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Abstract
In the months leading up to Kenya's general election in March 2013, there was much concern – both within Kenya itself and internationally – that political competition would trigger a fresh wave of ethnic violence. However, the 2013 elections passed off largely peacefully, despite an unexpected presidential result and fact that the losing candidate, Raila Odinga, appealed the outcome to the Supreme Court. This article argues that Kenya avoided political unrest as a result of four interconnected processes. A dramatic political realignment brought former rivals together and gave them an incentive to diffuse ethnic tensions; a pervasive ‘peace narrative’ delegitimized political activity likely to lead to political instability; partial democratic reforms conferred new legitimacy on the electoral and political system; and a new constitution meant that many voters who ‘lost’ nationally in the presidential election ‘won’ in local contests. This election thus provides two important lessons for the democratization literature. First, processes of gradual reform may generate more democratic political systems in the long-run, but in the short-run they can empower the political establishment. Second, sacrificing justice on the altar of stability risks a ‘negative peace’ that may be associated with an increased sense of marginalization and exclusion among some communities – raising the prospects for unrest in the future.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Joel Barkan, Job Bwonye, Neil Carrier, Margie Cook, Gregory Deacon, Godwin Murunga, Adams Oloo, Mary O'Hagan, Michelle Osborn, Jacob Rasmussen, Mutuma Ruteere, Andrea Scheibler, Job Wandania, Muthoni Wanyeki and Peter Wanyama Wanyoni for their insights into Kenyan history and politics, and the 2013 election, which have greatly enriched the analysis of this article.
Notes
1. For a classic example, see CitationMcGroarty and Abshir, “Kenya Vote Begins Amid Threat”; for the recent academic debate on the potential for elections in Kenya to result in political violence, see CitationJenkins, “Ethnicity, Violence, and the Immigrant–Guest Metaphor”; and CitationGreiner, “Guns, Land and Votes.”
2. Ethnic clashes and attacks on electoral officials occurred in some areas, mainly at the coast and in the north of the country; see CitationWillis and Chome, “Marginalization and Political Participation.”
3. CitationShah, “Ethnicity and Electoral Legitimacy.”
4. CitationShah, “Ethnicity and Electoral Legitimacy.” The findings of Ferree, Gibson, and Long also call into question the official outcome. See “Voting Behaviour and Electoral Irregularities in Kenya's 2013 Election.” For a long time, speculation was fuelled by the failure of the IEBC to release the results. See Kegoro, “Hassan Should Stop Chasing Shadows and Release Pending Poll Vote Tallies.”
5. This research was partially funded by a grant from the Africa Conflict Prevention Programme of the UK government. The research team included five Kenyan and five British academics. The authors are grateful to all involved, whose research and suggestions have improved their own understanding of the election. This paper is independent of the research project: many authors involved in the research are not included in this special issue, and many authors who were not involved in the research have contributed to this set of articles. The findings presented here solely reflect the personal reviews of the authors.
6. CitationLindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa, p. 44; see also Posner and Young, “The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa.”
7. CitationThroup and Hornsby, Multi-Party Elections in Kenya; CitationRutten et al., Out for the Count.
8. CitationAnderson, “Kenya's Elections 2002.”
9. CitationLynch, “Fruits of Perception”; see also Nasong'o, “Constitutional Reform and the Crisis of Democratization in Kenya.”
10. CitationCheeseman, “Kenyan Elections of 2007.”
11. It is not clear exactly how this was organized, or what relationship this ‘Mungiki’ had to previous iterations of the gang.
12. CitationRepublic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, pp. 272, 305; for a discussion of the causes and dimensions of the violence, see Branch and Cheeseman, “Democratization, Sequencing, and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya.”
13. CitationLynch, “Durable Solution, Help or Hindrance?,” p. 604.
14. CitationKathina Juma, “African Mediation of the Kenyan.”
15. CitationGithongo, “Fear and Loathing in Nairobi.”
16. Cottrell and Ghai, “Constitution-making and Democratisation in Kenya, 2000–2005”; CitationKanyinga and Long, “Political Economy of Reforms.”
