Accord mediation team.²⁷

The coalition government committed itself to implementing all the recommendations of the Waki Commission. Donors strongly supported the idea of the Special Tribunal, believing that accountability was vital to prevent future violence, and that ICC involvement was either not justified because the crimes were not of sufficient gravity or because the process would be too slow and expensive. At this point, donors enjoyed significant legitimacy in Kenya for their role in resolving the crisis, as did the Waki Report's recommendations, including the creation of the tribunal. However, they did not publicly threaten the government with sanctions or indicate that it would not be “business as usual” if it did not establish the tribunal, but they made it clear to the government in private that the full implementation of the Waki Report's recommendations was essential.²⁸

Before the year's end, however, donor commitment to uphold their pressure had already waned. By then, Western countries had re-engaged with the government, even though the latter had not made much concrete progress on its commitments, but assistance still fell short of “business as usual.”²⁹ Several Western embassy officials suggested they did not have the leverage to influence the Kenyan government. A European ambassador erroneously stated that Western countries only provided 5–10% of the government's budget and that the withdrawal of aid would not have a serious financial impact. The correct figure for 2008 was 21.0% and was on a significant upward trend: Kenya's net official development assistance from Western countries is well above the figure donors cite and has in fact been increasing significantly over the past decade, from 15.7% of government expenditures in 2002 to 32.2% in 2011.³⁰ This suggests that donors' collective financial clout was far greater that they realized, even if not all those funds were channeled through the government.

Shifting the goalposts, 2009–10

In spite of the coalition government's emphatic commitment to creating a Special Tribunal, it never did so.³¹ By early 2010, most donors had dropped the issue, despite having previously framed it as key to future cooperation with the Kenyan government. Though many still believed in the importance of accountability, donors “felt stuck” and unsure how to react to a government that “listen[ed] politely” and then continued to do what it wanted.³² A United Nations (UN) official stated that “donors are running out of sticks.”³³ Overall, because donors were unwilling or unable to follow through on any threats, their pressure lacked credibility, allowing the government to “run rings around sometimes gullible international partners.”³⁴

If Western actors lacked leverage to bolster their pressure, which aid figures suggest was not the case, their relative inaction on accountability issues could be interpreted as pragmatism, especially as Kenyan human rights and other civil society organizations had also shifted their focus from the Special Tribunal to the ICC. However, numerous observers believed that donors did not want to take more robust action and “abandon Kenya” because their other interests were at stake, mainly in the area of security (terrorist threats from al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, the situation in Somalia and South Sudan, etc.), though this argument is more applicable to the United States and the UK than other donors.

One reason donors appeared inactive when it came to applying pressure on the Kenyan government is because they did not always share interests or priorities. Scandinavian nations retained a commitment to more “traditional” aid projects while also funding various peace-building and democracy-promoting activities, while mid-level donors such as Japan, France, and Canada were keen to enhance their economic opportunities in the country, and were increasingly funneling their aid to infrastructure and business development activities. The UK maintained considerable political and economic interests, but was also focusing on its commercial activities to a greater extent. The United States continued to provide substantial aid to Kenya. American interests and assistance to the country grew exponentially along with its national preoccupations against insecurity and terrorism. Indeed, while all donors acknowledged the importance of collaborating to foster peace and stability in East Africa, the United States most obviously prioritized these concerns above all others.

As international donor interest shifted towards the ICC, a few actors, namely Scandinavian ones, pushed for more accountability, but their smaller size precluded them from having much sway.³⁵ Divisions among donors were thus an impediment to influence. For instance, the US Ambassador was very outspoken, but the Americans tended to act alone rather than seek a donor consensus. In some instances, one could even speak of rivalry, including with China, which invested freely while applying no pressure for accountability. Also mitigating against financial pressure was the imperative to disburse aid budgets, especially for the United States, the UK, and France.³⁶

During this period, Western attention centered on the constitutional review process and the groundwork for the next general elections. Progress in those two areas was generally understood to be essential for continued donor support – other reforms could and would come later.³⁷ However, these requirements were rather broad and served as less of a galvanizing point than previous ones, namely ending the 2007–08 political violence or prosecuting those responsible. With the move from crisis to everyday work, donors became “disoriented, drifting, irresolute.”³⁸ Even so, it was not quite business as usual. Some donors, including the UK but not France, had shifted much of their assistance to the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector as a means of keeping the aid flowing without directly supporting a government that they did not trust.³⁹

