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ABSTRACT
Since coming to power, President Museveni has consistently stitched together disparate actors and representatives of divergent constituencies in his ruling coalition. This became especially necessary as his rule grew less popular and more precarious. This article argues that the nature of the ruling coalition reflects the structure of politics and menu of priorities for the incumbent. The political landscape shapes composition of the ruling coalition, which mirrors realignment of social forces, interest groups and balance of power. This article casts a critical spotlight on two phases – 1986–2005 and 2006 to the present – placing coalition dynamics and the 2021 elections in the broader context of the shift in Uganda’s overall political landscape. Drawing on qualitative data sources including elite interviews and newspaper reports, and with specific focus on cabinet appointments, the article shows that electoral calculations and regime survival considerations are the biggest drivers of Museveni’s ruling coalition changes and composition.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the guest editors, the editors of this journal and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and criticisms on earlier versions of this article. The usual caveat applies.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Interview with a veteran journalist, 12 June 2021, Kampala.
2 The Independent, “I Don’t Need Help Choosing Cabinet Ministers – Museveni.” July 11, 2021. https://www.independent.co.ug/i-dont-need-help-choosing-cabinet-ministers-museveni/.
3 Timothy Kalyegira, “Will Museveni Cabinet of Fishermen Deliver?” Daily Monitor, June 13, 2021. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/will-museveni-cabinet-of-fishermen-deliver--3435080
4 Oulanyah served in the position of Speaker for less than a year as he fell ill and passed away in March 2022. He was succeeded by the then deputy speaker, Anita Among.
5 In fact at one point, the top four positions after the president, that is, the Vice President, Speaker, Deputy Speaker and Prime Minister were held by individuals from Buganda and Busoga.
6 See, for example, Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age; Gandhi, Political Institutions; Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian; Yom, From Resilience; Buehler and Ayari, “The Autocrat’s Advisors”; Geddes et al., How Dictatorships Work.
7 Buehler and Ayari, “The Autocrat’s Advisors,” 330.
8 Geddes et al., How Dictatorships Work.
9 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian, 55; Geddes et al., How Dictatorships Work, 65.
10 Roessler, Ethnic Politics.
11 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian; Buehler and Ayari, “The Autocrat’s Advisors.”
12 Buehler and Ayari, “The Autocrat’s Advisors,” 331.
13 Kjaer and Katusiimeh, “Nomination Violence,” 179.
14 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian, 68.
15 Ibid., 65.
16 For example, Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy; Brownlee, Authoritarianism in An Age.
17 Arriola et al., “Democratic Subversion,” 1359.
18 This cabinet dataset is incomplete and therefore not directly reported or cited in this article but its results are part of the empirical discussion.
19 The Observer, “How Muhoozi Rise was Known in 1997.” August 29, 2012. Accessed January 14, 2023. https://www.observer.ug/news/headlines/20646--how-muhoozi-rise-was-known-in-1997.
20 Khisa, “Shrinking Democratic,” 345.
21 Besigye made this argument repeatedly in media interviews and debates, thus his decision not to contest the 2021 elections did not come as a big surprise.
22 Wilkins, et al. “Contextualising the Bobi.”
23 Kjaer and Katusiimeh, “Nomination Violence,” 183.
24 Reuss and Titeca, “When Revolutionaries Grow.”
25 This observation is based on my original dataset of Museveni’s cabinets since 1986.
26 Khisa, “Inclusive Co-Optation,” 98.
27 Interview with a retired senior army officer and former Member of Parliament, 14 June 2021, Kampala.
28 Kjaer and Katusiimeh, “Nomination Violence in Uganda’s,” 184.
29 Interview with a senior retired army officer, a veteran of the Luwero bush war, 14 June 2021, Kampala.
30 Elias Biryabarema and James Akena, “Lawmakers Brawl in Uganda Parliament for Second Day Over Presidential Age Limit.” Reuters, September 27, 2017. Accessed January 14, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-politics/lawmakers-brawl-in-uganda-parliament-for-second-day-over-presidential-age-limit-idUSKCN1C21VI.
31 Khisa, “Shrinking Democratic,” 353.
32 Matembe, The Struggle for Freedom, 26.
33 The Africa Report, “How Kagame and Museveni Became the Best of Frenemies.” October 4, 2019. Accessed 29 June 2021. https://www.theafricareport.com/18087/kagame-and-museveni-the-best-of-frenemies/.
34 Interview with a former senior government official, now an opposition leader, 15 June, 2021, Kampala.
35 Haggai Matsiko, “Divided State House.” The Independent, April 10, 2017. Accessed 30 July 2021. https://www.independent.co.ug/cover-story-divided-state-house/3/.
36 Multiple interviews, May–June 2021, Kampala.
37 Interview with a senior journalist and newspaper editor, 14 June 2021, Kampala.
38 Baker Batte Lule, “Rwabwogo Attack Rekindles Museveni Succession Debate.” The Observer, March 3, 2017. Accessed 30 July 2021. https://observer.ug/news/headlines/51572-rwabwogo-attack-rekindles-museveni-succession-debate.html#comment-2643.
39 Odrek Rwabwogo, “Are Strongmen a Hindrance or Facilitator to Institutional Growth, Successful Political Transition?” New Vision, February 13, 2017 (not published online).
40 K. David Mafabi, “Of Ideology Experts and Ideological Confusion.” Daily Monitor, February 24, 2017. Accessed 30 July 2021. https://allafrica.com/stories/201702240043.html.