17. CitationMutua, Kenya's Quest for Democracy.
18. CitationGhai, “Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan State”; CitationGithinji and Holmquist, “Kenya's Hopes and Impediments.”
19. For a discussion of continuities in patronage in Kenya see Cheeseman, “Kenya Since 2002: The More Things Change the More They Stay the Same”; CitationMueller, “Kenya and the International Criminal Court.”
20. CitationTsuda, “Experience of the National Rainbow Coalition.”
21. CitationBrown and Sriram, “Big Fish Won't Fry Themselves.”
22. CitationKanyinga and Long, “Political Economy of Reforms,” pp. 46–7.
23. CitationLynch, “Electing the Alliance of the Accused”; CitationLynch, “Trust, Reconciliation and Sustainable Peace.”
24. For example, CitationKlopp, “‘Ethnic Clashes’ and Winning Elections”; CitationLynch, I Say To You; CitationOucho, Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflict.
25. CitationDaily Nation, “Jubilee Anchored on Desire for Peace.”
26. CitationDaily Nation, “Why Mudavadi–TNA Deal Failed.”
27. CitationThe Star, “ODM Hurdles Won't Hinder Me”; CitationDaily Nation, “Court Nullifies Siaya Governor Cornel Rasanga's.”
28. CitationDaily Nation, “Competing Coalitions Exhibit Campaign Swag.”
29. CitationDaily Nation, “Battle for Votes Moves.”
30. CitationLynch, “Electing the Alliance of the Accused.”
31. CitationNyairo, “Foreigners have No Business.”
32. CitationLynch, “Electing the Alliance of the Accused.”
33. CitationLynch, I Say to You.
34. CitationDaily Nation, “Miguna Does it Again.”
35. CitationThe Star, “US Warns of ICC Consequences”; CitationThe Star, “Back Off, Kenya Tells EU Envoy.”
36. CitationThe People, “State Moves to Cut.”
37. CitationInternational Crisis Group (ICG), Kenya's 2013 Elections, p. 18.
38. CitationAnderson, “Kenya on the Brink”; CitationChege, “Kenya: Back from the Brink?”
39. CitationDiamond, “Democratic Roll-back.”
40. CitationHuman Rights Watch (HRW), High Stakes, p. 5.
41. CitationHuman Rights Watch (HRW), Turning Pebbles.
42. CitationLynch, “Electing the Alliance of the Accused”; CitationLynch, “Trust, Reconciliation and Sustainable Peace.”
43. CitationHRW, High Stakes, p. 13.
44. CitationAmnesty International (AI), Police Reform in Kenya, p. 6.
45. Daily Nation, “Editorial: Role of the Police.” Daily Nation September 12, 1974 p. 6.
46. CitationAtieno Odhiambo, “Democracy and the Ideology of Order.”
47. CitationLynch, “Trust, Reconciliation and Sustainable Peace.”
48. CitationMoss and O'Hare, “Staging Democracy”.
49. CitationICG, Kenya's 2013 Elections, p. 1.
50. Shah, “Ethnicity and Electoral Legitimacy.”
51. Shah, “Ethnicity and Electoral Legitimacy.”
52. CitationGithongo, “Whither Civil Society?”
53. CitationInternational Crisis Group (ICG), Kenya After the Elections, p. 3.
54. CitationMenya, “Raila Ignores Police Directive.”
55. CitationWillis and CitationChome, “Marginalization and Political Participation”; CitationLynch, “Electing the Alliance of the Accused.”
