Trade networks and the practical norms of taxation at a border crossing between South Sudan and Northern Uganda

Abstract

This article provides an ethnographic insight into how the daily realities of state performance along the South Sudanese most Southern border of Magwi County are an outcome of negotiations between traders and state officials. It is argued that the ‘practical norms’ of taxation, meaning the actual rules that govern the actions of state officials, are largely framed by the way in which state officials and traders are embedded in different networks. The analysis distinguishes between regional trade networks of accumulation based on associative ties that appropriate elements of state performance and SPLM/A authority into their business practices, and local trade networks of survival based on communal ties that relate to state performance more through the informal institutions of kinship and subsistence security. It is demonstrated that the types of network ties and their embedded institutional content that connect traders and state officials yield very different practical norms with different implications for South Sudan's state-building process ‘from below’.

Keywords:

• border trade
• taxation
• customs
• state performance
• state-building
• practical norms
• South Sudan

Funding

This work was supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the IS Academy for Human Security in Fragile States Grant [Act number 20683, Contract number DEK0111286].

Notes

1. Woman trader's focus group excerpt, Magwi town, November 2012.

2. Olivier de Sardan, Jean Pierre, Researching the Practical Norms.

3. Di John, “Taxation, Developmental State Capacity”; Prichard, “Taxation and State Building”; Bird, “Tax Challenges Facing Developing Countries.”

4. Sharma, “Rethinking Theories of the State.”

5. Blundo, “Dealing with the Local State”; Bierschenk, “States at Work in West Africa”; Olivier de Sardan, Jean Pierre, Researching the Practical Norms.

6. This case study is part of a PhD project about informal trade, entrepreneurship and the state in South Sudan; see http://isacademyhsfs.org/.

7. To prevent ambiguity, ‘state’ with a lowercase ‘s’ refers to the polity and ‘State’ with a capital ‘S’ refers to the federated State as a political entity within the federal sovereign body of South Sudan.

8. Lourenço-Lindell, Walking the Tight Rope.

9. Meagher, Identity Economics.

10. Olivier de Sardan, Jean Pierre, Researching the Practical Norms; Titeca and de Herdt, “Real Governance Beyond the ‘Failed State.’”

11. Menkhaus, “Rise of a Mediated State”; Hagmann and Péclard, “Negotiating Statehood.”

12. Meagher, “Strength of Weak States?”

13. Beckert, “Great Transformation of Embeddedness,” p. 16.

14. Convert and Heilbron, “Where Did the New Economic Sociology?”

15. Portes, “The Informal Economy and Its Paradoxes.”

16. MacGaffey and Bazenguissa, “Traders, Trade Networks and Research Methods,” p. 13.

17. MacGaffey and Bazenguissa, “Traders, Trade Networks and Research Methods,” p. 13.

18. MacGaffey and Bazenguissa, “Traders, Trade Networks and Research Methods,” p. 12.

19. Polanyi, Great Transformation.

20. Granovetter, “Impact of Social Structure,” p. 35.

21. Polanyi, Great Transformation, p. 71.

22. Hagmann and Péclard, “Negotiating Statehood.”

23. Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy.

24. Bierschenk, “States at Work in West Africa.”

25. Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders.

26. Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC), War, State Collapse and Reconstruction, p. 5.

27. Helmke and Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics,” p. 729.

28. Before July 2011 officially the semi-autonomous region of Southern Sudan within the Republic of Sudan.

29. For a detailed map of Magwi County, see http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid = 4617/.

30. Interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in English where possible and in Acholi where necessary. The Acholi interviews were transcribed and reinterpreted by a second translator from Northern Uganda.

31. To address concerns about conducting qualitative fieldwork among people whose livelihoods depend on practices that could be considered illegal in a strictly legal sense, the informed decision was made to anonymise all informants who collaborated in this study. Informants were repeatedly informed about the confidentiality of their cooperation, about their right to review the notes and audio recordings, and about the option to withdraw their statements. In addition, data were stored securely and never shared with a third party.

32. Marcus, “Ethnography In/Of the World System.”

33. This accounts for official imports recorded at all official borders including Juba International Airport. Figures are generally unreliable as imports are poorly and inconsistently recorded at most border check points.

34. World Bank/IFC, Doing Business in Juba, p. 14.

35. At the time of writing, oil exports had resumed only days before after a 16-month shutdown initiated in January 2012 as part of a contentious negotiation process between Juba and Khartoum over pipeline tariffs and border demarcation.

36. At the time of writing, oil exports had resumed only days before after a 16-month shutdown initiated in January 2012 as part of a contentious negotiation process between Juba and Khartoum over pipeline tariffs and border demarcation.