Close to business as usual, 2011–12

The adoption of a new constitution in August 2010, endorsed by two-thirds of voters in a referendum, ushered in a new era in Kenyan politics, leading many to hope that political violence might remain a feature of the past. Kenyan politicians periodically raised the possibility of establishing of a domestic tribunal to try those responsible for the post-election violence, but it was mainly intended to forestall ICC action. In mid-2012, when donors raised accountability issues with the Kenyan government, they highlighted the need for continued cooperation with the ICC regarding the charges that had been laid against six Kenyans in September 2011, rather than domestic or hybrid national/international prosecutions. Meanwhile, with al-Shabaab incursions into Kenyan territory and Kenya's retaliatory military operation into Somalia, many donors, the United States in particular, fixated on Kenya's strategic location from a security perspective. “When you consider Somalia, piracy, oil and drones, you realize what a huge strategic concern Kenya is,” said one aid official. “And that's why no one really cared about the ICC.”⁴⁰ Moreover, as the government had pledged to cooperate fully, accountability was not discussed. Donors also believed that public statements could be counterproductive and elicit a reaction against donor “meddling” or infringement on sovereignty (as happened in early 2013, described below).⁴¹

By 2012, memories of the 2007–08 crisis – and the accompanying sense of urgency – had faded among donors. As of July 2012, not one Western ambassador in Kenya had been present during the post-election violence. The departure of the particularly vocal American and Dutch ambassadors left donors relatively silent, with the exception of the German representative. In any case, at this time donors were generally satisfied with the Kenyan government and its performance (including economic growth rates of 5–6%) and saw no reason to take a hard line.⁴² Instead, they dangled the “carrot” of even higher levels of foreign aid as an inducement for good governance, economic growth and poverty reduction.⁴³ As in previous years, many donors felt they lacked the tools to influence the government. It was therefore back to business as usual, except for their avoiding non-essential contact with ICC indictees, especially Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Uhuru Kenyatta and Cabinet Minister William Ruto. Local donor officials were concerned that Kenyatta might be elected president, but were not making any plans on how to react.⁴⁴

Donors began to worry about the potential for renewed electoral violence and repeatedly encouraged the government to take preventative measures.⁴⁵ Donors also undertook two main types of activities: institution/capacity-building and reconciliation. First, since the adoption of the new constitution in 2010, donors focused on supporting its implementation, including assistance to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. It was easier for them to coordinate on such technical issues than on the reform agenda or the ICC, where donor opinions and preferred approaches diverged.⁴⁶ Second, they funded various local peace-building/reconciliation initiatives which sought to defuse tensions at the local level, but failed to address the fact that previous instances of violence were organized and financed at political levels and were not simply spontaneous expressions of ethnic enmity, thus ignoring lessons from previous outbursts of large-scale violence.⁴⁷ Police reform attracted little donor attention, despite that fact that police officers had killed hundreds of civilians during the 2007–08 crisis.⁴⁸

The campaign, elections and aftermath, 2012–13

During from the run-up to the March 2013 elections to the formation of a new government, a period of intensely politicized discourse, donors initially avoided making public pronouncements, as they understood that they could feed nationalist, anti-Western rhetoric. However, at the last minute, with the worst possible timing, they made high-profile public pronouncements that, if anything, proved counterproductive.

Choosing peace over democracy

In the lead-up to the March 2013 elections, international actors focused on elections and largely set aside their concerns for justice and accountability. At times they also placed more emphasis on safe (violence-free) elections than the free and fair component, focusing on peace at the expense of democracy. Johnnie Carson, who was US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa at the time, later confirmed that “The US's number one goal was to avoid a repeat of the 2007–08 violence and achieve peaceful elections,” while the actual “mechanics of the process” were a secondary priority.⁴⁹

In early December 2012, with Raila Odinga leading the polls, former rivals and fellow ICC indictees Kenyatta and Ruto embarked on an affair of determined convenience. Many were surprised that the two could set aside their bloody quarrel; after all, they were on opposite sides of the conflict in 2007–08. The alliance was clearly strategic, with both parties presumably understanding that a joint victory would help reduce their chances of prosecution. Kenyatta and Ruto campaigned jointly under the banner of the Jubilee Alliance. As the contest narrowed, Kenyatta distinguished himself from his key rival Odinga by developing an anti-imperialist rhetoric underscoring his aim of “protecting Kenyan sovereignty.” Throughout, Jubilee's nationalistic campaign acquired distinct anti-British undertones, as Kenyatta positioned himself as a champion of African and Kenyan autonomy.