56. Cf. CitationPykett et al., “Framing the Good Citizen,” p. 523.
57. Interview with a local newspaper journalist, Nairobi, April 10, 2013.
58. Interview with a local radio presenter, Nakuru, April 3, 2013.
59. Interview with a local newspaper journalist, Nakuru, April 3, 2013.
60. Interview with a civil society activist, Eldoret, March 27, 2013.
61. Interview with a clergyman, Eldoret, March 26, 2013.
62. CitationICG, Kenya After the Elections, p. 4.
63. CitationMacharia, “Kenya Election and the Militarisation of Peace.”
64. CitationKenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ), “Kenyan Civil Society Group.”
65. Interview with a local radio presenter, Nakuru, April 3, 2013.
66. Interview with a peace activist, Nakuru, April 3, 2013.
67. Interview with a civil society activist, Nakuru, April 4, 2013.
68. Cf. CitationGaltung, “Peace, and Peace Research”; also CitationLynch, “Trust, Reconciliation and Sustainable Peace.”
69. CitationAI, Police Reform in Kenya.
70. CitationCheeseman, “Kenya in 2012.”
71. CitationKenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR), Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project, pp. 16, 33.
72. CitationKenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR), Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project, p. 36.
73. CitationMayabi, “14.3 Million Registered”; CitationEuropean Union, Election Observation Mission to Kenya.
74. CitationThe Star, “IEBC Suspends CEO Oswago and Shollei.”
75. CitationAfrica Centre for Governance (AFRICOG), Election Petition.
76. CitationElections Observer Group (ELOG), Historic Vote.
77. Newspaper article on CORD leaders and electoral commission.
78. CitationELOG, Historic Vote.
79. Many of the failings of the electoral system are detailed in CitationAFRICOG, Election Petition. For more on the CORD response, see CitationAfrica Confidential, “Credibility of the IEBC Under Fire”; and CitationAfrica Confidential, “Closest of Shaves.”
80. For example, CitationDaily Nation, “Court Nullifies Siaya Governor Cornel Rasanga's.”
81. CitationCheeseman, “Kenyan Elections of 2007”; one of the more critical observer reports in 2013 was Ossmann, “African Great Lakes Initiative Report on Observation of March 2013 Kenyan National Elections.”
82. CitationBrownsell, “Odinga: From the Polls.” For a sense of the anger and frustration that the ruling caused, see CitationKenya Stockholm, “Bitter Lessons from the Supreme Court Ruling.”
83. CitationBBC News, “Kenya Supreme Court Upholds.” For a summary of the Supreme Court's rulings, see http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/supreme-court-rulings1.html/. Accessed June 2, 2013. For the decision itself, see Republic of Kenya, “Supreme Court Rulings: Petition 5 of 2013 Raila Odinga & Others vs. IEBC. & Others.” It is worth noting that some of the legislative and regional results were overturned. See “Siaya Governor Cornel Rasanga Loses Seat”.
84. For an interesting discussion, see CitationNgenge, “Kenya 2013 Elections.”
85. International Crisis Group, “Kenya After the Elections”.
86. For example, CitationBarkan and Chege, “Decentralising the State”; CitationBrancati, “Decentralization: Fuelling the Fire”; CitationConyers, “Decentralisation and Service Delivery”; and CitationRobinson, “Introduction: Decentralising Service Delivery?”
87. CitationCheeseman, “Why Villagers Love Uhuru.”
88. CitationCheeseman, “Why Villagers Love Uhuru.”
89. CitationCornell and d'Arcy, “Plus ça Change?”
90. Interviews and conversations held in Nairobi, September and October 2013.
91. CitationIpsos Synovate, “Polls Political Barometer Survey.”
92. CitationLynch, “Trust, Reconciliation and Sustainable Peace.”
93. CitationSchedler, “Nested Game of Democratization,” p. 110.
94. CitationLindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa; for a discussion of the conditions under which opposition parties win power see Cheeseman “African Elections as Vehicles for Change.”
95. CitationBrown, “Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections.”
96. CitationOpalo, “Long Road to Institutionalization.”
97. The roots of the Kenya crisis are discussed from a variety of different angles by CitationBranch et al., Our Turn To Eat.
98. CitationThe Telegraph, “Kenyan Press Outraged.”