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Articles

Local power dynamics and petty corruption in Burundi

Pages 698-717 | Received 17 Mar 2017, Accepted 01 Aug 2019, Published online: 18 Aug 2019
 

ABSTRACT

Based on five months’ field research in two districts of Burundi (Bukeye and Mabayi), this case study analyses tax collectors’ rationales and informal practices during their interactions with citizens. The analysis also examines local governance, in order to understand how informal practices are accepted, legitimised and even supported by local authorities. Field observations reveal a fluctuating balance of power, and the various constraints and room for manoeuvre used by local agents dealing with tax payers. Further, an investigation into tax enforcement provides a basis for measuring the discrepancy between, on the one hand, formal good governance norms and standards of behaviour and, on the other, informal strategies developed by local civil servants and officials. The article demonstrates that corruption is mainly a social phenomenon, far from its formal definition, which generally refers only to the search of private gains. Corruption is systemic and part of the current CNDD-FDD party’s governance framework in Burundi, relying on public administration’s politicisation, solidarity networks and socio-economic factors. More broadly, the article shows that corruption labelling remains topical to spur a State conception and structural changes through ‘good governance’ and anti-corruption norms.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Anders, In the Shadow of Good Governance.

2. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 449–450.

3. Jackson and Köbis, “Anti-Corruption through a Social Norms Lens,” 2.

4. Kubbe and Engelbert, Corruption and Norms.

5. Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel, “Collective Action on Corruption in Nigeria.”

6. Rose-Ackerman and Søreide, International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption.

7. Baez Camargo, Corruption, Social Norms and Behaviours, 9

8. Fisman and Golden, Corruption: What Everyone Needs to Know.

9. Falisse and Leszczynsk, Professional Identity, Bribery and Public Service Delivery.

10. Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild.

11. Mbembe, “Notes from the Postcolony.”

12. Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works.

13. Bayart, The State in Africa.

14. Smith, “Kingship and Corruption in Contemporary Nigeria.”

15. Favarel-Garrigues, La Police des mœurs économiques, 320.

16. Uvin, “Corruption and Violence in Burundi,” 17–20.

17. Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi.

18. Nimubona and Sebudandi, Le phénomène de la corruption au Burundi.

19. République du Burundi, Stratégie Nationale pour la Bonne Gouvernance.

20. Ibid, 72.

21. Courpasson, L’action contrainte.

22. Vokes, “Primaries, Patronage, and Political Personalities.”

23. Communes are the only decentralised entities in Burundi, enjoying the right of taxation. Communes are divided into zones and hills, the latter being represented by elected representatives. Hill’s representatives are under commune’s authority.

24. République du Burundi, Loi n°1-02 du 03 Mars 2016 portant réforme de la fiscalité communale.

25. Holmes, Ndihokubwayo and Ruvakubusa, Pour l’Etat et le citoyen.

26. Mabayi local administrator, official meeting on the evaluation of fiscal mobilisation, 23 April 2015.

27. Interview with a potato seller, Kiziguro market, 4 March 2015

28. Gaynor, “The Tyranny of Participation Revisited.”

29. Leurquin, Le niveau de vie.

30. Hammouda, Burundi: Histoire Economique et politique.

31. Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice.

32. Chretien, Burundi, l’histoire retrouvée.

33. Deslaurier, “Louis Rwagasore, martyr de l’indépendance burundaise.”

34. Hammouda, Burundi: Histoire Economique et politique.

35. International Crisis Group, Burundi: la crise de corruption.

36. The calculation was done six times at the market of Kiziguro, and three times at the market of Rutunguro.

37. Olivier de Sardan, Les normes pratiques, 1. Olivier De Sardan defines a practical norm as ‘informal regulations, de facto, implicit or latent, which underlie actor’s practices and differ from public norms’.

38. Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy.

39. By definition, ‘to pay taxes means paying off a pecuniary obligation, for good and without direct compensation’. See Barilari, Le consentement à l’impôt, 27.

40. Gazibo and Thiriot, Le politique en Afrique, 89

41. Blundo and Olivier De Sardan, Everyday Corruption and the State.

42. Blundo and Médard, “La corruption en Afrique francophone,” 11. Neopatrimonialism corresponds to a situation where the State is structurally differentiated from society, but functions without clear distinction between public and private domain.

43. Brachet and Wolpe, “Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance.”

44. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Bertlsmann Transformation Index, 2018 Burundi Country Report.

45. Blundo and Olivier De Sardan, Everyday Corruption and the State.

46. Crozier and Friedberg, L’acteur et le système, 45.

47. De certeau, L’invention du quotidien.

48. Olivier de Sardan, A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa.

49. Interviews with sellers at Kiziguro market, 5 January 2015.

50. Médard, Clientélisme politique et corruption.

51. Accountant’s interview, Bukeye, 15 April 2015.

52. République du Burundi, Loi n° 1/13 du 09/08/2011 portant révision du code foncier du Burundi

53. As a comparison, in Mabayi the title deed costs 3% of the property price, which corresponds to the official rate. Accordingly, the price applied by Bukeye’s accountant is already a practical norm.

54. Phone interview with accountant’s representative, 12 January 2017.

55. République du Burundi, Stratégie Nationale pour la Bonne Gouvernance et la Lutte contre la Corruption 2011–2015.

56. République du Burundi (RdB), Loi n° 1/12 du 18 avril 2006 portant mesures de prévention et de répression de la corruption et des infractions connexes, 3.

57. Ibid., article 5.

58. Ibid., article 5.

59. Interview with an anti-corruption brigade officer, Muramvya province, 14 April 2016.

60. Nicaise, Évaluation de la performance des collectivités décentralisées.

61. Interview with finance inspector during Bukeye’s financial audit, 10 January 2015.

62. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Bertlsmann Transformation Index, 2018 Burundi Country Report.

63. Phone interview with C. Kamanzi, Muramvya’s financial inspector, 12 August 2016.

64. Baez Camargo, Corruption, Social Norms and Behaviours, 7.

65. Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel, “Collective Action on Corruption in Nigeria.”

66. Crozier and Friedberg, L’acteur et le système, 45.

67. Smith, Culture of Corruption.

68. Rufyikiri, Corruption au Burundi.

69. Uvin, “Local Governance After War.”

70. Jackson and Köbis, “Anti-Corruption through a Social Norms Lens,” 17.

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