There were widespread fears that this election would again result in violence; after all, many of the factors that facilitated the bloodshed in 2007–08 were still present. Again, the electoral campaign appealed to ethnic divisions, with the Jubilee Alliance showcasing a Kikuyu–Kalenjin coalition, against Odinga's Coalition of Reform and Democracy (CORD), which had a strong Luo base. The same unresolved issues of land distribution, corruption, and poverty were also at the fore. And again, polls suggested a tight race. Tensions and the stakes were high.

In the months preceding the March 2013 election, most donors wisely kept a relatively low profile, lest they be seen as meddling. “We didn't speak up during the elections campaign to support one candidate or party,” explained one diplomat. “We actively did not want to interfere.”⁵⁰ Instead, donors focused their efforts on gathering and sharing information, often provided by the United States. Certainly, most donors valued an ongoing atmosphere of security, not simply because they supported Kenyans' right to vote, but also to protect their own interests in Kenya. And no country was more concerned about Kenya's security than the United States. It is somewhat ironic then that a high-ranking US official caused much turbulence close to Election Day, as discussed below.

Consequences of a poor choice of words

Some Western donors had murmured darkly about the implications of a Jubilee victory, but there was no planned or united response to that possibility. In January 2013, British High Commissioner Christian Turner said that the UK's position was to avoid anything but essential contact with ICC indictees. Then, in a February media telephone briefing, US Assistant Secretary of State Carson stated that while the United States was not officially backing a specific candidate, “choices have consequences.” Soon after, numerous other donors made similarly dire pronouncements. “It is Kenyans who will decide its leaders but those decisions have consequences,” said French Ambassador Étienne de Poncins. “The position of France is clear that we only have essential contact with people who are indicted by the ICC.”⁵¹ Other donors also lined up to reiterate their policy to have only “essential contact” with individuals who were indicted by the ICC.

The choir of donor voices sang in relative unison after Carson spoke. According to donor officials in Nairobi, the shared melody of “essential contact” and “consequences” came down from donor capitals.⁵² However, with the clarity of hindsight, donors reassessed their endorsement of Carson's comments. “The Carson statement was not well thought out. In fact, it was really stupid,” opined an aid official. “The Americans should have shut up.”⁵³ Indeed, some donors acknowledged that on the heels of their overtly bullish statements, Kenyatta's win forced donors into a position that was difficult to sustain. One diplomat said, “We went big on the ICC and we shouldn't have. In retrospect, we didn't need to.”⁵⁴

For the rest of the electoral campaign, such assertions served to further antagonize Kenyatta and Ruto. In fact, Jubilee's anti-imperialist stance only amplified after Carson's pronouncement. Additional donor statements also backfired by energizing Jubilee's supporters. While many, if not most, Kenyans had already decided to cast their votes along predictable (predominantly ethnic) lines, it is certainly possible that Carson's comments, echoed by other outspoken donors, drove many undecided Kenyans to the polls to rally behind Kenyatta or increased voter turnout among Jubilee's ethnic constituencies.

The real winner to emerge from this tempest was Uhuru Kenyatta and his party. Earlier in 2012, Jubilee hired UK-based BTP Advisers, who helped Kenyatta and Ruto present the ICC as an arm of Western powers, as well as develop the message that that foreign nations should not interfere with Kenya's elections and the country's sovereign affairs.⁵⁵ As the campaign progressed, a growing number of Kenyans became disenchanted with the ICC process and, as one aid official noted, “Donors' comments around the ICC … played in Jubilee's favour.”⁵⁶

A post-election snub, then back to business as usual

On Election Day, 4 March 2013, peace prevailed – though it is not clear that democracy did. Despite some regional discord during the campaign, the elections were generally free of violence, a significant achievement. After an agonizing week of technical glitches and recounts, followed by a controversial Supreme Court ruling, Kenyatta secured the presidency with 50.07% of the vote. It was hardly a landslide, but it was enough to avoid a run-off vote, despite enough irregularities to serious question the validity of the first-round victory.

