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Special Collection: Political ecologies of REDD+ in Tanzania

The bricolage of REDD+ in Zanzibar: from global environmental policy framework to community forest management

Pages 506-525 | Received 28 May 2016, Accepted 09 Jul 2017, Published online: 28 Jul 2017
 

ABSTRACT

The policy framework known as Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is based on the underlying idea of creating economic incentives for forest conservation and CO2 emission reductions. This article explores what happens when REDD+, as a globally conceived environmental policy framework, is translated into practice in Zanzibar. Based on ethnographic fieldwork among actors involved in the policy translation process, the article investigates how these actors receive, interpret and give meaning to the introduction of REDD+. With the concept of institutional bricolage as an overarching perspective, the article engages in a discussion of what factors provide legitimacy to REDD+ at policy level in Zanzibar, and moreover, why certain elements of the REDD+ policy framework are incorporated into practice while others are discarded. The article demonstrates how actors make creative use of the resources available, but only within a spectrum that allows for reinvention of established practices and acceptable ways of doing. The article concludes that although the process of carbon accounting represents a ‘technical necessity’ of the REDD+ policy framework, it lack the legitimacy necessary to become durable. REDD+ in Zanzibar is thus at risk of becoming yet another example of a ‘conservation fad’ – an approach that initially invoked a widely shared enthusiasm, but later was dubbed a failure and abandoned.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to her two supervisors Professors Randi Kaarhus and John A. McNeish for helpful input throughout the writing process. The author wants to thank the audiences of two workshops in Oslo: One on ‘Political Ecologies of the Green Economy’ in December 2014 and another on ‘Critical Institutionalism and Environmental Justice’ in June 2016; as well as three anonymous reviewers for valuable and insightful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Grete Benjaminsen is a PhD Research Fellow at the Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric) at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences.

Notes

1. Swahili for “Conservation of Traditional Forests”.

2. CARE, Proposal for HIMA, 5.

3. The original idea of mitigating climate change through the reduction of carbon emissions from deforestation in the tropics (RED) was proposed during the international climate change negotiations in Montreal in 2005. Later an extra ‘D’ was added to also include forest degradation. The ‘plus’ commonly implies the inclusion also of the enhancement of ‘forest carbon stocks … in developing countries’. Angelsen et al., Analysing REDD+, 381.

4. UNFCCC, “Decision 1,” para 70.

5. See, for instance, Leach and Scoones, Carbon Conflicts in Africa, 25–6.

6. The agreement totaled a potential amount of NOK 500 millions over the next five years. The total budget of the HIMA project was US$ 5,539,175 over four years.

7. CARE International is an international humanitarian NGO with its secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland. The Department of Forestry and non-Renewable natural Resources is from now on referred to as the Department of Forestry.

8. Sills et al., REDD+ on the Ground, xx.

9. Lund et al., “REDD+ as a Conservation Fad,” 124.

10. See, for instance, Angelsen et al., Analysing REDD+.

11. McAfee, “Green Economy and REDD,” 244. See also Fletcher et al., “Questioning REDD+,” 673.

12. See, for instance, Sills et al., REDD+ on the Ground, 423.

13. Lund et al., “REDD+ as a Conservation Fad,” 125, see also Redford et al., “Fads, Funding, and Forgetting”, and Fletcher et al., “Questioning REDD+”.

14. Lund et al., “REDD+ as a Conservation Fad,” 125.

15. Redford et al., “Fads, Funding, and Forgetting,” 438.

16. The 13 months were divided between four stays from April 2011 to April 2013.

17. The meetings and seminars lasted from one to two hours to three days.

18. Eight of these were group interviews, the remaining included 76 individuals, which means that some were interviewed more than once.

19. See, for instance, Lund et al., “REDD+ as a Conservation Fad”.

20. See Benjaminsen, “Between Resistance and Consent,” 387–94 and Benjaminsen and Kaarhus, “Commodification of Forest Carbon,” 7–22.

21. See, for instance, Wedel et al., “Anthropology of Public Policy”; Shore et al., Policy worlds, see also Mosse, Cultivating Development; Mosse, “Anthropology of International Development”.

