http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1261-3982
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ABSTRACT
In spite of a strong preference for African solutions to African conflicts within the African system of states, non-African third parties are frequently involved in mediation in Africa, most frequently in cooperation with African third parties. Yet, the factors that explain the outcomes of non-African involvement remain largely understudied. This article addresses this gap in research through employing a comparative case study between the Naivasha peace process between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and the Abuja peace process between the Government of Sudan and the Darfurian rebels that led to the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006. These cases suggest that non-African leverage coordinated by African third parties enhances the prospects for mediation success, while uncoordinated non-African leverage seems to supplant efforts of African third parties. The phrase African solutions to African challenges should therefore be understood as a division of labour, rather than an excuse for non-African third parties to ignore Africa’s problems or African third parties acting on their own. While African third parties should take the lead in resolving civil wars in Africa, non-African third parties should support these processes by lending additional strength.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
ORCID
Allard Duursma http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1261-3982
Notes
1 Zartman, “Africa as a Subordinate State System”; MacFarlane, “Intervention and Security”; Foltz, “The Organization of African Unity”; Williams, “From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference,” 261; Dersso, “The Quest for Pax Africana.”
2 Zartman, “Africa as a Subordinate State System,” 550.
3 Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict, 279.
4 Khadiagala, Meddlers or mediators, 6.
5 For the codebook, which includes definitions and analytical summaries, on international mediation in civil wars in Africa, see: Duursma, “Partnering to Make Peace.” A civil war is made up of two armed and opposing actors, with one being the government, that have a stated incompatibility.
6 Ibid.
7 De Waal, “Sudan: Darfur.”
8 Massey, “Multi-Faceted Mediation.”
9 Duursma, “Partnering to Make Peace.”
10 On this case study selection strategy, see: Zartman, “Comparative Case Studies”; Duursma, “A Current Literature Review,” 85.
11 De Waal, “Sudan: Darfur,” 305.
12 El-Affendi, “The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process,” 101–32; Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace.
13 Cohen, “African Capabilities for Managing Conflict,” endnote 4.
14 Interview with Mohamed el-Amin Khalifa, Chief government negotiator, in Khartoum, 18 December 2014.
15 Khadiagala, Meddlers or Mediators, 194.
16 Interview with Ghazi Salah al-Din al-Atabani in Khartoum, 7 December 2014.
17 Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, 98.
18 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace, 113.
19 The National Energy Policy Development Group, “National Energy Policy.”
20 Cockett, Sudan: Darfur, 156–61; Duursma, “When to Get Out of the Trench.”
21 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace, 105; Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan, 24–25.
22 Cockett, Sudan: Darfur, 161.
23 Interview with Richard Makepeace, the British Ambassador to Sudan at the time, in Oxford, 7 November 2014.
24 The three other indicators used to assess the willingness of Khartoum to normalise relations with the US were Sudan’s cooperation with the deployment of a Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT), Sudan’s cooperation with a slavery investigation, and an end to aerial bombardments of civilians.
25 Mason, Learning from the Swiss, 15–17; Khadiagala, Meddlers or Mediators, 239.
26 Danforth, “Outlook for Peace in Sudan,” 19.
27 Interview with Ghazi Salah al-Din al-Atabani in Khartoum, 7 December 2014
28 Ghazi Salah al-Din al-Atabani quoted in: Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan, 19.
29 Interview with Jan Pronk in The Hague, 1 June 2015. Pronk was the first chairman of Friends of IGAD.
30 El-Affendi, “The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process,” 583–84.
31 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace, 113.
32 Khadiagala, Meddlers or Mediators, 230–31.
33 Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan, 81, Cockett, Sudan: Darfur, 178.
34 Waihenya, The Mediator, 24; Simmons and Dixon, “The Mediator’s Perspective,” 90.
35 Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan, 113.
36 Simmons and Dixon, “The Mediator’s Perspective,” 25.
37 Interview with Lazaro Sumbeiywo in Addis Ababa, 1 February 2015. See also: Waihenya, The Mediator, 90.
38 Simmons and Dixon, “The Mediator’s Perspective,” 25.
39 Simmons and Dixon, “Reflecting on the IGAD Peace Process,” 30.
40 Martin, Kings of Peace Pawns of War: The Untold Story of Peacemaking, 125.
41 Interview with Sayed el-Tayeb in Khartoum, 8 January 2015.
42 Waihenya, The Mediator, 125.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur, 169.
46 Simmons and Dixon, “The Mediator’s Perspective,” 25.
47 Simmons and Dixon, “Reflecting on the IGAD Peace Process,” 30, Waihenya, The Mediator, 93.
48 Interview with Douglas Johnson in Oxford, 27 February 2015. Douglas Johnson acted as a resource person to the mediation team in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiations over the Three Areas. See: Rothchild, “Conditions for Mediation Success,” 101; Rolandsen, “Sudan: The Role of Foreign Involvement,” 82.