The fact that Kenyatta and Ruto won the elections was an unexpected outcome according to most donors. Two years earlier, no one had imagined this result. “We underestimated Kenyatta,” told one diplomat. “We thought he just had deep pockets and was a playboy. He surprised us with the deal with Ruto. Not many saw that coming. No one really thought his candidacy was serious.”⁵⁷

Western countries unanimously commended the Kenyan people for their peaceful elections and seemingly snubbed the newly elected President by not initially congratulating the winners. Germany articulated its expectation that Kenya would stay true to its international duties, including cooperating with the ICC.⁵⁸ Similarly, the United States underscored the need for Kenya to uphold its international obligations, while US Secretary of State John Kerry commended “all those elected to office” without singling out Kenyatta.⁵⁹ British Prime Minister David Cameron made no public statement of congratulations but wrote to Kenyatta stating, “Kenyan people [should] be proud of the strong signal they have sent to the world about their determination to exercise their democratic right peacefully.”⁶⁰ Canada doffed its hat to the millions of Kenyans who peacefully stood in line to cast their votes and congratulated “Kenyans on exercising their democratic right and on conducting peacefully the first elections under a new constitution.”⁶¹ Following suit, even UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declined to congratulate Kenyatta on his win, instead commending Kenyans for a peaceful election.⁶² Western countries also did not send “anyone from their capitals to the inauguration.”⁶³ Nonetheless, local ambassadors attended, despite it not being a case of “essential contact.”⁶⁴

Following Kenyatta's inauguration, donors scrambled to decide whether and how Kenya's election results changed anything. Many extended their congratulations to Kenyatta after the Supreme Court confirmed the results, making it seem like that had been the stumbling block all along. In the end, as a Western diplomat stated, donors decided “to say that it's all business as usual because [Kenyatta and Ruto] are cooperating,” while admitting that “This can be seen as sucking up.”⁶⁵ Although they disliked the idea that their threats may be perceived as toothless, most donors were reluctant to specify which consequences Kenyan voter actions might entail, preferring to speculate on the hypothetical. Diplomats pondered about their “margin of manoeuvre” and would only go so far as to acknowledge that “if there is an arrest warrant, [we] will have to comply.”⁶⁶ All officials interviewed reiterated that they were confined to essential contact. None cared to elaborate on the apparent elasticity of the term.

Donors were clearly unprepared for the possibility that Kenya's new leaders would not necessarily be inclined to be as amenable towards the ICC as they had appeared thus far. However, from the beginning, Kenya has appeared to frustrate the court's endeavors, while giving just enough impression of cooperation to keep donors at bay. ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda repeatedly accused the Kenyan government of failing to cooperate with the ICC's attempts to gather evidence.⁶⁷ Among assertions of witness intimidation, the ICC was not given access to key provincial commissioners and police chiefs responsible for areas hardest hit by the 2007–08 post-election violence. In March 2013, lack of access to witnesses and evidence led Bensouda to drop charges against one of its four remaining Kenyan indictees, former head of the civil service, Francis Muthaura.⁶⁸

The unaccommodating testiness that Jubilee expressed towards the West and especially the ICC during the election campaign continued after the new government took office. In May 2013, for instance, the Kenyan government unsuccessfully tried to convince the UN Security Council to terminate the ICC cases, calling the court “an affront to the domestic policy and internal affairs” of Kenya, and asked the African Union's member states to urge the ICC to drop the charges.⁶⁹ Such efforts to undermine the ICC only multiplied after al-Shabaab's high-profile September 2013 attack on Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall.

While donors were disinclined to comment on Kenya's anti-Western rhetorical turn, most felt that diplomatic relations would become awkward if the indictees openly refused to comply with the ICC. “Non-cooperation is a scenario that none of us want,” said one diplomat. “In terms of aid, we don't want to put any money into the hands of government, but we also don't want to penalize Kenya for their leaders.”⁷⁰ One European diplomat freely admitted, “Sanctions were never considered.”⁷¹

Aside from issuing cryptic warnings about the implications of non-compliance, donors did not apply any real political pressure on Kenya to increase its level of cooperation with the ICC. Donors recognized that their comments prior to the elections painted them into a corner. Official statements indicated ongoing commitment to the ICC, but most were more concerned with their economic and security interests. “Kenya is our largest Sub-Saharan African recipient,” one diplomat explained.

It is the economic and transportation hub for the East Africa region. It's a good investment environment with a stable government, despite the hitches of the 2007–08 elections. As this most recent election was peaceful, there is a consequently better environment for increased investment.⁷²

The Westgate attack further strengthened the Kenyan leaders' hand in its relations with the West. The United States and other Western donors considered Kenyan security cooperation more important than ever, further emboldening the country's leadership in its anti-ICC campaign and weakening Western support for the ICC process.