41 Ironic because for long Museveni has held animus against the Daily Monitor, often characterising it as an enemy paper yet the paper consistently grants space to pro-Museveni voices. It is also instructive that three of Mr Museveni press secretaries came from Daily Monitor (previously called The Monitor): Onapito Ekomoloit, Lindah Nabusayi and Don Wanyama.
42 Oloka-Onyango and Ahikire, Controlling Consent.
43 Wilkins et al., “Contextualising the Bobi,” 633–5.
44 Ibid., 636.
45 Kjaer and Katusiimeh, “Nomination Violence.”
46 The Observer, “85% of Ugandans Opposed to the Age Limit Amendment – Survey.” December 9, 2017. Accessed 13 January 2022. https://observer.ug/news/headlines/56340-85-of-ugandans-opposed-to-age-limit-amendment-survey.html.
47 See Vokes, “Primaries, Patronage,” 661.
48 In keeping with Museveni’s politics of rewards to individuals who fall out of favour with the electorate, Mr Nsubuga was recently appointed a Commissioner on the Uganda Human Rights Commission, a constitutional body charged with overseeing protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms.
49 Turnover was estimated at more than 60% for the 2011 and 2016 elections. Given the NRM’s big losses in central Ugandan, turnover was likely even higher in 2021. See Agather Atuhaire, “200 MPs Kicked Out.” The Independent, March 6, 2016. https://www.independent.co.ug/200-mps-kicked/.
50 Wilkins et al., “Contextualising the Bobi,” 636.
51 By which I mean a rather charged and uncertain political environment of a young popstar taking on the political establishment with the rallying call of ‘people power’.
52 Daily Monitor, “Bobi Wine Banned from Performing at Music Shows.” October 18, 2017. Accessed 6 November 2021. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/bobi-wine-banned-from-performing-at-music-shows-1722518.
53 Friesinger, “Patronage, Repression,” 137.
54 Ibid, 139. Bugembe previously held the number two position in the ‘Firebase Crew’, Bobi Wine’s music group, and was deputy ‘president’ to self-appointed ‘ghetto president’, Bobi Wine.
55 Bebe Cool has as big a music profile as Bobi Wine, in fact he considers himself, and his fans agree, that he has a bigger music name and pedigree than Bobi Wine. He has been an outspoken supporter of Museveni even after his father, Mr Bidandi, became a key regime critic and opponent of Museveni, running against the incumbent for president in 2011.
56 Recognising music’s power and potency Museveni did tap into Uganda’s legion of music celebrities during the 2016 campaigns, wooing a group of top musicians under ‘tubonge nawe’ (meaning we are with you). He also previously ventured into political performativity and popstar status with a music hit during the 2010/2011 election cycle dubbed ‘do you want another rap’, although criticised, and even sued, for appropriating an Ankole folk chant. To keep with this effort of appealing to the young and appearing ‘cool’, Museveni’s handlers also created and popularised a stage name ‘Sevo’ derived from Museveni, as part of a broader strategy of exciting and appealing to ghetto youth.
57 Although Museveni successfully instrumentalised the fight against the novel virus to his political advantage.
58 Interview with a senior newspaper editor and media scholar, 15 June 2021, Kampala.
60 See Mutibwa, The Buganda Factor.
61 This was what Museveni did with Kadaga’s predecessor, Edward Ssekandi, who went from Speaker to Vice President. Ssekandi fell out of favour after losing his parliamentary seat in the January 2021 elections, making it easy for Museveni to dispense with him. The natural replacement would have been Kadaga, moving from Speaker to Vice President as had happened with Ssekandi but also because Kadaga is the third most senior NRM party leader and would not be expected to hold any position below that of Speaker or Vice President.
62 Daily Monitor, “NRM CEC Drops Kadaga, Endorses Oulanyah for Speakership Race.” May 23, 2021. Accessed 31 October 2021. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/nrm-cec-drops-kadaga-endorses-oulanyah-for-speakership-race-3411244.
63 Quite ironic for the NRM’s third top leader to contest an election as an ‘independent’ running against an official party candidate. Thus the race for Speaker was between two NRM candidates.
64 The Independent, “Museveni Reveals How Kadaga was Edged Out.” May 25, 2021. Accessed 7 November 2021. https://www.independent.co.ug/museveni-reveals-how-kadaga-was-edged-out/.
65 Yasiin Mugerwa, “New Cabinet List Leaks.” Daily Monitor, 8 June 2021. Access 31 October 2021. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/new-cabinet-list-leaks-3429992.
66 Interview with a senior editor at Daily Monitor, 11 June 2021, Kampala.
67 Interview with a senior investigative reporter and editor for Nation Media Group, Uganda, 24 September 2021.
68 Interview with a former journalist, now businessperson, 12 June 2021, Kampala.
69 Interview with a veteran journalist and former editor for Daily Monitor, 29 October 2021.
70 Ibid.
71 Interview with a veteran journalist, editor, and journalism scholar, 29 October 2021.
72 Ibid.
73 In fact in 2005, Kategaya, Matembe and Bidandi were sacked from cabinet after they openly opposed the removal of presidential term limits. In her book, The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy Betrayed, Matembe recounts many incidents in which she confronted the president and strongly disagreed with his positions on issues like corruption, rule of law and accountability.
74 https://twitter.com/mkainerugaba/status/1598722759080968192. See also, Geofrey Serugo, “NRM Cows as Gen Muhoozi Guns it Down.” The Observer, December 7, 2022. Accessed 4 August 2023. https://observer.ug/news/headlines/76108-nrm-cowers-as-gen-muhoozi-guns-it-down.