37. Before August 2010, Amuru was part of Gulu district and Lamwo was part of Kitgum district.

38. This rough estimate was provided by the GoSS representative for Commerce and Supply at Nimule checkpoint. Official figures are still non-existent.

39. UBOS and BOU, Informal Cross Border Trade, p. 29.

40. Gibana: a local government tax derived from the colloquial Arabic ‘jibu le ana’ meaning ‘give to me’ levied by Magi County officials at the international border with Uganda; Solomon and Bell, County and State Revenue, p. 11.

41. For an account of the challenges faced by Ugandan traders involved in cross-border trade with South Sudan, see Schomerus and Titeca, “Deals and Dealings,” pp. 13–17.

42. Before South Sudan was divided into ten federated states, it was composed of three regions: greater Upper Nile (now Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity states), greater Bahr el Ghazal (now Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes and Warrap State), and greater Equatoria (now Eastern, Central and Western Equatoria state).

43. Meagher, “Hidden Economy,” p. 66; Manger, Trade and Traders in the Sudan.

44. Manger, Trade and Traders in the Sudan; Leopold, Inside West Nile; Titeca, “Tycoons and Contraband”; MacGaffey, Real Economy of Zaire.

45. Twijnstra, “State Patrimonialism and (Un)Productive Entrepreneurship.”

46. Twijnstra, “State Patrimonialism and (Un)Productive Entrepreneurship.”.

47. Titeca, “Tycoons and Contraband,” p. 48.

48. Blundo, “Dealing with the Local State,” p. 806.

49. A term synonymous with SPLA/M membership dating back to its socialist alignment with Ethiopia; Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government, pp. 34–53.

50. Interview conducted in Juba, September 2011.

51. Focus group discussion conducted in Bibia (Uganda), July 2011.

52. Interview conducted in Juba, November 2012.

53. The Citizen Newspaper, March 11, 2012. http://allafrica.com/stories/201203110315.html; Gurtong.net, March 13, 2012. http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/6618/Customs-Exemptions-Affect-South-Sudans-Revenue.aspx.

54. Helmke and Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics,” p. 727.

55. Helmke and Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics,” p. 727; Stokes, “Do Informal Institutions Make Democracy Work?”

56. Selassie, Non-Oil Revenue Study, p. 65.

57. By the time the last revisions were made to this article in October 2013, the situation created by the 2012 customs reforms at the border remained unchanged.

58. Referring to the Crown Agents consultants providing technical assistance to the Department of Customs in Nimule; Department for Internal Development (DFID), Support to South Sudan's Customs Development, p. 22.

59. Interview conducted in Juba, August 2013.

60. Atkinson, “Evolution of Ethnicity Among the Acholi.”

61. Allen, “Flight from Refuge,” p. 224.

62. A general term used to describe the South Sudanese tribes from the Equatoria region including the Acholi, Madi, Bari, Kuku, Kakwa, Mundari, Lugbara and many others.

63. Leopold, “Crossing the Line”; Harrell-Bond et al., “Counting the Refugees.”

64. Finnström, “Survival in War-Torn Uganda.”

65. Allen, “Flight from Refuge.”

66. Evers and Mehmet, “Management of Risk.”

67. Evers and Mehmet, “Management of Risk.”, p. 6.

68. Twijnstra and Titeca, “Everything Changes to Remain the Same?”

69. Interview conducted in Parajok, February 2011.

70. Interview conducted in Magwi, February 2011.

71. Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, Everyday Corruption and the State.

72. Helmke and Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics.”

73. Helmke and Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics.”, p. 729.

74. Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, “New Political Order in the DR Congo?,” p. 40.

75. Bräutigam, “Close Encounters,” p. 449.

76. Meagher, Identity Economics, pp. 83–104; MacGaffey and Bazenguissa, “Traders, Trade Networks and Research Methods,” pp. 12–16.

77. Arop, Genesis of Political Consciousness; Johnson, Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars; Nyaba, South Sudan; de Vries, Facing Frontiers.

78. Meagher, Identity Economics, p. 85.

79. Evers and Mehmet, “Management of Risk,” p. 6.

80. Wood, “Staying Secure, Staying Poor,” p. 455.

81. Twijnstra and Titeca, “Everything Changes to Remain the Same?”

82. Titeca, “Tycoons and Contraband,” p. 49.

83. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, p. 68.

Additional information

Funding

Funding: This work was supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the IS Academy for Human Security in Fragile States Grant [Act number 20683, Contract number DEK0111286].