Indeed, for many donors, Kenya's strategic location, economic potential and ideological ties are more important than traditional aid projects. Kenya continues to be the economic centre of East Africa, and the gateway to the rest of the region and Central Africa. With new investment possibilities in oil and a moderate but steady growth rate, donors value their burgeoning business opportunities in the region. The UK is Kenya's primary foreign investor and total trade between the two countries exceeds £1 billion.⁷³ Several donors are looking to increase their business prospects, particularly in the extractive industries. There was never any question that investors might pull out of Kenya with a Jubilee victory, and even in the event that arrest warrants are issued, future economic sanctions are highly unlikely.

Peace, security and stability trumped principles of justice and accountability in 2013. No donor wanted to destabilize the country. Moreover, donor countries with business interests in Kenya were increasingly concerned about competition with India and China, neither of which showed any reluctance to do business with a nation whose leaders were indicted by the ICC. Western donors could hardly take back previous statements about essential contact and consequences without losing face, but they could continue to do business with Kenya, thereby demonstrating their true priorities.

Some donors consider the Kenyan government's efforts, through the intermediary of the African Union, to end the ICC trials and refer the outstanding cases back to Kenya as evidence of non-cooperation. A European diplomat said, “I cannot say that they are cooperating with the ICC while seeming to undermine the legitimacy of the court.”⁷⁴ Although no donor will say as much on the record, some admitted under guise of anonymity that they are hoping that the ICC cases will “quietly disappear.” Even before the Westgate attack, one aid official admitted that “many of the donors want the case to go away.”⁷⁵

The elasticity of “essential contact”

After Kenyatta and Uhuru's victory, donors began to stretch the meaning of “essential contact.” In May 2013, President Kenyatta travelled to the UK for an international conference on Somalia. Although Kenyan participation is crucial in matters pertaining to Somalia, Kenyatta's presence was perhaps less so. And while the UK was adamant that there would be no photo opportunities for the media during this trip, Kenyatta nonetheless received a full diplomatic welcome. On that occasion, the international press noted how diplomats became more “flexible” regarding contact.⁷⁶

Some donors, along with the UN and the European Union, appeared to suspend or redefine “essential contact” because the accused were still reputedly cooperating with the ICC.⁷⁷ A Nairobi-based diplomat explained:

We respect the ICC process and the international court. But so far the accused are not proven guilty of any crimes. They are cooperating and have pledged to do so. It's not impacting or influencing bilateral relations as long as they cooperate.⁷⁸

Another diplomat admitted that “They are banking on our talk being cheap. There is some distinction on the idea of essential contact. We are emphasizing that Kenya isn't Sudan or Zimbabwe. But it's overcompensation. Right now, it is business as usual.”⁷⁹

That US President Obama did not stop in Kenya during his July 2013 African tour was the only indication that diplomatic relations the ICC cases might have any impact on relations with Western countries. According to White House officials, “the fact that Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta [and his deputy William Ruto] is facing trial at the International Criminal Court” prevented a potential visit.⁸⁰ Nonetheless, Obama personally called Kenyatta after the Westgate attack and “reaffirmed the United States' partnership” with Kenya.⁸¹

Clearly, as long as Kenyatta and Ruto give enough indication of their cooperation with the ICC – and it need not be that much – large Western donors will continue to prioritize their business interests and security concerns, even if some smaller donors support their development and governance endeavors. One mid-sized donor aid official summed up what many donors were feeling, “We are trade focused and will likely remain so. So far, we've seen just enough cooperation. When we talk privately, it's business as usual.” The same official also predicted that the government “will stop cooperating sooner or later.”⁸² Donors still do not know, however, how they will react if and when the government stops working with the ICC, an arrest warrant is issued or convictions obtained, which is the main reason many hope the cases will be withdrawn or otherwise fail to convict Ruto and especially Kenyatta.

Conclusion: recurring patterns and challenges

As explained above, Levitsky and Way consider African countries to have high degrees of leverage but low levels of linkage, which helps explain why democracy promotion has met with limited success on the continent. Kenya, however, as illustrated in this article, has relatively high levels of both – and its leaders have nonetheless managed in many ways to resist donor pressure for decades. In this case, the linkages, which include significant Western interests in Kenya, undermine rather than sustain Western efforts to promote justice and democracy and, as a result, long-term peace. Thus, structural elements (including what Peiffer and Englebert term “extraversion”) can actually make it more difficult for donors to promote political goals, while Kenyan political leaders effectively use their agency to declaw Western pressure. Donors' own shortcomings have greatly facilitated their task.

