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Abstract
This article attempts to answer how Burundi has become one of the main troop-contributing countries to international peacekeeping missions. To do this, it examines how the post-conflict political settlement between Burundian parties and external partners has impacted on the decision to deploy Burundian troops in multilateral peace operations in Africa. The authors claim that Burundi's decision to deploy troops, which took place in the midst of an overarching security sector reform, had a temporary stabilizing effect on the internal political balance due to several factors, including professionalization, prestige, and financial opportunities. From an international perspective, Burundi's role in peacekeeping has helped to reverse the image of Burundi as a post-conflict country in need of assistance to that of a peacebuilding state, offering assistance to others who are worse off. These factors taken together have also enhanced the possibilities for the Burundian Government to continue its trend of demanding independence from international oversight mechanisms and political missions, while maintaining good relations with donors, despite reports of increasing authoritarianism and limited political space. The article draws on significant fieldwork, including over 50 interviews with key actors in the field and complements the scarce literature on African troop-contributing states.
Acknowledgments
David Ambrosetti and Gérard Birantamije's fieldwork mobilized in this article has been realized as part of a collective research program, IRENE (Institut des sciences sociales du politique, CNRS/Université Paris Ouest), funded by the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (2011–2014). A first draft of this paper has been presented at the REPI, Université libre de Bruxelles, 14 May 2014. We are grateful to Emmanuel Klimis, Méthode Ndikumasabo, Stef Vandeginste, Barbara Delcourt, and conference participants for the feedback received at this occasion.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. Cunliffe, “Legions of Peace”.
2. Fisher, “Managing Donor Perceptions,” 404–423; Beswick, “Peacekeeping, Regime Security,” 739–754; see also, Wilén, “Hybrid Peace,” 1323–1336.
3. Franke and Esmenjaud, “Who Owns African Ownership?,” 137–158.
4. ICG, “Burundi”, 28 August 2007.
5. Tshitenge Lubabu, “Burundi: l’armée en paix”.
6. Ciza, “Retour des militaires”.
7. Cunliffe, “Legions of Peace”, chapter 5.
8. Vandeginste, “Power-sharing, Conflict and Transition,” 63–86.
9. Saami, “Military Integration in Burundi,” 213.
10. Lemarchand, “Genocide in the Great Lakes,” 5–6.
11. Lemarchand, Burundi, xxii–xxiii.
12. Reyntjens, “Burundi. Prospects for Peace,” 7–8.
13. Saami, “Military Integration in Burundi,” 214.
14. Weissman, “Preventing Genocide in Burundi,” 6.
15. ICG, “Burundi: To integrate the FNL”; Boshoff et al., The Burundi Peace Process.
16. Boshoff et al., The Burundi Peace Process.
17. Remacle et al., L’Afrique des grands lacs: Des conflits à la paix, 11.
18. ICG, “Burundi”, 28 August 2007.
19. Curtis, “The International Peacebuilding Paradox,” 88.
20. See for example: Fisher, “Managing Donor Perceptions,” 404–423; Beswick, “Peacekeeping, Regime Security,” 739–754.
21. UNSC, 1719, 25 October 2006.
22. See for example, Arusha Accords, 2000; Birantamije, La crise de l’Etat, 179–183; Rumin, “Burundi,” 71–72.
23. BBC News, “Burundi Joins Somalia Peace Fforce”.
24. Wilén, “Hybrid Peace”; Alao, “Privatization of Security”.
25. Opening speech of President Pierre Nkurunziza, 20 May 2013 (authors’ translation).
26. In October 2001, Pierre Nkurunziza, the Executive Secretary of the CNDD-FDD, toppled the leader of the movement, Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, and became the new leader of the movement, Nindorera, Le CNDD-FDD au Burundi, 17–18.
27. Lemarchand, Burundi; Chrétien, Le défi de l’ethnisme; Nsanze, Le Burundi Contemporain.
28. Arusha Accord, Protocol III, art. 14, §g; Constitution, art. 257.
29. The Pretoria Protocol; see also Boshoff and Gasana, “Mapping the Road to Peace in Burundi,” 3; Nimubona et al., “The Process,” 145.