49 Telephone interview with Jason Matus, 26 January 2015. See also: Johnson, “Why Abyei Matters.”
50 Telephone interview with Jason Matus, 26 January 2015.
51 Toga, “The African Union Mediation,” 215–16.
52 Cockett, Sudan: Darfur, 180.
53 Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, 127; Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 179; Slim, “Dithering Over Darfur?,” 815.
54 Powell, “The Crisis in Darfur.”
55 Hamilton and Hazlett, “Not on Our Watch.”
56 Seymour, “Let’s Bullshit!”; Cockett, Sudan: Darfur, 213–18.
57 Interview with Alex de Waal in Boston, 3 September 2014; Interview with Luca Zampetti in Addis Ababa, 4 February 2015.
58 Hottinger, “The Darfur Peace Agreement,” 47.
59 Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, 134.
60 Gelot, Legitimacy, Peace Operations, 79.
61 Lanz, “Sudan/Darfur,” 80; Duursma, “Obstruction and Intimidation of Peacekeepers.”
62 Interview with Abdul Mohamed in Addis Ababa, 17 February 2015.
63 Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur, 2–3.
64 Interview with Hilary Benn in London, 21 November 2014.
65 De Waal, “Darfur’s Deadline,” 270.
66 Interview with Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe in Addis Ababa, 13 February 2015.
67 Brooks, “Enforcing a Turning Point.”
68 On 3 March 2006, AU chief mediator Salim Ahmed Salim instructed his mediation team to draft a comprehensive document on the basis of the bilateral consultations with the conflict parties and plenary sessions that had been held. However, at this same meeting, it was decided to not yet distribute this draft agreement to the conflict parties in spite of donor pressure to do so, as this might derail the peace talks. Interview with Interview with Alex de Waal, adviser to the AU mediation team, in Boston, 3 September 2014. See also: De Waal, “Darfur’s Deadline,” 268; Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 217.
69 Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 218; Toga, “The African Union Mediation,” 241; De Waal, “Darfur’s Deadline.”
70 Interview with Hilary Benn in London, 21 November 2014.
71 Email from Alex de Waal, 27 November 2014.
72 Brooks, “Enforcing a Turning Point,” 428–29; Brosché and Duursma, “Hurdles to Peace.”
73 Interview with Abdullahi El-Tom in Oxford, 22 February 2015. US pressure had also proven ineffective vis-à-vis the government side earlier on in the peace process. Commenting on the threat of sanctions, a senior GoS official reflected that ‘the United Nations Security Council has threatened us so many times, we no longer take it seriously.’ Nathan, “The Making and Unmaking,” 249. Similarly, GoS official Ghazi Salah al-Din al-Atabani reflects that ‘The only carrot the US could provide was not using more sticks, and the only stick would be not using more carrots.’ Interview with Ghazi Salah al-Din al-Atabani in Khartoum, 7 December 2014.
74 A. M. Abuelbashar, “On the Failure of Darfur Peace Talks in Abuja.” Sudan Tribune, 25 August 2006.
75 Interview with Abdullahi El-Tom in Oxford, 22 February 2015.
76 Barltrop, Darfur and the International Community; Srinivasan, “Negotiating Violence.”
77 Email from Salim Ahmed Salim, 14 June 2016.
78 Interview with Laurie Nathan in Basel on 23 June 2016.
79 Interview with Nurudin Azeez, military liaison officer of AMIS to the Abuja peace talks, in Addis Ababa, 17 February 2015; interview with Abdul Mohamed, UN mediator during the Abuja talks, in Addis Ababa, 17 February 2015.
80 Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 211; Toga, “The African Union Mediation,” 39.
81 De Waal, “Darfur’s Deadline,” 273. Confirmed in an interview with Hilary Benn in London, 21 November 2014.
82 Flint and de Waal, Darfur, 211; Toga, “The African Union Mediation,” 239; Duursma, “Mediation with Muscles or Minds?”
83 Mwansali, “From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference.”