The most recent Kenyan electoral cycle, culminating in the 2013 elections constitutes the latest iteration of a consistent pattern of donors not enforcing stated conditions for future political and financial support. After each crisis, donors have trouble maintaining interest for more than a year before they grow complacent. Personnel changes, causing a lack of corporate memory, provoke disinterest and consequently donor officials are risk averse.⁸³ Western officials are also faced with the professional imperative of spending their aid budgets. Above all, most donors – certainly the major ones – prioritize their own economic and security interests and are unlikely to do anything that might jeopardize these concerns. For those who watch the behavior of international actors, not least successive Kenyan governments, donor threats appear less credible with every iteration.

Donors repeatedly claim that they have little actual sway with Kenya because the importance of Western foreign aid is declining, but this is simply not the case. According to the World Bank data cited above, donors' net official development assistance doubled from 16% to 32% of Kenyan government spending in less than a decade. Development assistance represents fully one third of the government's budget, which means that donors have far more leverage than they admit to. Donors not only fail to acknowledge this influence among themselves, they consistently demonstrate a lack of political will to use it.

Western officials also repeatedly cite as a reason for inaction what one might call countervailing leverage from non-Western countries as rival sources of aid, trade and investment. As China and India aggressively vied to break into Kenyan markets, Western donors feared they might miss out. According to one aid official, “China is building roads and not criticizing the country's human rights record or the government.”⁸⁴ However, China is not a credible alternative to Western assistance, neither in total quantity, nor in sectoral coverage. Non-traditional donors generally show little interest, for instance, in funding social expenditure. In the words of a Canadian aid official, Kenya “is only looking East for a couple of things. The East cannot replace the West.”⁸⁵ Western donors' thus vastly overstate their impotence. In truth, they lack the will more than the ability.

A third reason donors declined to suspend aid is that they claimed that they did not want to hurt Kenyans who are in need. This explanation also lacks credibility because they did so twice in the 1990s and because they could have targeted any aid embargo in ways that protected the poor, including by channeling it through civil society.

Even if donors did not want to reduce aid flows, they had other forms of potential leverage on politicians, such as imposing visa bans, which a few did, notably the United States, or the seizure of foreign assets or other forms of sanctions.⁸⁶ There is no guarantee that donors would be able to impose their preferred policies on the Kenyan government, even if they made a more concerted effort. Moreover, some actions could provoke daunting short-term costs, including destabilization and the potential loss of lives. The more diffuse donors' reform agenda, the more difficult it is to coordinate action and strategies, thereby strengthening the Kenyan government's hand: As one aid official noted, “One ambassador speaking up will get picked off, but as a collective, we have a greater voice.”⁸⁷ Donors may indeed have a louder voice when they speak in unison, but they generally fail to do so except when faced with the gravest crises, as in 1991–92, 1997–98 and 2008. After the signature of the National Accord in February 2008, domestic and international factors were especially propitious for donor influence, but donors acted only timidly. When they did make forceful statements, in early 2013, the timing could not have been worse. If anything, their threats encouraged the very events they sought to avoid, and subsequently made donors look weaker than ever.

The partial solutions favored by donors may avert crises, but such quick fixes tend to ignore underlying problems and sow the seeds of new crises. Over the longer term, democracy and justice may prove to be just as essential to peace and stability as the other way around. Some Kenyan elites may benefit greatly from donor complacency and weakness, but Kenya as a whole and the poor in particular pay the price. International pressure can be effective to enact change and reverse anti-democratic initiatives, especially when coordinated with local civil society pressure.⁸⁸ However, for the foreseeable future, donors are likely to remain reluctant to use their power to enforce consequences, and the Kenyan government knows it. In Kenya, donors' rhetoric is little more than empty threats.

Acknowledgements

Stephen Brown made his contributions to this article while Senior Fellow at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany. He is grateful to the centre and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (grant number 820-2009-001) for funding and other forms of assistance. Rosalind Raddatz acknowledges the generous support of the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation. The authors have benefitted from comments and suggestions received from Hervé Maupeu and two peer reviewers, as well as during presentations at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies' Institute of African Affairs, Hamburg, 22 May 2013; at a workshop on the 2013 Kenyan elections, Nairobi, 3–4 June 2013; and at a conference on “Kenya at 50” at Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 26–27 September 2013.