30. Interview with a Burundian Brigadier General, Bujumbura, 5 March 2014 and a Burundian Colonel, former member of Etat-major general intégré, Bujumbura, 23 April 2014.
31. Rumin, “Burundi,” 71–114; Johnson, “Les cadres stratégiques,” 7.
32. Nindorera, Le CNDD-FDD au Burundi.
33. Phone Interview with former officer in charge of bilateral cooperation program on SSR in Burundi, 31 October 2012; Interview with an officer in charge of police reform in a bilateral cooperation program, Bujumbura, 2 May 2013.
34. On this point see, Beswick, “Peacekeeping, Regime Security,” 739–754; Wilén, “Hybrid Peace,” 1323–1336.
35. Ngabire et al., “Dossier Contradiction,” 1–8.
36. Ngabire et al., “Dossier Contradiction,” 4.
37. Ngabire, et al., “De l’opinion incendiaire,” 2–3.
38. Boshoff and Frey, “Burundi's DDR,” 44; République du Burundi, Plan d’opérations conjointes; The Defence Minister later creates a General Direction dedicated to the former combatants.
39. The MDRP provided the National Commission for DDR and UNICEF with 79.5 million dollars: 18 months of salary and 600,000 Burundian Francs (375 US$) to support income-generating activities to avoid tensions around this demobilization. There were several volunteers for demobilization from all camps, see Uvin, “Ex-combatants in Burundi”.
40. Commission nationale chargée de la Démobilisation, de la Réinsertion et de la Réintégration des ex-combattants (CNDRR), rapport d’activité 2008.
41. Reyntjens, “Chronique Politique,” 10–11; Rumin, “Burundi,” 88; see also: Jeune Afrique, “Burundi. Bruit de bottes”.
42. Ndayisaba, “Etat d’avancement de la réforme”.
43. Interview with General in Bujumbura, Burundi, 4 March 2013.
44. Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), “Burundi: New Security Measures,” 17,195; ARB, “Burundi: FNL Rapprochement,” 16,976; ICG, “Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue”.
45. ARB, “Burundi: Party Leader under Fire,” 16,929.
46. CIGI, “Burundi,” 4.
47. Interview with a Burundian Colonel, Bujumbura, May 7, 2013.
48. Kron and Ibrahim, “African Union Peacekeepers Killed”.
49. Nitunga, “Quel est l’objectif de l’Exercice,” 4.
50. Kamrava, “Military Professionalization,” 68.
51. Interview with Burundian Colonel, Bujumbura, May 6, 2013; Nindorera, La réforme du secteur, 33; Ndayegamiye, “Les Restructurations Militaires,” 7.
52. Wilén, Justifying Interventions in Africa, 167.
53. UN, S/2007/682, § 48.
54. Belgian Defense, “Engagements de la défense au Burundi”.
55. Interview with Military Officer, Bujumbura, Burundi, 10 May 2013.
56. Williams, “U.S. Army Africa Command Team”.
57. ARB, “Somalia: December Diary,” 17,357.
58. US. Department of State, “African Contingency Operations Training”.
59. Dickinson, “For Tiny Burundi, Big Returns”.
60. US Embassy Burundi, “20th Battalion Graduates from ACOTA”; Globe Newswire, “Northrop Gruman”.
61. See for example: Paroqué and Reyntjens, “Le rôle de la Belgique,” 285–306.
62. Email correspondence with Belgian Military Strategic Officer, 2 August, Brussels, 2013; Belgian Defense, “PPM Burundi”.
63. Interview with a Burundian Colonel, Bujumbura, 6 February 2014.
64. MOU between the Burundian Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Cooperation and Development and the Defence of the Netherlands on the Development of the Security Sector, Hague/Bujumbura, April 2009.
65. This could be compared to Fisher's emphasis on the importance that the image of Uganda as an ally in counterterrorism activities play in donors’ perception, see: Fisher, “Managing Donor Perceptions.
