Concepts of dialogue as counterterrorism: narrating the self-reform of the Muslim Other

Abstract

Since 9/11, the terrorist is often awarded the position of the radical Other: the personified existential threat to the West. The counterterrorism strategy presented by the Danish government describes itself as covering a ‘broad spectrum’ of efforts. It includes an ‘active foreign policy’ in relation to the Muslim world and an ‘active integration policy’ in relation to Muslim migrants. Both inside and outside the nation-state, efforts range from ‘hard power’ security strategies of elimination and control involving military, police and intelligence operations, to ‘soft power’ strategies of information, partnerships and dialogue. This article analyses Danish counterterrorism policy narratives to identify the concepts of dialogue implied and the positions awarded to less-than-radical Muslim Others. This article finds that Muslims might – especially after the Danish Muhammad cartoon affair – in counterterrorism dialogue find a position for talking back, even if it is still a position circumscribed by control and securitisation.

Keywords:

• dialogue
• counterterrorism narratives
• less-than-radical Other
• securitisation
• Muslims

Acknowledgements

This article owes a lot to discussions in a series of fora. An early draft was presented at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and to the Security Programme of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, where comments from Tore Bjørgo, Iver Neumann and Peter Burgess were particularly important. Marie Koch Wegter was most helpful when discussing a later version at the occasion of the 1st Nordic Conference on Research on Terrorism in Copenhagen. Finally, three anonymous reviewers and the editors of Critical Studies on Terrorism helped the article find its final form.

Notes

1. Cf. Gregory (2004) for an inventory of objectifying discursive constructions allowing the West to disregard the lives of Muslim Others in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. Cf. Gad (2011) for an analysis of the peculiar Danish way of arguing for an imperial right to promote ‘universal’ values.

2. Where no official English version of the text is provided, quotes are translated from the Danish by the author.

3. The initiative was only effectively launched to the public years later (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). It was evaluated and adjusted in the aftermath of the Muhammad cartoon affair (Udenrigsministeriet 2006) – the parliament debated the initiative and the evaluation on 24 May 2006. Following a second evaluation process (Skadkaer Consult 2009), the initiative was re-launched (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008, also available in Danish, Arabic and French). The initiative was originally conceived of as closely linked to EU efforts and framed by the presence in the region of parallel American efforts (Regeringen 2003, p. 16), but synergies were soon found to be lacking (Udenrigsministeriet 2006, p. 12).

4. The final report was based on a civil servant report prepared for consultations (Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration 2008). The language and foci of the papers echo EU writing on counter-radicalisation, and the civil servant version explicitly mentions the EU policy (along with UK, Dutch, German and Canadian experiences) as inspiration (2008, p. 23). Parallel to the writing and editorial process, Denmark formally acted as the lead country in the EU's efforts to base de-radicalisation policies on ‘knowledge and research’.

5. In parallel, there is a need for imbuing state authority with Muslim authority by teaming up with Muslim employees in the police force and schools (2008, pp. 39, 44).

6. ‘Oplysning’ literally means ‘enlightenment’, but it may also be translated ‘informing/information’.

7. The description of domestic ‘dialogue and information’ involves that ‘the young people should be made familiar with facts’ via ‘targeted information activities’, ‘information meetings’, ‘information material’, ‘targeted use of the Internet’. But it does also involve that ‘[t]he young people should also feel that they have the opportunity to make their opinion known and that someone is listening – even if they will not always agree’ (Government of Denmark 2009, pp. 15–16).

8. The Danish text has ‘bryde meningsmodsætninger’ [literally: ‘break contrasts of opinion’], where the English text has ‘diminish clashes of opinion’ which could imply a policy of inclusion rather than one of interchange.

9. Marie Koch Wegter, who has hands-on experience with the Arab Initiative from her work in the MFA, intimates to me that the Initiative was always so performed in the Middle East (personal communication, 5 October 2009). A review of the Arab Initiative concludes on the basis of a comparative study of Middle East reform programmes that the relative ‘success of The Arab Initiative may, finally, be ascribed to the egalitarian approach on a series of levels’ (Skadkaer Consult 2009, p. 30). The project comparing Middle East reform programmes focused only on the programme formulations, however, not on how the policies were carried out in practice (cf. Schlumberger 2009). The analytical strategy of the present article does not allow more detailed treatment of this question – only to note that, when talking to parliament, the government formulated narratives of a primarily one-way project for Their reform with the predefined aim of countering terrorism. Hence, the need to explicitly describe how it – post-cartoon affair – is not so, and to present it in a way conveying the impression that it is not so anymore.

10. Ultimately, there was no lunch at all: The proposed ‘support’ to Muslim religious communities was downgraded to ‘dialogue’ in the final version of the action plan (Government of Denmark 2009, p. 25).

11. The contact unit was not included in the final version of the action plan.

12. In contrast to the ‘homo-diplomacy’ suggested by Constantinou (2006), which is a self-reform intended to better facilitate otherness.

13. Not only this or that quality of the Self is put into question; the very capability of agency is at stake: if the Self listens to possible demands of an Other and retracts from this course of action, the Self will have lost the capacity to act altogether – since the same demand is also one of the demands of the radical Other (cf. MP Langballe, DPP, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Møller, Con., 13 April 2004, MP Langballe, DPP, and MP Espersen, DPP, 16 November 2005, 17:40–45, 19:10).

14. On the basis of surveys in Jordan and Egypt, the Minister of Foreign Affairs concedes that ‘the impression of Denmark has changed as a result of the [cartoon] affair. From giving relatively positive associations to a liberal and open-minded welfare society, Denmark is today closely associated with the “West” under the leadership of the USA, which is typically perceived to be cynical and of double moral standards’ (Udenrigsministeriet 2006, p. 13). The conclusion drawn by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to this problem is not to choose a policy of dialogue, however, but rather one of enlightenment: ‘It will take a sustained effort to reestablish a positive image of Denmark with a point of departure in the real [sic] Denmark as a peaceful Scandinavian country’ (2006, p. 14). Even if the final conclusion to the analysis is that ‘living in strict accordance with our own principles will probably be the most efficient lever for the recovery of the trust and credibility in the cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries’ (2006, p. 27), the recommendation highlighted in the executive summary is ‘[t]o make an increased public diplomacy effort to communicate the motives and values for the Danish engagement in the Middle East and to present the Arab Initiative as part of a comprehensive Danish foreign policy for the Middle East which places equal priority on the security political and socio-economic aspects’ (2006, p. 3).