Notes

1. Stephen Brown conducted the 2008, 2010 and 2012 interviews cited in this article. He undertook the ones from 2010 jointly with Chandra Lekha Sriram (University of East London). Rosalind Raddatz carried out the 2013 interviews. Because of sensitivities on the topics discussed, very few interviewees agreed to be cited by name. When they were unwilling to allow any indication of their position, we provide full anonymity by citing them as “unattributable interview.”

2. In 2011, the ten largest contributors of net official development assistance to Kenya were, in descending order: the United States (US$715 million), Germany (US$157 million), the UK (US$142 million), European Union institutions (US$134 million), France (US$93 million), Japan (US$80 million), Sweden (US$77 million), Denmark (US$71 million), Canada (US$42 million), and the Netherlands (US$35 million) (OECD, Query Wizard).

3. For instance, Geisler, “Fair?”; Kelley, “D-Minus Elections”; and Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, to name but a few examples.

4. Collier, “Failure of Conditionality”; Kanbur, “Aid, Conditionality and Debt”; Mosley et al., Aid and Power.

5. Crawford, “Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality”; Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform.

6. Whitfield, Politics of Aid; Brown and Harman, African Agency in International Politics.

7. Feyissa, “Aid Negotiation.”

8. Fisher, “Some More Reliable than Others.” On the Ugandan government's use of its intervention in Somalia to evade donor censure on governance issues, see Fisher, “Managing Donor Perceptions.”

9. Whitaker, “Soft Balancing among Weak States?”; also Whitaker, “Compliance among Weak States”; Whitaker, “Reluctant Partners.” For an account that attributes more power to the United States in this relationship, see Prestholdt, “Kenya, the United States and Counterterrorism.”

10. McGee and García Heredia, “Paris in Bogotá”; Brown, “Sovereignty Matters.”

11. Crawford, “Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality”; Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform.

12. Brown, “Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion.”

13. Fisher, “The Limits – and Limiters – of External Influence.”

14. Brown, “‘Well, What Can You Expect?’”

15. Zürcher, “Conflict, State Fragility and Aid Effectiveness,” 469.

16. Peiffer and Englebert, “Extraversion, Vulnerability to Donors,” 362.

17. Levitsky and Way, “Linkage versus Leverage,” 379.

18. Levitsky and Way, “Linkage versus Leverage,”, 380; also Levitsky and Way, “Linkage and Leverage.”

19. Borchgrevink, “Limits to Donor Influence.”

20. Whitfield and Fraser, “Negotiating Aid.”

21. For instance, see Geist, “Kenya's 1997 Elections”; and Election Observation Centre, Kenya General Elections 1997; as well as analysis in Brown, “Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections.”

22. Brown, “Quiet Diplomacy and Recurring ‘Ethnic Clashes.’”

23. Kiliku Commission, Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee; Akiwumi Commission, Report by the Judicial Commission of Inquiry. See also the summary in Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), Lest We Forget.

24. Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 200, 246–7.

25. For an analysis of the atrocities and their causes, see Anderson and Lochery, “Violence and Exodus in Kenya's Rift Valley”; and Mueller, “Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis”; as well as several articles in Kagwanja and Southall, a special issue of Journal of Contemporary African Studies.

26. Cheeseman and Tendi. “Power-Sharing in Comparative Perspective”; also Brown, “Donor Responses to the 2008 Kenyan Crisis”; and Hansen, “Kenya's Power-Sharing Arrangement.”

27. Waki Commission, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 473; also Brown, “National Accord.”

28. Two unattributable interviews, Nairobi, December 2008; two interviews with Western embassy officials, Nairobi, December 2008. Worth noting is that the creation of the tribunal itself might not have been sufficient to achieve widespread accountability. Lack of government cooperation and witness intimidation have severely hampered the work of the ICC – and it would be easier to sabotage the effectiveness of a Special Tribunal.

29. Interviews with a European ambassador and two Western embassy officials, Nairobi, December 2008.

30. World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

31. Both wings of the coalition contained high-ranking officials who are widely believed to be responsible for the 2007–08 atrocities and they joined forces in an anti-accountability alliance, effectively blocking efforts to present the enabling legislation from ever being debated in parliament; Brown with Sriram, “Big Fish Won't Fry Themselves.” Annan handed over the Waki documents to the ICC in July 2009. The ICC launched an official investigation in March 2010 and laid charges in September 2011.

32. Unattributable interview, Nairobi, January 2010.

33. Interview, United Nations official, Nairobi, January 2010.

34. Unattributable interview, Nairobi, January 2010.

35. Interview with Willy Mutunga, Representative, Ford Foundation, Nairobi, 20 January 2010. On the relative size of donors, see note 2.