66. Interview with Dutch Officer, Embassy of the Netherlands, Bujumbura, Burundi, 6 March, 2013.
67. Burundi-USA, “La FDN va commencer une formation contre le terrorisme.”
68. Interview with a Burundian Major, Bujumbura May 8, 2013.
69. Interview with a Burundian Colonel, Bujumbura, May 6, 2013; Mbonimpa, “FTX Mashariki salam 2013”.
70. Interview with a Burundian Major, Bujumbura May, 5, 2013.
71. See for example, Licklider, “New Armies from Old”; Simonsen, “Building ‘National’ Armies,” 571–590.
72. Interview with Former Burundian Ministry of Defence, Germain Niyoyankana, 14 December 2011, Bujumbura.
73. Interview with Burundian Minister of Defense, 8 March 2013, Bujumbura.
74. See for example: Tilly, The Formation of National States.
75. Interview with Burundian Colonel, 10 May 2013, Bujumbura.
76. Ambrosetti and Esmenjaud, “Whose Money Funds,” 73–89.
77. Ndayiziga, “Enjeux autour de l’intervention,” 4.
78. Dickinson, “For Tiny Burundi, Big Returns”.
79. Law no 1/13 from 30 July 2013 in the revised general budget of Burundi for the exercise in 2013 under the heading: “Recettes exceptionnelles”, 4; Interview with Burundian General, 4 March, Bujumbura, 2013.
80. Interview with a Burundian colonel, Bujumbura, May 6, 2013.
81. Ndabashinze and Nzosaba, “Burundi: Le gouvernement confirme l’achat”.
82. Law no 1/15 29 April 2006 on the Status of FDN Officers.
83. See for example: “Gitega: le Quartier Somali”; Esbjörnsson, “Vi som bor här”.
84. Interview with a Burundian colonel, Bujumbura, May 5, 2013; Ndayiziga, “Enjeux autour de l’intervention,” 4.
85. Clottey, “AU Envoy Says AMISOM Troop Payments Remain in Arrears”.
86. ARB, “Uganda-US, America's Friend,” 17,027; Fisher, “Managing Donor Perceptions,” 404–423.
87. Curtis, “The International Peacebuilding Paradox”.
88. Wilén, Justifying Interventions in Africa, 165–166.
89. UNDPI, “Burundi Government Expels UN Official”; Le Figaro, “Burundi: départ du représentant de l’ONU”.
90. RFI, “Au Burundi, le gouvernement demande la fermeture du bureau de l’ONU”; Madirisha, “Le Burundi accorde un sursis de 6 mois au BNUB”.
91. Curtis, “The International Peacebuilding Paradox,” 89. On this strategic use of ‘ownership’ in SSR, see: Rayroux and Wilén, “Resisting Ownership,” 24–44.
92. HRW, “You Will Not Have Peace”; HRW, “Closing Doors?”; ICG, “Burundi: From Electoral Boycott”; ICG, “Burundi: Bye-bye Arusha”; Jeune Afrique, “Burundi: la crise politique”; Ndikumana, “Le Burundi s’enfonce dans la crise politique”; Curtis, reference ix.
93. See for example OAG, “Projet de révisions”; Weru, “Alarm over Burundi’s”, and discussions in Rwanda and the Congo; BBC, “DRC Congo Unity Government”; Smith, “Paul Kagame Hints at Seeking Third Term”.
94. Curtis, “The International Peacebuilding Paradox,” 88–89.
95. UNSC, “Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2137 (2014)”.
96. See Cunliffe, “Legions of Peace,” 176–177.
97. Declaration from Russ Feingold, Special Representative for President Obama in the Great Lakes region on the political situation in Burundi, March 2014; Alliance des Démocrates pour le Changement (ADC-Ikibiri), Letter to the UN Secretary General with the topic “Prévention d’une catastrophe humanitaire en perspective au Burundi”.
98. UNDPI, “Burundi Gov’t Expels UN Official”.