22. See, for instance, Mosse, Cultivating Development.

23. Cleaver, Development Through Bricolage, 33–50.

24. Ibid., 45.

25. Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind.

26. Cleaver, Development Through Bricolage, 33.

27. Ibid., 34.

28. Ibid., 15.

29. Ibid., 13.

30. The former is a Union institution, while the latter only has jurisdiction on mainland Tanzania. Within these two institutions, the Division of Environment and the Forestry and Beekeeping Division were assigned special roles. From 2012, the task force was expanded to include more sectors, as well as representatives from the civil society.

31. From 2012 he was joined by a second representative.

32. Interview with a representative of REDD+ at Union-level, 28 February 2012, Dar es Salaam.

33. Tronvoll, “Bridging Divided Identities,” 227.

34. The union matters mainly include matters relating to trade, immigration and security. See complete list in Tronvoll, “Bridging Divided Identities,” 228.

35. Myers and Muhajir, “Wiped from the Map,” 669.

36. Interview with senior governmental representative, 22 May 2012, Zanzibar Town.

37. Interview with senior governmental representative, 8 February 2012, Zanzibar Town.

38. Korhonen-Kurki et al., “Multiple Levels, Multiple Challenges,” 97.

39. The complexities involved in monitoring, measuring, reporting and verifying changes in carbon stocks (including leakage) is debated in the literature. See, for instance, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, “Planting Trees to Mitigate,” 62–3; Zhang, “From Externality to Leakage,” 136–7.

40. Interview with UN representative, 28 February 2012, Dar es Salaam. Similar statements were made by other donor representatives.

41. Interview with a representative of UNREDD in Tanzania, 28 February 2012.

42. In comparison, one stack of firewood is sold for more than US$0.5 and the price of a bag of charcoal is about US$5.

43. United Republic of Tanzania, National REDD+ Strategy, xv.

44. United Republic of Tanzania, Population Census, iii.

45. Fagerholm, “Community Values and Benefits,” 34.

46. Chachage, “Environment, Aid and Politics,” 150.

47. The most famous was referred to as Mwinyi Mkuu (the Great Owner/Lord), who was the ruler of the indigenous Shirazi population of Unguja. See Middleton, “World of Swahili,” 42; Sheriff, “Slaves, Spice and Ivory,” 26; Sheriff and Ferguson, “Zanzibar under Colonial Rule,” 116–17.

48. Chachage, “Environment, Aid, Politics,” 150. The British declared Zanzibar a protectorate in 1890. British influence in Zanzibar was however paramount already in the 1870s. Sheriff and Ferguson, Zanzibar under Colonial Rule, 152–3.

49. Nahonyo et al., “Biodiversity Inventory Report,” 42–3.

50. Chachage, “Environment, Aid and Politics,” 150.

51. Ibid., 150.

52. These re-allocations were, however, both highly ‘politicized’ and ‘uneven’, resulting in that a disproportionately large amount of land ended up in the hands of political elites of Post-Revolutionary Zanzibar. See for instance Myers, “Peri-Urban Land Reform,” 274–5.

53. Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, “Forest Act No.10,” 182–7.

54. See, for instance, Burgess and Clarke, “Coastal Forests Eastern Africa,” 71–3.

55. Department of Forestry and Non Renewable Resources, “The Zanzibar Forest Policy,” 8.

56. For the period between 1996 and 2009, Kukkonen and Käykhö, “Analysis of Forest Changes,” 199. In comparison, HIMA sources operated throughout the course of the project with a deforestation rate of 1% per year. See for instance CARE, HIMA Proposal, 1; VCS Project Database, para 1.

57. Kukkonen and Käykhö, “Analysis of Forest Changes,” 199.

58. Owen, “Tackling the Energy Drivers,” 12.

59. Kukkonen and Käykhö, “Analysis of Forest Changes,” 194.

60. Ibid., 193.

61. The coral-rag areas are found in the Eastern part of the islands. The land is locally known as maweni or uwanda. Maweni literally means ‘in the stones’, and constitute rough bushes and soils with coral limestone, while uwanda are open areas of bush and grass, typically sued for animal grazing.