36. Interview with Mugambi Kiai, Programme Officer, Open Society Initiative for East Africa, Nairobi, 10 December 2008; unattributable interview, Nairobi, January 2010; interviews with a European diplomat and a Western diplomatic official, Nairobi, June 2012.

37. Interview with Mugambi Kiai, Programme Officer, Open Society Initiative for East Africa, Nairobi, 15 January, 2010; unattributable interview, Nairobi, January 2010; unattributable interview, Nairobi, June 2012.

38. Unattributable interview, Nairobi, January 2010.

39. Interview with a European diplomat, Nairobi, June 2012; unattributable interview, Nairobi, January 2010.

40. Interview with a Western diplomatic official, Nairobi, May 2013.

41. Interviews with a Western diplomatic official, a European diplomat, and an unattributable source, Nairobi, June 2012.

42. Interviews with a Western diplomatic official and an unattributable source, Nairobi, June 2012. The former described Kenya as a “flawed, but sort of a success story as a democracy” and considered some level of electoral violence inevitable, as “it is part of the culture.”

43. Interview with a European aid official, Nairobi, June 2012.

44. Interviews with a European diplomat, a European aid official, a Canadian aid official, and an unattributable source, Nairobi, June 2012.

45. Interview with a Western diplomatic official, Nairobi, May 2013.

46. Unattributable interview, Nairobi, June 2012. The Kenyan government actively exploited division among donors, “defanging” them in the process; interview with a European aid official, Nairobi, June 2012.

47. Brown, “Lessons Learned and Forgotten.”

48. Waki Commission, Report of the Commission of Inquiry. The United States, the UK, and Sweden raised the issue, but other donors considered it “too sensitive”; interview with a European aid official, Nairobi, June 2012.

49. Johnnie Carson, remarks made at the “Kenya at 50” conference, Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 26 September, 2013.

50. Interview with a diplomatic official, Nairobi, June 2013.

51. Analysis Africa, “Nairobi Angers Brussels”.

52. Interviews with a diplomatic official and an aid official, Nairobi, May 2013.

53. Interview with a Western aid official, Nairobi, May 2013.

54. Interview with a Western diplomatic official, Nairobi, May 2013.

55. Mathenge, “How British PR Firm Helped.”

56. Interview with a Western aid official, Nairobi, May 2013.

57. Interview with a Western diplomatic official, Nairobi, May 2013.

58. Lough, “Western Powers Congratulate Kenya.”

59. Kelly, “US, UK congratulate Kenyans.”

60. UK Prime Minister's Office, PM Letter to President-Elect Kenyatta.

61. Government of Canada, Canada Comments on Election Results in Kenya.

62. Daily Nation, “Kenya Election Reactions.”

63. Interview with a Western aid official, Nairobi, June 2013.

64. Interviews with a diplomatic official and a Western aid official, Nairobi, May 2013.

65. Interview with a diplomatic official, May 2013.

66. Interviews with two diplomats, Nairobi, June 2013.

67. Daily Nation, “Kenya Frustrating Justice.”

68. Kaberia, “Kenya: ICC Prosecutor Drops Muthaura's Case.”

69. Bosco, “Kenya's Blistering Attack.”

70. Interview with a Western diplomatic official, Nairobi, May 2013.

71. Interview with a European diplomat, Nairobi, June 2013.

72. Interview with a diplomat, Nairobi, June 2013.

73. UK Department of Trade and Investment, Increasing Business with Kenya.

74. Interview with a European diplomat, Nairobi, June 2013.

75. Interview with a Western aid official, Nairobi, June 2013.

76. Blair, “Kenyan Leader.”

77. The Star, “Kenya and UK Strike Deal.”

78. Interview with a diplomat, Nairobi, June 2013.

79. Interview with a Western diplomatic official, May 2013.

80. AFP and Capital Reporter, “ICC Cases Reason for Kenya Snub.”

81. Associated Press, “Obama Phones Kenyan President.”

82. Interview with a Western aid official, Nairobi, May 2013.

83. One interviewee stated that donors “would all love to see national accountability but no one will stick out their necks”; interview with a European development agency official, Nairobi, June 2012.

84. Interview with a Western aid official, Nairobi, May 2013.

85. Interview with a Canadian aid official, Nairobi, June 2012.

86. On targeted sanctions, see Drezner, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart.”

87. Interview with a Western aid official, Nairobi, May 2013.

88. For instance, see Baker, “Outstaying One's Welcome.”