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ABSTRACT
This article explores the failed assassination attempt on the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on 26 June 1996, which allegedly involved logistical and financial support from some elements in Sudanese intelligence. This episode had a large impact on the Sudanese regime, as it encountered massive internal and external challenges that almost led to its downfall. The article examines the implications of the assassination attempt on the regime. It investigates the external and domestic dynamics following the incident and the change of perspective among the government elite in its engagement with the international sphere. The article focuses on the risks confronted by the Sudanese regime, and the foreign and internal policy it pursued to avert catastrophic repercussions. It examines the political, economic, military and security threats that followed, as well as the pragmatic path adopted by the regime to secure its grip on power. For the first time since independence, Sudan was condemned in the UN Security Council as a consequence of the attack, and this ultimately led to regime fragmentation.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. PIAC, 1991.
2. Deterioration took different forms, such as closing the Khartoum branch of Cairo University, the premises of the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation in Khartoum, and the expulsion of diplomats. Egypt annexed the disputed Halayeb triangle in order to provoke the regime in Khartoum.
3. Guardian Weekly, 9 March 1992.
4. Cliffe, Regional Dimensions of Conflict, 98.
5. Interview with Dr. Qutbi Al-Mahdi, June 2003, Khartoum. He was an ex-Sudanese Ambassador to Iran from 1993 to the end of 1996. He was appointed as the director of the National Intelligence agency (1997–2000).
6. On 10 July 1995, Time magazine.
7. Al Jazeera TV, Interview with Dr Hassan.
8. The Sunday Times, 14 April 1996.
9. The names of the three suspects were Mustafa Hamza, Mohammed Siraj, Izzat/or Yassin. Most of those involved used aliases.
10. UNSC Resolutions 1044, 1054, 1070.
11. On 13–14 March 1996, a summit of “peacemakers” on terrorism was held at Sharm Alshaykh, Egypt, co-hosted by President Clinton and President Mubarak, 29 delegations attended the meeting. The summit came in the context of terrorism and the Middle East process.
12. Nmoma, The Shift in United States-Sudan.
13. Niblock T C, Sanctions and Pariahood, 18.
14. The Independent, 28 June 1995.
15. MoFA, the African Affairs Department, Exceeding Multilateral Framework in the Regional and International level, October 27, 1997. In the first meeting, Ethiopia exploited its chair of the OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention and Management to forcibly introduce the issue, thereby violating the Cairo declaration which stipulates the illegality of deliberating on any matter of that kind in the OAU mechanism without the approval of the parties to the conflict. It also ignored the mechanism's regulation that required inviting all parties involved. The meeting was convened without inviting the government of Sudan.
16. Ibid.
17. Nmoma, The Shift in United States-Sudan.
18. The five non-permanent members were out of the council: Sultanate of Oman, Nigeria, Rwanda, Czech Republic, and Argentina – replaced by Guinea Bissau, Egypt, South Korea, Poland, and Chile. Britain took the chair from Russia for the month of January.
19. The resolution was coined by the Egyptian delegation in cooperation with Ethiopia, the US, and Britain.
20. UNSC, 1044.
21. Sudan Update, 24 August 1995.
22. SUNA, Sudan News Agency. Mohammed Ahmed Mustafa Al-Dabi was appointed director of the foreign security organization, replacing Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, Brigadier Al-Hadi Abdallah replaced Gen. Hassan Dahawi as the director of the internal security organization, and Brigadier Bakri Hassan Salih was appointed Minister of the Interior, replacing Brigadier Al-Tayeb Ibrahim Mohammed Khair.
23. The Permanent Mission of Sudan, Report on the United Nations Security Council Resolution Regarding the Ethiopian Complaint, New York, 14 February 1996, 20. At the Security Council Informal meeting with the foreign minister Ali Uthman Taha on 17 January 1996, the US representative to the Council pointed out that the intentions of the Sudanese government to remove the security officials was to punish them for their role in the operation.
24. “In September 1995, the government released Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, the former prime minister, 32 political detainees, and 18 convicts in political cases.” Alhayat, 5 September 1995.
25. UNSC, 1054.
26. Letter dated 24 June 1996 to the chair of the UNSC.
27. The four groups were Egyptians, Afghan Arabs, Usama bin Laden, and Palestinians. The letter reported that 37 Egyptians were deported and a list of them was handed to the Egyptian authorities.
28. Letter dated 24 June 1996 to the chair of the UNSC.
29. He was one of the main organizers of “operation Moses” to transfer the Falasha Jews from the Sudanese territories to Israel requested and coordinated by the American government.