62. Kukkonen and Käykhö, “Analysis of Forest Changes,” 199.

63. Ibid., 199.

64. Shifting cultivation contributed to 34%, fuelwood gathering 20%, wood gathering for charcoal production 17%, human caused fires 9%, timber (for local consumption) 10%, firewood for lime construction 4% and seaweed stick collection 3%, HIMA Project Description, 53.

65. Interview with forest officer, 11 January 2012, Zanzibar Town.

66. Department of Forest and Non Renewable Natural Resources, “The Zanzibar Forestry Policy,” 7.

67. However, if fuelwood and what is termed as ‘indirect environmental benefits’ (such as soil quality improvement, watershed protection, and biodiversity maintenance) are included, forestry has been estimated to account for over 10% of GDP. Department of Forest and Non Renewable Natural Resources, “The Zanzibar Forestry Policy,” 7.

68. See Benjaminsen, “Between Resistance and Consent,” 386–7.

69. See Myers, “Local Communities,” 154–8; Saunders, The Politics of People, 59–62.

70. CARE, HIMA Proposal, 2.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., 7.

73. Leach and Scoones, Carbon Conflicts in Africa, 32.

74. Comment made by senior forest officer during a HIMA stakeholder meeting, 21 April 2011, Zanzibar Town.

75. The argument that rights to resources are ‘secure’ when it is documented on paper has been heavily criticized in the literature. See for instance Peluso and Lund, “Frontiers of Land Control,” 674.

76. Comment made by a member of a Shehia Conservation Committee during a HIMA consultation meeting (REDD Forum) on 1 February 2012, Zanzibar Town.

77. Comment made during a group interview with members of the Shehia Conservation Committee, which is part of the HIMA project, 4 April 2012, Coastal community, Unguja Island.

78. Treue et al., “Does Participatory Forest Management,” 35.

79. Cleaver, Development through Bricolage, 147–50.

80. Kaarhus, Conceiving Environmental Problems, 324–5. See also Ferguson, The Anti-Politics-Machine, 74–88; and Murray Li, Will to Improve, 7–10.

81. Chatterjee, “Development Planning,” 51–52 in Kaarhus, Conceiving Environmental Problems, 324.

82. Department of Forestry and Non Renewable Natural Resources, The Zanzibar Forestry Policy, 11.

83. Similar observations were made by Levine, “Staying Afloat,” 570–1.

84. Interview with forest officer, 10 April 2012, Zanzibar Town.

85. This argument resonates with the Participation in Development literature, see for instance Chambers, Whose Reality Counts.

86. Interview with forest officer, 10 February 2012, Zanzibar Town.

87. Interview with forest officer, 14 March 2012, Zanzibar Town.

88. Interview with forest officer, 13 March 2012, Zanzibar Town.

89. In addition, to the confiscation and redistribution of land, an estimated number of 10,000 (mainly individuals with ‘Arabic’ background) were killed. Thousands also had to flee the country.

90. Interview with forestry official, 11 January 2012, Zanzibar Town.

91. Goffman, Presentation of Self.

92. Cleaver, Development Through Bricolage, 73.

93. Green, “Globalizing Development in Tanzania,” 128.

94. Koch, “Role of Aid Experts,” 7

95. Cleaver, “Bricolage, Conflict and Cooperation,” 33.

96. Lund et al., “REDD+ as Conservation Fad,” 125.

97. Interview with senior forest officer, 11 April 2012, Zanzibar Town.

98. Other activities included supporting tree planting and use of fuel-efficient cook stoves in rural areas.

99. VCS is according to their own website ‘the world's leading voluntary greenhouse gas program …  founded by a collection of business and environmental leaders who saw a need for greater quality assurance in voluntary carbon markets’. Verified Carbon Standard, “who we are” (http://www.v-c-s.org/who-we-are). Accessed April 21, 2015.

100. See for instance CARE, Summary of Carbon Feasibility Study, 3.

101. See for instance Leach and Scoones, Carbon Conflicts in Africa, 25–6.

102. Interview with HIMA staff, 21 February 2012, Zanzibar Town.

103. Leach and Scoones, Carbon Forestry West Africa, 957.

104. Cleaver, Development through Bricolage, 42.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. I also received travel grants from the Nordic Africa Institute and the Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation Research Program funded by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

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