30. Al-quds Al-arabi, 4 April 1996.
31. Some diplomats reported that in an informal meeting with the Non-Alliance Caucus of the UNSC, the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright has reprimanded Egypt, because the proposed resolution (1054) was weak.
32. Mideast Mirror, 3 April 1996.
33. Cliffe, Regional Dimensions of Conflict, 98.
34. Sudan Focus, June/July 1996.
35. Ministry of Social Planning, Humanitarian Affairs Commission.
36. Ibid.
37. The resolution was passed with 13 UNSC members in favor (Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Botswana, Poland, Republic of Korea, Chile, Guinea Bissau, France, Egypt, UK, Honduras and the US), while Russia and China abstained.
38. UNSC, Session 3690.
39. Ibid.
40. UNSC, 1070.
41. Ministry of Social Planning, Humanitarian Affairs Commission.
42. Ibid.
43. Report of the Expert, Mr. Claude Bruderlein.
44. Ibid.
45. Niblock, Sanctions and Pariahood.
46. Speaking before a conference organized by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.
47. The NDA was composed of northern opposition parties such as DUP, Umma Party, the Sudanese Communist Party, Beja Conference, the unions, Alliance Forces, Southern Parties Alliance (which included 6 groups), and the SPLA/M. Northern main political parties (Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party) objected to the transfer of military activities to the north since it denoted confrontation with the Sudanese armed forces, but they endorsed the merger of the military and political efforts.
48. Nmoma, The Shift in United States-Sudan.
49. Sudan Focus, 15 November 1996.
50. According to a report published in the Washington Post, about US$ 20 million in arms and military equipment was to be sent to Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda (10 Nov. 1996). The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, George Moose, reportedly said the armament were intended to assist the three governments “for their own defense”
51. Sudan Update, 27 January 1997.
52. Al-Sudan Al-Hadeeth, 12 January 1997.
53. Ibid.
54. Al-Sudan Al-Hadeeth, 3 February 1997.
55. Sudan Focus, 15 January 1997.
56. Massey Simon, Operation Assurance.
57. The “Political Charter” was signed between the government of Sudan and the SPLA/M, the Nasser group, and South Sudan Independent Movement. Both leaders in the dispute were ethnically different from John Garang, the leader of the SPLA/M -main faction.
58. Interview with a former government official.
59. The Sudanese Embassy in China-Beijing, the Mission Annual Report/1995.
60. Ibid.
61. IMF, Annual Report: 2000, 17.
62. Interview with ex-ambassador Jafaar Hassan Salih, January 2005.
63. The conflict was over Badme, a border territory of 450 Kilometers, but the conflict has other wider economic and political reasons.
64. Africa Confidential, 29 May 1998.
65. The Economist, 8–14 May 1999.
66. MoFA, Letter of H.E Bishop Gabriel Roric.
67. Interviewing Henry Jobe of MSD Pharmaceutical Company, the American who designed the Al-Shifa factory stated, “we didn't intend a dual use for it. We didn't design anything extra in there. The design we made was for pharmaceuticals” – ‘Sudanese Plant Not built for Weapons’ The Observer, August 30, 1998.
68. The factory owned by Salah Idris, a Sudanese businessman close to the governing party.
69. Sudan Update, November 20, 1998.
70. Asharq Al-Awsat, October 24 2004.
71. Interview with Abbas Ibrahim Al-Nour, Dec. 2004, Khartoum. Former Ambassador to Libya from 1990 to 1994.
72. Centre for Sudanese Studies, Halat Al-Watan, 231.
73. The leadership office of the party, the highest authority voted against the pluralism and freedoms framework suggested by Dr. Turabi, the Secretary General, by 11 votes. This decision was expected to be the party decision and direction for the political future, but Dr. Turabi insisted on transferring the matter to the Shura council which he was able to convince to adopt the new political framework by 142 to 94 votes.
74. Mekki, “Tetworat Aldakhil-Alinfraj Alsyasi”.
75. This internal dynamics of the NCP dispute is outside the scope of this article, however; in this part, we will explore the split link to the external dimension.
76. Mahy Aldeen A., Al-Turabi wa Al ingaz, 424.
77. Al-Abdeen A., Maqalaat on Al-Harakat Al-Islamyyah, 10.
78. Ibid, 13.
79. Al-Abdeen A., Maqalaat on Al-Harakat Al-Islamyyah, 22.
80. Bellucci, Islam and Democracy, 172.
81. Hassan, Mazza Yagry Fi Al-Sudan.